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Abstract 
Despite regular elections, political parties in some weak states have managed to stay 
in power for decades. Many scholars, in trying to explain such party dominance, have 
offered a variety of explanations, ranging from the ability of these parties to control 
the state, manipulate elections, and suppress opposition parties. The current literature 
is however limited in two aspects: (i) it tends to focus on one or a few of these factors 
and rarely takes a more systemic approach to see how they are inter-related, and (ii) 
analyses have been based on limited empirical data. 
This study offers a framework called 'Party domination as a system' and a new set of 
empirical data on the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). It suggests that party 
dominance in a weak state should be understood as a system of interactions that takes 
place among three groups of actors: (i) the dominating forces (the dominant party, the 
state and the elite); (ii) the countervailing forces (opposition parties and donors); and 
(iii) voters. To operationalize the framework, the study conducted extensive fieldwork 
to investigate four areas of the CPP's domination: (i) its control over the state budget; 
(ii) its rural administrative networks; (iii) its off-budget spending on rural 
infrastructure projects; and (iv) its management of decentralization. 
Key to the CPP's dominance, the study found, has been its tight control over the state 
budget and the use of that control to accommodate elite and patronage interests. 
Reflecting the current fiscal centralization, elites at the central level have benefited 
most from such accommodation strategy. However, although there has been limited 
financial resources flowing down to the sub-national and local levels, the party still 
manages to put in place a very strong rural administrative network by ensuring its 
control over rural administrative domains (i.e. local authority) and traditional and 
religious domains (especially the pagodas). 
Off-budget spending is the most fascinating finding. While the formal state budget is 
weak and unable to meet the people's demands, the CPP has devised a shadowy 
mechanism called the Party Working Group (PWG) and assigned key party officials 
to raise their own money to help build rural infrastructure throughout the country. 
Through the PWG, the CPP has been able to send repeated political messages about 
how this former communist party has become more pro-poor, supportive of 
Buddhism, and able to deliver rural development, something that the opposition 
parties have not been able to do. The survey conducted for this study confirms that 
this strategy has worked well, contributing to bigger electoral victory for the CPP. 
The CPP has been cautious not only about popular legitimacy, but also its 
international reputation. In addition to holding regular elections and being able to 
substantially reduce violence during election time, the CPP-led government has 
responded to donor demands, by pushing for various institutional reforms. In doing 
that, however, it has been careful, learning not to let reforms undermine but 
strengthen its control and popular legitimacy. The findings about decentralization 
reform serve as evidence of how the party has done this. 
The CPP's rise has been made easier by the quiescence of most Cambodian voters, 
who, through their experience of wars, have learnt they cannot demand much from the 
state. The weak and young oppositions in Cambodia leave voters with little choice 
other than the CPP. These oppositions, with their limited access to state resources and 
their vulnerability to the divide-and-rule strategies used by the CPP, are unlikely to 
pose any significant threat to the incumbent party in the near future. 
This, however, does not give the CPP much room for complacency, for its continuous 
dominance will depend on its continuous adaptation. For instance, at least 40% of 
voters in the 2008 election did not vote for the party. In addition, from the next 
election on, about half of eligible voters will be those born after the Khmer Rouge, 
which means the Party will need to get ready to deal with a new kind of electorate 
who are more likely to demand more from the state and its leadership. 
Reflecting on the case of the CPP, the 'Party domination as a system' framework is 
very useful, allowing the study to see that a party's dominance rests very much on its 
adaptive and learning capacity which in turns reflects its skill in strengthening its 
controls over the state and elite coalitions on the one hand, and strategically dealing 
with the countervailing force and voters on the other. In so doing, the party needs to 
constantly find a balance between control and legitimacy. 
However, the framework alone is insufficient in generating new understanding about 
the underlying dynamics of dominant party politics. A good in-depth case study is 
also needed to generate new empirical data and contextual factors that shape a parly's 
rise to dominance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Dominant party politics in a weak state 
Political parties are important actors shaping political and development discourses in 
many but not all developing countries. Their roles have long received research attention 
especially since the end of the Cold War (Friedman and Wong 2008a). From an 
academic perspective, political parties have also become a key variable in explaining 
the success or failure of democratization efforts that have taken place all around the 
globe. Parties' significance is even more pronounced within a commonly identified 
regime known as a 'dominant party system.' 
A dominant party system has drawn much interest in recent academic debates (see for 
instance Carothers 2002; Schedler 2006; Brownlee 2007; Reilly and Nordlund 2008; 
Friedman and Wong 2008b; Green 2009; Lindberg 2009). These studies use different 
names when referring to such a political system, including dominant party systems 
(Friedman and Wong 2008a), electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006), and dominant 
power politics (Carothers 2002). Yet, despite the different terms, all these studies are 
referring to a political system which reflects the description provided by Schedler 
(2006:3): 
a regime that plays the game of multiparty elections by holding regular 
elections... yet they violate the liberal democratic principles... so profoundly 
and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather 
than 'instruments of democracy.' 
This study chooses the term 'dominant party politics' or 'a dominant party system' 
partly to reflect its interest in the role of a political party as the central actor and as a 
starting point for discussion. 
Recently, dominant party politics has become the topic of hot debate among academics 
and practitioners working on issues of good governance and democratization. The 
question being addressed is why and how, despite competitive democratic elections, 
some political parties still manage to stay in power for decades (Carothers 2002; 
Schedler 2006; Brownlee 2007; Reilly and Nordlund 2008; Friedman and Wong 2008b; 
Green 2009; Lindberg 2009). This question has been raised for both advanced 
democracies such as Japan, Taiwan and others, and less developed countries such as 
those in Africa and some in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Cambodia (Schedler 2006). 
A few answers are offered in the current literature. A dominant party, some argue, uses 
not one but a combination of strategies to manipulate elections as well as to ensure its 
control (Schedler 2002; Schedler 2006). The skill with which the party employs those 
strategies depends on its power base and its adaptive capacity (Brownlee 2007; 
Friedman and Wong 2008b). However, the party cannot rely on measures of control 
alone. Being in power also demands that it establish a certain amount of legitimacy 
(meaning 'the rights to rule') in the face of the people and the international community 
(Schedler 2009) (The concept of legitimacy is explained in more details in section 2.4). 
Thus, to be dominant, the party needs to have both control and legitimacy. These two 
elements or factors are complementary to the party's ruling, but at a certain point, they 
can also lead to trade-offs, meaning more control might lead to less, not more 
legitimacy (Schedler 2009) (The concept of 'trade-off is spelled out in section 2.2). 
What has already been learnt is very insightful and aids in further understanding of 
dominant party politics. The gap, however, is that the existing literature is still broad 
and its explanations lack depth with regards to the causal mechanisms which help 
elevate and sustain a dominant party. There are a number of reasons for this lack of 
depth in the existing literature. First, most existing studies tend to focus on the roles of 
elections in such a political system and see the dominant party as just an explanatory 
factor of why elections have not managed to have a new party coming to power. These 
studies, expectedly, tend to fall short not only in explaining the dominant party and its 
strategies, but also in capturing what is called 'extra-electoral elements' which need to 
be understood in order to explain the persistence of a non-democratic regime (Snyder 
2006; Whitehead 2008). 
Generating new insights about dominant party politics requires a more in-depth 
understanding of the contexts in which such a party wields its power. Some good case-
studies exist which attempt to capture such contextual dynamics (see for instance the 
cases of Japan (Scheiner 2006), Mexico (Green 2007), and other countries such as 
Singapore, Malaysia and South Africa (Friedman and Wong 2008a)). However, more 
effort is still needed to generate new empirical evidence so as to generate a new 
analytical framework and new explanatory variables, rather than exhausting the same 
pool of data and attempting cross-country comparisons. 
Another gap in the literature lies in the limited attempts to apply a dominant party 
perspective to the study of politics in developing countries dominated by a single party. 
For instance, Schedler (2006) provides a list of countries which are said to be ruled by 
dominant parties: six in the former Soviet Union, four in North Africa and the Middle 
East, eleven in sub-Saharan Africa, and three (including Cambodia) in South and East 
Asia. Yet, it is noted that many of these regimes have not been systematically studied, 
nor have answers been sought as to why and how those parties still manage to stay in 
power for so long. 
This study does not mean, however, to say that politics in developing countries has 
been little researched. On the contrary, many studies have addressed this issue1. The 
limitation, however, is that those studies tend to approach the subject by focusing more 
on those countries' journeys toward democracy. Despite decades of the 'third wave' 
democratization, many countries still have a dominant party in control. This has led 
various scholars to argue that, probably, now we should stop trying to understand these 
regimes in terms of their transition to democracy, but instead in terms of the dynamics 
that explain their existence and persistence (Carothers 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002). 
Two bodies of literature are often drawn on when studying a developing country's 
politics: the first deals with neo-patrimonialism (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; van de 
Walle 2006), and the other examines weak or fragile states (Brinkerhoff and Johnson 
2009; Oosterom 2009; Porter et al. 2010). Briefly, neo-patrimonialism is a concept used 
to describe a governance system characterized by a mix between legal and rational 
bureaucracy on the one hand, and patrimonialism on the other (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1994). 
According to Weber, in a pure patrimonial administrative system, a government office 
is treated as a type of income-generating property, and the holders of the positions do 
not follow state rules to carry out their administrative responsibilities. This is in 
contrast to a rational-legal system of public management which is characterized by a 
graded hierarchy, proper documentation, salary scale, rule-based, and political 
1 See for instance www.gsdrc.org for a wide range of governance research topics focusing on a 
developing country context. 
neutrality (Weber 1947, Quoted in Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002:5-7)). Many 
countries have officially adopted a rational-legal administration, yet patrimonial rule 
still continue to co-exist with, and suffuse, rationale-legal institutions. This kind of a 
hybrid system is called 'neo-patrimonialism' (Bratton and van de Walle 1994). 
The key similarity between neo-patrimonial concept and that of weak and fragile states 
is that both bodies of literature emphases the weak governance structure of many states 
in developing nations. A weak, fragile state, it is argued, has a number of key 
characteristics: the formal state structure and bureaucracy are weak and patronage 
networks are prevalent. Such patronage seeks rent from the state, which in turn makes 
the latter unable to meet its most basic functions including provision of security, public 
services and rule of law (van de Walle 2005; Scott 2007). 
While recognizing that the phenomenon of dominant party politics does exist, literature 
on neo-patrimonialism and weak states seems to be less insightful in explaining it. 
Scholars have only come up with the broad conclusion that a developing country is 
poor because its state is weak, patrimonial practice and the associated corruption are 
rampant, and the leadership has no political will to address these challenges (van de 
Walle 2006). By implication, these scholars fail to see the political and governance 
landscape of the countries under study from the perspective of the rulers themselves. In 
other words, they fail to capture the holistic and systemic picture of the way in which a 
dominant party rules a country. 
In a dominant party system, this study will argue later, patronage and its associated 
corruption, while working to enrich certain individuals and their groups, is also 
instrumental and serves as one of the bases of power of the dominant party itself. 
Therefore, as some scholars have recently argued, by just concluding that patronage is 
undesirable and bad, the current literature does not take us far and deep enough to 
really comprehend what is going in a developing country's politics (Unsworth 2010). 
Talking about a developing country's politics, another important literature is that on 
democracy and democratization. In modern times, there is no one generally accepted 
definition of democracy although the main features include free competition among 
political parties, periodic elections, and respect for the fundamental freedom of thought, 
expression, and assembly (Diamond 1999). Many developing countries now hold 
regular multi-party elections as a way to show that they have actually embraced the 
notion of democracy and gone through democratization process. However, elections in 
many of those countries have been manipulated and other non-electoral rights have not 
been respected. Consequently, what so-called third wave democratization has produced 
are varieties of hybrid democratic regimes (Diamond 1999, Carothers 2002, Lindberg 
2009). 
These hybrid political systems have been called by different names, including 'semi-
democracy,' 'virtual democracy,' 'electoral democracy,' 'pseudo democracy,' 'illiberal 
democracy,' 'semi-authoritarianism,' 'soft authoritarianism,' and 'electoral 
authoritarianism' (Levitsky and Way 2002). One assumption is that, to different 
extents, these regimes have been moving in a democratic direction. Empirical evidence, 
however, suggests differently: some have become more democratic ( Mexico, Senegal, 
Taiwan), some even less democratic (Azerbaijan, Belarus), and some others either 
remained stable or moved in different directions (Malaysia, Russia, Ukraine, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe) (Levitsky and Way 2002). 
The evidence has led some scholars to suggest that, a new way to understand these 
diverse types of illiberal democratic regimes is to get beyond studying politics through 
the prism of democracy (for instance, see Carother 2002, Snyder 2006, Lindberg 2009). 
These scholars propose that these regimes should neither be seen as democratic nor in 
transition to democracy, but as 'authoritarianism' with adjectives, for instance, as 
'electoral authoritarianism' (Levitsky and Way 2002) or 'competitive authoritarianism' 
(Snyder 2006). One key implication from this shift in thinking is that, rather than trying 
to understand whether and how elections have led to democracy, scholars should try to 
better understand these regimes for what they are and focus more on what Snyder 
(2006) calls their extra-electoral factors. 
This study wishes to join this new debate by trying to better understand the non-
democratic regime in Cambodia under the domination of the CPP. To do that, the study 
uses a case study approach, taking the dominant party in Cambodia as its case. Rather 
than relying on the existing pool of empirical data, extensive fieldwork was conducted 
to collect new evidence to test the new framework which can help us to understand 
dominant party politics in a more systematic, empirical-based manner. The following 
section introduces the case and provides justification for its selection. 
1.2. Dominant party politics and a weak state in Cambodia 
Cambodia is located in Southeast Asia, bordering Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. 
Covering 181,035 kilometer squares, Cambodia currently has a population of about 
13.4 million, growing at 1.54% per year, divided almost equally between men and 
women. More than 80% of the people still live in rural areas, and the country's 
population is rather homogenous ethnically. About 96% of the popular are Buddhist. 
The country is currently ruled through a Constitutional Monarchic system; the National 
Parliament is elected every five years, and a Prime Minister is elected from the winning 
party (Chandler 2008; Blue et al. 2009). 
Cambodia has a long and interesting history, with many ups and downs. It was once an 
empire but then got invaded by its neighboring countries, colonized by the French, and 
more recently, plunged into genocide and protracted civil wars. The country's history is 
dated back to before the 1st century. At that early time, the country as a political entity 
was influenced by Indian culture, although the Indian caste system was not adopted 
(Chandler 2008: 27). Then came the Angkorian period which lasted from about 802 to 
1431 AC. This period is generally seen as the glorious past of Cambodia (Chandler 
2008). At its height, the Angkor Empire at times stretched and ruled over parts of 
modern-day Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar and Malaysia (Chandler 2008). 
After Angkor, beginning in the 14th century, Cambodia started to fall and went through 
various dramatic and chaotic events. These events included the moving of the Capital 
from one place to another, the shift to Buddhism, internal conflicts and repeated 
invasions and interference by the strengthening neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam. As a 
result, during this period, Cambodia's land had been shrinking significantly. Also, 
during this period, until the arrival of the French in 1863, what can now be called 
government was in essence personal networks through which the Kings would grant 
titles, wield authority and use his discretion to extract rents from those considered as 
coming under his patronage in exchange for their loyalty (Chandler 2008: 130-6). 
Under almost 100 years of French colonization, some forms of bureaucratic system was 
brought in, mainly to serve French tax collection purposes. The imposed bureaucracy at 
the time allowed the state to reach further into the society and become closer to the 
peasants. It was also during this period that one started to see Cambodian peasants 
playing more roles in Cambodian politics (Chandler 2008). The French-imposed 
6 
bureaucracy, however, did not make the more traditional ways of administration 
disappear. Instead, the practices of patronage and their associated social values 
persisted, transformed and were mixed with the newly introduced system. The hiring of 
Cambodian civil servants to work for the French had also extended existing patronage 
closer to and extracted resources from the peasants (Chandler 2008: 173-4). 
Figure 1: Cambodia map, the ruling party, and conflicts 
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Prior to the French colonization, the reach of the state to its peripheral territory had 
been limited. During that time, people lives were largely limited to the boundary of 
their villages, with very limited interaction with outsiders. The transformation to 
colonial administrators however changed the dynamics of village lives partly buying by 
brining into more contact with outsiders, including the state (Marston 1997:77). 
Cambodia obtained its independence from France in 1953, and adopted a constitutional 
monarchy. In 1955, King Sihanouk abdicated the throne to join politics. He won the 
election and created a regime called Sangkum Reast Niyum (Society of the People). 
That victory signified the political rise of the now Prince Sihanouk and allowed him to 
2 Source: www.thecpp.org.kh 
3 Source: https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html. visited date: 
December 8, 2010 
4 Source: www.flickriver.com 
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dominate Cambodian politics for the next fifteen years. During the Sihanouk period, the 
outreach of the state to the people was still limited. The state hierarchical mechanisms 
were limited down to only the district level, nevertheless. As Marston observes, "If 
there were relatively few pyramidal links by which the grass root population linked to 
the upper echelons of power, Sihanouk's use of television and practice of giving 
speeches for mass audiences throughout the country, meant that the general population 
may have felt a greater symbolic link to the top of the pyramid than it ever had before" 
(Marston 1997: 80). 
Prince Sihanouk's style of personalized power was very obvious. He used to say 'I am 
the State.' He was also very intolerant of dissent and tended to identify his opponents 
with foreign powers (Chandler 2008:231-240). The methods used by Prince Sihanouk 
to rule the country, together with his mishandling of Cambodia's position during the 
Cold War and the Vietnam War, placed his regime in jeopardy (Chandler 2008:231-
240). Sihanouk's regime came to an end with a coup staged by his general, Lon Nol, 
who was supported by the United States. The personalization of power, the widespread 
use of patronage which bred rampant corruption quickly came to characterize Lon 
Nol's regime, all of which led to his defeat by the Khmer Rouge in 1975. 
The Khmer Rouge plunged the country into its darkest age with its radical 
revolutionary ideas. Money, markets, formal education, Buddhism and other forms of 
religious practices, the freedom to dress, express oneself and move around, as well as 
family life and other so-called 'feudal institutions' were all abolished. The Khmer 
Rouge period turned Cambodian upside-down (Chandler 2008:255-76). During the 
Khmer Rouge period, the old administrative systems were radically replaced by 
agricultural cooperatives whose three members were holding real power. Outsiders 
were often brought in to rule specially to break down local-bonds of loyalty and 
patronage. The monkhood and even family networks were undermined (Ledgerwood 
and Vijghen, 2002:119). Yet, the Khmer Rouge brought in a new face of patronage in 
which patrons exercised their power in extreme ways, such as control of food and brutal 
violence (Thion 1993). 
The Khmer Rouge regime, along with the Cambodian war legacy, also had other 
significant institutional and psychological impacts on Cambodia and her people. In the 
face of security threats from the unrest, Cambodian people have even stronger needs for 
a patron to provide them with security protection and economic benefits. The issues of 
security left people with limited choices in buying into relationships with a patron. This 
also might mean that the level of coercion is also high in the relationship. Oppression 
and security threats have been used as a means to demand loyalty from clients 
(Chandler 1996: 317). 
The Khmer Rouge regime promoted suspicion of one another, even within a family 
(Boyden and Gibbs, 1997:102), for instance, a son reported to the Angkar about his 
father stealing a chicken and had him killed. Also, in the regime, strangers were 
brought in to control a village, which made the feeling of distrust even deeper. These 
effects are significant for an entire generation of people. Hope lies with younger 
Cambodians (who were born after the Khmer Rouge period) especially those who have 
a high level of education and are less affected by the memory of wars, and yet, well 
reminded about the mistakes the leaders in the past have made to bring this country into 
such a tragedy. 
The 'killing field' regime was toppled by the Vietnamese army accompanied by the 
United Front for National Salvation, later on known as the Cambodian People's Party, 
or the CPP, in January 1979. Civil wars continued until 1993 when a U.N sponsored 
election was held. The CPP lost the 1993 election but managed to win an increasingly 
larger margin at the subsequent elections (Chandler 2008). From then on, Cambodia 
was increasingly controlled by the CPP. 
The CPP is the dominant party that this study will focus on. Its emphasis is on the 
party's ruling from the introduction of democratization in 1993 onward. But, first, what 
defines a political party as dominant? The existing literature answers this question by 
looking at whether the incumbents have surpassed power and longevity tests. In a 
parliamentary system such as Cambodia's, dominance is identified in term of seats 
controlled by the party. But the number varies a lot - from a simple majority to 75%. In 
latest work in which dominant party politics was defined, Green (2007) argues that a 
simple majority is sufficient for a party to be called dominant. According to Green's 
classification, the CPP can easily be called a dominant party. Since 1993, the CPP has 
won more than 50% in three of the four elections. In the last election in 2008, it won 
more than two thirds of the seats. 
A dominant party must also pass the longevity test. On this topic, Greene argues that if 
a party wins more than four consecutive elections, or has been in power for more than 
20 years, it can be called a dominant party. The CPP, which so far has won only three 
consecutive elections, has in practice been in power since 1979, that is, about 30 years. 
With its current strengths, it is unlikely that the party will lose in the next election (to 
be held in 2013). Therefore, the CPP is also argued to pass the longevity test. Trying to 
fit Cambodia into the power survival and longevity test is a useful categorization 
exercise. It is not, however, as telling as looking into the history of the party's journey 
to dominance itself. 
Cambodia adopted democracy as its formal political system when the United Nations 
helped arrange the first national election in 1993. At the time, the CPP, after ruling as a 
communist party for more than a decade, lost the election to the Royalists. With this 
historical fact, one can say that the CPP is a party that has lost and won back power. 
Yet, even such an obvious statement is debatable, for while it lost in 1993, it did not 
lose much of its real influence and control over the state apparatus and resources 
(Roberts 2001). 
The post-1993 election period was dominated largely by power sharing and a 
compromise between the CPP and the Royalists. The sharing did not go well and 
resulted in internal fighting in mid-1997, (some called it a coup by the CPP), which led 
to the overthrow of the Royalists and their subsequent political downfall. The CPP 
rushed to take the next election in 1998 and began its power consolidation. Presently, 
the CPP has become very dominant over the public sphere including the legislature, the 
executive, the bureaucracy at various levels of government, the judiciary, and the public 
media. With that dominance, it casts a considerable shadow over private interests and 
the market as well (Adler and Craig 2010). 
The Royalists on the other hand had become weaker, due partly to intra-party power 
competition and mismanagement, and partly to the CPP's constant interference and 
divide-and-rule strategy. In the last national election in 2008, the Royalists won only 
two seats, a devastating result which eventually forced Prince Ranaridh, who had 
headed the party since 1993, to resign from politics altogether. The only noticeable 
challenger to the CPP now is the opposition party called Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) 
which currently holds 25 of 113 seats in the parliament. This party too has become the 
target of constant interference from the CPP (Blue et al. 2009; Thayer 2009). 
The CPP, from the foregoing discussion, can be classified as a dominant party which in 
turn makes Cambodia a country with dominant party politics. In addition, Cambodia 
also falls into the category of a weak state, the definition of which was presented in 
section 1.1. The country has suffered civil wars since the 1970s and it was only in 1998 
that it was for the first time free from armed conflicts. Such conflicts, which continued 
for decades, left Cambodia in ruins. 
The state was virtually absent when the CPP came to power in 1979. From 1979 to 
1989, when running the country, the CPP's priority was on fighting and resisting the 
return of the Khmer Rouge and other resistance groups including the Royalists. At that 
time, the regime was surviving in complete isolation from the international community 
(Gottesman 2003). In 1993, the political landscape changed. The international 
community intervened and arranged a national election which the CPP lost. At this 
point, resolving conflicts was also the key priority of the donors who came to help. It 
was within this atmosphere of conflicts and competition over power and resources that 
the CPP managed to find its way back to power. 
In terms of governance, Cambodia faces similar challenges as in many other developing 
countries. First, corruption is high. Under the CPP, with more resources available in the 
economy, patronage has become prevalent throughout the state, penetrating all levels of 
government. Government ministries, and the resources within their reach, have in a way 
become domains under the control of a few key people in the leadership ranks, who 
themselves play the role of patrons to those below, and of clients to those above. All 
together, Cambodia's state apparatus gets mixed with patronage relations consisting of 
many chains of mutual interests and kickbacks (Pak et al. 2007). 
Another characteristic which places Cambodia side by side with many poor African 
countries is its high aid-dependency. In the period 1992 to 2009, Cambodia received 
USD9.79 billion in foreign aid (RGC 2010a). Most of this money has been increasingly 
allocated to high priority sectors including health, education, agriculture, and rural 
development. But a large portion of that money (about 25%) has also been spent on 
technical assistance and the hiring of international consultants (CDC 2007). Given the 
money and technical assistance they provide, donors have themselves constituted 
another pole of power, interacting with other domestic social forces including civil 
society and political parties. Donors in Cambodia also experience similar problems of 
aid-ineffectiveness identified in other countries, including the issue of recipient 
ownerships, aid alignment and harmonization (CDC 2007). 
Besides being a weak state, Cambodia is also a Southeast Asian (SEA) country. In this 
regard, despite its geographical location, Cambodia has rarely been compared 
systematically with other SEA nations. The main explanation for this lack of attention 
is that Cambodia has been too under-developed compared to these other regional 
nations including Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. From 
the 1970s to the 1990s, when these countries were rapidly industrializing and gaining 
wealth, Cambodia was trapped in civil wars, genocide, and was under the controversial 
occupation of Vietnam. It is therefore not surprising that scholars, quite correctly, tend 
to throw Cambodia into another research basket, i.e. the post-conflict category. 
However, it is argued by some Southeast Asian scholars (Vatikiotis 1998; Case 2002; 
Case 2006) that it is not just economic development and the level of modernization that 
make countries in this region comparable. At the core of political and economic 
changes in these countries, they argue, the nature and dynamics of elite-elite and elite-
mass relations are central in characterizing state-society relationships. These scholars 
also emphasize the importance of culture in shaping political and development 
outcomes of the country, and more importantly, the kind of legitimacy expected by the 
people and the legitimization likely to be taken. This suggests that Cambodia should no 
longer be excluded from the study of Southeast Asia. 
1.3. Dominant party politics in Cambodia - Four early 
observations 
Within the broader political context described above, this study makes its exploratory 
journey, starting with four early observations about the CPP and its political strategies. 
These observations were made when I was working as a researcher on governance 
issues in Cambodia from 2003 to 2007. 
Observation 1: The CPP's changing electoral strategies and appeals: The first 
observation relates to how the CPP adapts to electoral politics. As in many other 
democratic countries, political parties in Cambodia go through electoral competitions to 
win power. In winning such a competition, it is observed that the CPP has changed its 
strategies over time, shifting from the more violent and intimidating to the 'softer' and 
economics-related strategies such as vote buying, administrative surveillance, and 
various forms of co-optation (Un 2005). This is an interesting observation but what is 
still unknown, however, is the more concrete pieces of empirical evidence of 'how and 
why' such strategic changes have been happening. 
In shifting to softer strategies, the CPP has used a political movement wherein party 
officials, especially those at the higher level, have been travelling the country to help 
build schools, roads, irrigation schemes, and pagodas, and to give handouts to rural 
people. The Prime Minister Hun Sen is most active in this movement. According to a 
report released by his Cabinet just three months prior to the July 2008 election, from 
1995 to 2008, 3,030 schools were built by him or in his name. In addition to schools, 
the Prime Minister has also mobilized resources from different 'donors' (soboroschun, 
in Khmer) to build rural roads, irrigation and pagodas. All this, the report stresses, has 
been done with 'his wisdom and innovative application of culture or the art of sharing 
with each other' (Cabinet of Prime Minister, 2008). 
The infrastructure building by the CPP is well known in Cambodia. During the 2008 
campaign, as in other campaigns since 1997, the Prime Minister was featured daily on 
television and in other media reading out locally-sourced lists of requests for 
construction projects; these lists capped off by the triumphant, authoritative and 
impressive proclamation 'Choun tam samnom-por\ which literally means 'Granted 
according to your request.' 'Choun tam samnom-por' has become so popular that it is a 
cliche used in humor on radio and television, and even between children playing 
together. Moreover from these TV broadcasts, people started to see that it is not just the 
Prime Minister who made such contributions; many high ranking officials and business 
people with CPP connection have also participated and contributed. 
Observation 2: The CPP's control over the state budget and managing budgetary 
reform: My early observation was that the CPP's support for rural infrastructure was 
done mainly off the formal state budget, meaning that it was neither financed nor spent 
according to the regular, annual state budgeting process and system. That knowledge 
prompted me to ask another question: Why has the CPP, including the Prime Minister 
and other senior officials, spent off-budget money to support rural development? Why 
have they not used the formal budget money? These questions led me to study in 
greater depth the formal budgetary management and reform in Cambodia. 
From my early observations, I also learned that the Cambodian budget is small. The 
domestic revenue per capita was around US$75 in 2008 (for a population of about 13.5 
million). For the purpose of public service provision, a significant amount of foreign 
aid has been received: foreign aid per capita in 2008 was more or less the same as the 
government's revenue per capita for the same year. The donors have helped the 
government to reform its budgetary system, but progress has been slow (World Bank 
and Asian Development Bank 2003). With this additional information, I questioned 
whether it is the small budget and slow reform which has prompted the CPP to use the 
off-budget channel to support rural development. 
Observation 3: The CPP's building of rural administrative networks: While the 
CPP-led government was slow in reforming the state institutions, specifically the 
budgetary system, it was noted that the party has been quite effective in expanding and 
tightening its own administrative networks at sub-national level. The party, for 
instance, is said to have been active in strengthening its provincial, district and 
commune branches and tightening its village level control. The recent CPP report 
shows that it now has about 5 million registered members (CPP 2010)5, and that it has 
been vigorous in mobilizing people to become members and vote for the party. 
Moreover, the CPP has even created the sub-village (called 'group ') level. This specific 
observation gives me an impression that the CPP is not a loosely run organization, but 
one that is quite strong and solid, administratively. It is also noted that the party has 
given a substantial amount of attention to rural areas, considering that level as its power 
base. Whenever a party official, who in most cases is also a government official, makes 
a visit to a rural area, it is said in Khmer that 'he goes down to the base.'' This 
observation raises another question: How does a party whose government is criticized 
for being weak and slow to reform come to be so apparently effective when it comes to 
its own administrative organization? 
5 This does not mean all of the 5 million people vote for the CPP. Instead, the registered members mean 
those who were given a party card. 
Observation 4: The CPP's pushing and managing of decentralization reform: The 
local administrative structure relates to another observation which is about 
decentralization reform, first started at the commune level in 2002. The commune 
elections in 2002 meant that the CPP's appointed commune chiefs would be replaced 
by those elected by the people. When the government/CPP announced about the 
elections in 2001, some scholars of Cambodian politics, knowing that the local level is 
the key to the CPP's power base, were skeptical about the seriousness of such 
announcement. 
The CPP surprised the skeptics by pushing for the local elections in 2002 and then 
again in 2007. In mid-2009, the CPP-led government took the reform even further, 
decentralizing not just the commune, but also district and provincial levels. Although 
still at an early stage, the reforms at the district and provincial levels can become much 
deeper and more controversial compared to those introduced at the commune level. 
This new stage of reform, by design, will involve taking away more resources and 
authority from central ministries. The question is why the CPP has agreed and managed 
to push decentralization ahead. 
1.4. Research questions and proposed approaches 
The four early observations are seen as different pieces of the puzzle about the CPP's 
domination strategies which this study attempts to solve and see how they all fit 
together. Based on the case of the CPP, the study also attempts to draw some theoretical 
lessons as contributions to the broader literature. With this, the study proposes its 
central research question as follow: 
How has the CPP managed to stay dominant in Cambodia? 
By asking the question 'how,' this study is explicitly interested in discovering and 
explaining the mechanisms by which such dominance has been achieved. To 
understand the CPP's domination strategies, this research pursues further inquiries into 
the four observations stated earlier. Each will be studied not separately, but in ways that 
can bring them together to identify a pattern to explain the CPP's dominance. Thus, the 
questions about the four observations become not separate questions, but sub-questions 
to the central question. Those sub-questions are: 
• How has the CPP managed the state budget and its reform? 
• How has it built its administrative networks? 
• How and why has it provided off-budget support for rural infrastructure? 
• How has it approached decentralization reform? 
To understand the dynamics of dominant party politics in Cambodia, this study uses the 
following approaches. First, the study proposes to study the CPP's dominance as a 
system with its own dynamics. It seeks to identify key actors, factors and relational 
elements that constitute the state of dominance itself. From what is already known, 
those actors might include the party, the state, the elite and their networks of patronage. 
Some key factors might include control over state resources, elite coalition, and 
electoral performance. Within this system of dominance, these actors interact with one 
another, seeking to benefit from relevant factors within a given context. Chapter 2 will 
have more to say about this analytical framework. 
Second, this study seeks to better understand, but not to judge, what the CPP has done 
to become dominant. Of course, some of the study's findings will involve stating some 
positive and negative points associated with specific strategies used by the party. While 
such judgment calls are unavoidable in this analytical process, the study's main 
intention is to understand how the party has done, and not to impose moral perspectives 
on them. For instance, rather than seeking to assess the impact of specific strategies of 
the CPP on, say, rural development, the study wishes to understand how such strategies 
are actually devised, operationalized and managed. In other words, the study seeks to 
see what it looks like from where the CPP stands, not from a moral ground. 
That said, however, the study does not dismiss the poor record of governance and 
human rights under the CPP's rule. In terms of governance, Transparency International 
in 2008 ranked Cambodia the 14th most corruption country out of the 179 nations 
surveyed. Corruption has also been consistently pointed to as the biggest detriment to 
business and investment activities in the country6. Human rights abuse is raised as a key 
concern even today7. These statements about the ills which have been perpetuated 
under, and as a result of the CPP rule are not groundless but well supported by 
6 Cambodia Daily, June 16,2008 
7 Please see Amnesty International report on this issue by visiting 
http://www.amnestv.org/en/region/cambodia 
empirical evidence (see for instance Nissen 2005; PACT 2007; Adhoc 2009; Malena 
and Chhim 2009). However, discussing these issues is beyond the scope of this 
research, whose interests focus on learning more about the party itself. 
Third, rather than exhausting the currently available pool of information, I conducted 
extensive fieldwork in order to collect new empirical data that would generate new 
perspectives about the CPP as a political organization and the relevant political 
strategies it has used to ensure its control. The study also takes into account the 
importance of history and how things have changed over time by laying out a broad 
context to track how the party has journeyed to its dominance since 1979. After all, it is 
only when events are examined across time that changes and dynamics can be better 
comprehended. 
1.5. Contributions to the understanding of Cambodian politics 
This study is among the few that explicitly and systematically use a dominant party 
politics framework to examine the case of Cambodia. Existing studies have taken 
various perspectives to understand Cambodian politics and democratization (for 
instance Peou 2000; Hughes 2003; Un 2006; Roberts 2009). In their analyses, these 
studies focus on various factors including historical and cultural factors, the roles of 
elites, political culture and external interventions. The weights given to these variables 
have shifted over time: those conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s gave more 
attention to the roles of external interventions, especially the shortcomings of the UN 
intervention in 1993 and how the donor community fails to help sustain democracy and 
multi-party elections in the country. 
As the CPP was becoming increasingly dominant, the research began to give more 
weight to and express concerns about the rising hegemony of this party, and tried to 
look into the nature of political cultures and elites for an explanation (Un 2006; Roberts 
2009; Thayer 2009). These studies, however, while recognizing the centrality of the 
CPP and elite, have not fully reflected its significance in the way they frame their 
analyses. Instead, they tend to explain the political changes from the perspective of an 
international community who is trying to bring democracy and development to 
Cambodia, and ask what was still going wrong. 
A common issue identified in Cambodia is its patronage and rent-seeking (Blue et al. 
2009). While often identified as the main cause of corruption, the functioning and 
nature of the patronage in Cambodia is also still a 'black box' in the existing literature. 
Influenced by multilateral donors such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
UNDP, and also bilateral donors such as DfID and SIDA, existing research on this 
topic has often viewed patronage as something that has gone wrong with Cambodia's 
state and bureaucracy compared to the normative notion of legal-rational bureaucracy, 
new public management, the new institutionalism, and the expected role as prescribed 
in the World Development Report 1997, 'State in the Changing World' (World Bank 
1997; Pak et al. 2007). 
This study recognizes the existence of patronage and the various governance challenges 
that it presents. However, rather than seeing only its ill effects, the study attempts to 
understand the role and instrumentality of the patronage in maintaining the ruling 
party's power base. In doing so, the study brings new insights into the nature of 
patronage, and more importantly, how it evolves overtime. This is different from most 
of the existing studies (for instance Pak et al. 2007; Roberts 2009) which seem to place 
little emphasis on the dynamics which make patronage constantly changing, for better 
or worse, and what that means for the ruling party8. 
Such shortcomings in the current literature can be explained partly by the lack of 
empirical data on the subject. The CPP and its key political figures, despite their 
growing dominance, are still little known to the outside world. There has been some 
research specifically on the CPP (for instance Ham 1998; Kovick and Emling 2003; de 
Zeeuw 2009; Peou 2010), but these studies offer only limited knowledge, and hardly go 
beyond the formal operation and structure of the Party9. The lack of empirical 
knowledge has led Caroline Hughes, a prominent scholar on Cambodian politics, to 
assert that the CPP is still largely unknown to outsiders, especially to donor community 
(Hughes 2009). 
This study has been more successful than past research in gathering empirical data on 
the links between the CPP, the state, and its patronage. For instance, it presents data on 
the off-budget mechanisms which the Party has used to finance its infrastructure 
8 One that touches on this issue is Un (2005). 
' The exception was the study by Gottesman (2003) which provides very insightful historical accounts of 
the party during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
projects (Observation 1 above). My ability to collect such data had a great deal to do 
with my being a citizen of Cambodia and having worked as a researcher on governance 
issues for many years. With that background and experience, I have become not only 
familiar with the topic, but have also established credible networks with people who 
work within the CPP or possess knowledge about the CPP. With that network, I 
conducted key informant interviews, and carried out direct observations on some of its 
hitherto little known affairs. With this new data, the study brings new insights about the 
CPP as a political organization and as a network of power. 
The dominant party politics framework and the new empirical data together also allow 
this study to look at the politics of budgetary and decentralization reform from a 
different angle. Existing studies on budgetary reforms (most of which are donor 
reports) have touched more on the technical budgeting aspects and less on the political 
side of the coin (World Bank and Asian Development Bank 2003; IMF 2007). 
Recently, there have been more studies intended to fill this gap (Pak and Craig 2008; 
Taliercio 2008), but there is still a lot more to be discovered. This study provides 
insight into this issue by linking the budgetary reforms to the questions of power base, 
adaptability and legitimacy of the ruling party. 
Much research has also focused on decentralization reform in Cambodia. Since the first 
local election in 2002, many studies have looked at its impacts on various issues 
including rural development (Abrams 2004; IF AD 2004; Aruna Technology 2006), on 
inter-governmental reconfiguration (Rusten et al. 2004; Flam 2008; Pak and Craig 
2008), on aid effectiveness (Rohdewohld and Porter 2006), on promotion of pluralistic 
democratic development (Ojendal 2005; Kim 2008; Ojendal and Lilja 2008). Yet, few 
questions have been asked about its politics and when such questions are asked, they 
have been usually approached from the perspective of donors who try to promote 
democracy through dispersing power from the central government, rather than from the 
perspective of the ruling party itself. 
Another gap in the literature is the lack of empirical evidence about the nature of the 
policy process in Cambodia 1 0. Many key political and policy decisions in Cambodia are 
made behind the scenes (Hughes 2009), and so little has been learnt about it. In 
1 0 Among the very few good studies about this topic is the unpublished report by Hughes and Conway 
(2004), and a journal paper by Taliercio (2008) 
conducting fieldwork for this study, I had the chance to participate and directly observe 
the policy process around decentralization reform. Through my involvement, I had 
managed to conduct key informant interviews for the purpose of this study. This 
information, complemented by my research experience on related topics, has given me 
new insights into how the ruling party viewed decentralization and the notion of 
central-local relations, the roles of donors, and bureaucratic politics among key 
ministries. 1 1 
1.6. Contributions to the broader literature 
This study has reviewed existing literature including that on dominant party politics, 
electoral authoritarianism, patronage, and state reforms in order to develop a framework 
which can be applied to the case of Cambodia. In turn, using what is learnt from the 
Cambodian case, the study also seeks to make contributions back to these bodies of 
literature 
The first literature contribution is a suggested analytical framework called 'Party 
domination as a system.' This framework depicts a system within which different actors 
are presented together with their interactions and the implications for the party's 
domination. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, there are many studies 
that try to explain why a party can stay in power so enduringly. The result of these 
studies is often a list of explanatory factors, including state control, elite support, 
administrative capacity, manipulation, and weak opposition. The listing is of course 
very useful. Still missing, however, is a set of more elaborate and systematic 
explanations of (not just a listing of) 'how' those factors have contributed to advancing 
or hindering the ruling party's interest. 
As its second contribution, the study seeks to apply the concept of dominant party 
politics within a weak state. Many of the studies on dominant parties so far have not 
made an explicit attempt to combine the two, i.e. a dominant party on the one hand and 
a weak state on the other. In combining the two, a number of key governance issues 
associated with a weak state will be looked at from a different perspective. 
The first issue relates to the nature of patronage and its evolution within a weak state. 
This question is currently hotly debated. In governance literature, a distinction is often 
1 1 More will be discussed in Chapter 3 about fieldwork. 
made between informal and formal institutions. The formal institutions of the state refer 
mainly to the legal rational bureaucracy, while the informal is often equated with 
patronage (Pak et al. 2007). Implicitly or explicitly, the informal and patronage side of 
the coin is seen as bad and development-unfriendly. 
Some recent studies, however, have began to question this pre-judgment, arguing that a 
fresh look is needed to see what is bad and what is good about a patronage in a 
developing country's governance context (Unsworth 2010). More interest is also being 
shown in the evolution of patronage itself. Van de Walle for instance found that in 
Africa patronage practice has evolved in ways that are more responsive to the 
preference of the mass (van de Walle 2007). This study expects to participate in this 
particular debate, providing some insights into the evolution of patronage and linking it 
to the party dominance politics. 
The second issue focuses on the question of budgetary management and reforms in a 
weak state dominated by a single party. Existing literature on this topic tends to use the 
good governance agenda to analyze mismanagement of the state budget and the reasons 
for its slow reform progress. The usual argument is that the states in those countries are 
too weak because the patronage interests are too entrenched, and that there is no 
political incentive to reform (van de Walle 2005; Wescott 2008). This study, in 
contrast, looks at the reform from a dominant party perspective, emphasizing not just 
the rent-seeking and self-enrichment function of patronage, but also its relationship to 
and implication for the ruling parly's power base. 
The third issue is the politics of decentralization. It is clear from a recent conference 
held by the World Bank in Bangkok12 that, despite decades of implementing and 
supporting the reforms, donors are still poorly equipped with comparative analytical 
frameworks and empirical evidence from case studies to understand the politics of 
reform. This study hopes to draw out new ideas about why a dominant party is willing 
to push for decentralization, how it does it and what it means for its control foundation 
and legitimacy. 
Lastly, by presenting Cambodia as dominant party politics, this study brings the case 
country into a more comparable perspective with other SEA countries. In the last few 
12 The date of the event was November 16, 2009 
decades, the SEA has become, in Case's words, a 'storehouse' of dominant party 
politics (Case 2006). Six out of ten countries, Case argues, have experienced electoral 
authoritarianism Banother term for dominant party politics. It started with Singapore in 
the late 1960s, then Malaysia in the early 1970s, a decade later with Thailand and the 
Philippines, and then Burma. Historically, moreover, dominant party politics has had a 
far longer run in SEA than in other parts of the world, suggesting that much can be 
learned from this region. 
This study adds Cambodia in that 'storehouse.' As argued elsewhere, Cambodia has 
rarely been included systematically in the SEA debates, be they on cultures (Pye 1985; 
Vatikiotis 1998), legitimacy (Alagappa 1995), the roles of elites (Case 2002), economic 
development (Rowen 1998), elections (Taylor 1996), or dominant party politics itself 
(Case 2006). Therefore, bringing Cambodia into the regional literature is a crucial first 
step to locating Cambodia more explicitly vis-a-vis those countries surrounding it. 
1.7. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is arranged in the following order. Chapter 2 analytically reviews the current 
literature on dominant party politics and derives a set of explanatory factors. These 
factors are taken to be reflected within the context of a weak state. The key output of 
the chapter is an analytical framework which is used to guide the whole thesis. 
Chapter 3 starts by discussing how the research attempts to use the single- country case 
study approach, and its pros and cons. It then points out specific areas of CPP 
dominance that will be researched and from which inferences about the broader 
dynamics of such party dominance will be made. The last part of the chapter discusses 
the fieldwork. Operationalizing the framework derived in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 provides 
a roadmap for the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 4 provides historical background of the CPP and its rise to power since 1979, 
focusing first on its formative period, then on the period during which it has adapted to 
electoral politics. Through the historical discussion, the presence and roles of the 
opposition are also brought into focus. 
Chapter 5, following the detailed questions set out in Chapter 3, presents the empirical 
findings on three related strategies of the CPP as a dominant party: how it controls state 
budget, uses that resource to accommodate and form elite coalitions, and strengthens 
the local administrative network. In the discussion, the roles of donors whose huge 
amount of financial aid and roles are used in pushing budgetary reform in Cambodia 
are also examined. In presenting the rural administrative network of the CPP, the 
chapter also discusses how the party manages to penetrate and influence rural-decision 
making. 
While part of Chapter 5 discusses the CPP and state budget, Chapters 6 and 7 continue 
the story, this time focusing on the 'off-budget' transactions carried out by the CPP to 
build its political image and popular legitimacy. These chapters show how the CPP has 
developed a shadowy arrangement, attempted to raise funds from its own elite and 
spends it on rural infrastructure throughout the country. This strategy, although 
involving much less funding than the formal national budget and annual donor money, 
has proven rather successful in making the CPP and its leadership look good and appear 
to further development in the face of rural population. In another word, it is an effective 
shadowy legitimization strategy employed by the incumbent. 
Chapter 8 discusses decentralization, arguing that rather than undermining the CPP's 
control, it has actually been shaped to fit its interest. Decentralization, first at the 
commune, and then district and provincial level, has been helpful for the CPP to 
establish its local legitimacy. Yet, the CPP has been discreet in designing specific 
aspects of the reform to ensure that the party and the central level still control the sub-
national level through various mechanisms. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by consolidating the findings from the previous chapters. 
First, it places the case of the CPP within the analytical framework proposed in Chapter 
2 and from there, seeks to answer the central question of this thesis, i.e. how the CPP 
has managed to become and stay dominant in Cambodia. It then seeks to make specific 
conceptual contributions to the wider literature regarding a weak state dominated by a 
single party. Lastly, it proposes some topics for further research. 
Chapter 2: A dominant party in a weak state 
This chapter reviews the existing literature, starting with that on dominant party 
politics, then linking it to budgetary management and reform, popular perception and 
legitimacy, and inter-governmental relations and decentralization within a weak state. 
The aim is to learn from the literature answers to the question posed in chapter 1, i.e. 
how the ruling party in Cambodia managed to stay dominant. This chapter has four 
main parts: 
• First, it briefly discusses key concepts relating to a party's dominance, 
• Second, it reviews and derives a set of explanatory factors found to be important 
for a party to stay in power, 
• Third, in sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, it discusses those factors within the context 
of a weak state. In line with the research questions posted in chapter 1, the 
discussion focuses on three themes: state budget and its spending, popular 
legitimacy, and inter-governmental relations and decentralization, 
• The chapter finally proposes a derived analytical framework that will guide the 
whole thesis. 
The review makes reference to the cases of countries in SEA and Africa. This is not to 
suggest that other regions do not experience dominant party politics. Its emphasis on 
SEA, however, is justified on the grounds of cultural similarities (elitist culture, elite-
mass relations, Buddhism, etc) between Cambodia and those regional countries. The 
African experience, on the other hand, is mentioned because of the recent donor-driven 
research interest in the region relating to weak states, post-conflict situations, 
institutional reforms and foreign aid 1 3 . This study attempts to make use of and find gaps 
within this large body of existing literature 1 4. 
The existing literature provides evidence that, to be able to stay dominant, a party needs 
to possess both strong foundational elements of control and adaptive capacity. When 
put together, control and adaptability help provide a better picture of dominant party 
1 3 See for instance http://www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?obiectid=4D340CFC-14C2-620A-
27176CB3C957CE79 to see how popular the topic of fragile state and state building has become within 
donor community, and how focus it is on Africa. 
1 4 The attempt is even more relevant for Cambodia, given that donors have also been influential in setting 
the agenda for governance and development research in this country (see for instance, Adler and Craig 
(2010) 
politics. As the following discussion will show, the current literature, however, tends to 
focus on specific parts of the puzzle: some on one or two of the foundational elements 
of control, some on adaptive capacity. The following discussion takes a more holistic 
approach, trying to put these different pieces together. But before doing that, a brief 
discussion of some of the key concepts is provided. 
2.1. Political party, patronage and state - the concepts 
The review starts with the general concept of a political party. In a representative 
democracy, a political party is an organization seeking to link citizens and politicians 
by solving two common political problems: a collective action problem and a social 
choice problem (Aldrich 1995). The first refers to the problems of pooling candidates 
and their resources together and also to advertising their candidacies under a common 
brand to the voters. To respond to this problem, a party acts to facilitate a collective 
action by investing in its administrative and organizational infrastructure. The second 
refers to the problem of bringing together candidates with similar policy and 
programmatic preferences. When a party is formed, develops its programmatic 
coherence, and collectively makes its policy known, voters will know how best their 
interests will be served if they vote for that party (Aldrich 1995). 
Formally, politicians are linked to people through their party's programmatic appeals. 
The party is accountable to voters in delivering those programs once it is elected 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This is usually the case in advanced democracies. However, 
in emerging democracies, the politician-voter linkages usually occur in a more 
clientelistic manner where a party seeks to provide support to a specific group of voters 
in exchange for their votes 1 5 (Kitschelt 2000; Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002). This 
has a lot to do with the fact that political parties in those countries are rarely ideological 
or development-programmatic. 
Instead, they are more organizational structures whose strength depends on their 
administrative abilities to mobilize voters (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Carothers 
2006; Reilly and Nordlund 2008). The politicians and the parties in such situations, as 
Scott (1969) and much later on Scheiner (2006) note, had to do two things: (i) finding 
resources and support to provide to the clientele or specific ethnic groups with the 
1 5 Actually, such clientelistic link is also noted to be prevalent in the advanced democracy of Japan under 
the LDP (Scheiner 2006). 
expectation of obtaining their supports in return, and (ii) setting up mechanisms to 
ensure that those receiving favors did vote for the party. 
Seeking to gain support, those political parties tend to use patronage networks as a way 
to finance their clientelist channels. In this study, the terms clientelism, patronage, 
patron-client, and elite networks are used interchangeably. They all refer to what 
Brinderhoff and Goldsmith (2002: 2) define as: 
A complex chain of personal bonds between political patrons or bosses and their 
individual clients or followers... the patron furnishes excludable resources 
(money, jobs) to dependents and accomplices in return for their support and 
cooperation (votes, attendance at rallies). The patron has disproportionate power 
and thus enjoys wide latitude about how to distribute the assets under his control 
In modern polities, patronage networks might be linked together from a very low level 
(i.e. the rural level) to the higher patrons - possibly as high as central ministers or the 
prime minister. Patronage networks in those cases are usually backed up by upward 
chains of powerful, resourceful patrons who are considered as elites. Elites are defined 
as the most powerful people in a political system. They can be national or local elites, 
bureaucratic, business and political elites. Their actual positions can include ministers, 
key bureaucrats, legislators, business people, senior members of the armed forces, 
police and intelligence services (Orrnert and Hewitt 2006). 
In developing countries, patronage and the state are closely linked. Max Weber defined 
a state as 'a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory... if the state is to exist, the dominated must obey 
the authority claimed by the powers that be.' (Weber 1966, quoted in Fritz and Menocal 
2007: 5). Tilly defines a state as '[a]n organization which controls the population 
occupying a defined territory is a state in so far as it is differentiated from other 
organizations operating in the same territory; it is autonomous; it is centralized; and its 
divisions are formally coordinated with one another' (Tilly 1975, quoted in Fritz and 
Menocal 2007: 11). 
According to Weber, a modern state is underpinned by a 'legal-rational' bureaucracy. 
In that system, public office is de-personalized. There is a strong separation between 
political and administrative aspects of governance, with politically neutral officials 
enacting policy "without fear or favor." Authority and accountability in the system is 
exercised through a hierarchy of command, control and enforcement according to the 
set rules (Minogue 2001). 
By the 1980s, a new paradigm called New Public Management (NPM) was introduced. 
NPM especially promotes the use of private sector practices in the public sector in 
order to enhance efficiency and cut 'government fat.' That implies privatization of 
service delivery, efficiency reforms, contracting out, restructuring of the civil service, 
performance-based management and partnership formation with external actors 
(Minogue 2001). 
In developing countries, during the 1980s and 1990s, donors were pushing to downsize 
the state. However, in the mid 1990s, the state was brought back in as an actor that 
provides a strong institutional framework for markets and development (Evans et al. 
1985). In 1997, the World Bank introduced the notion of the Capable State, arguing for 
state roles to complement, not replace markets (World Bank 1997). A capable state 
needs to have three important building blocks. First, a government must build a strong 
central capacity for formulating, coordinating, and translating policies into strategic 
outcomes. Second, after policies are formulated and translated into strategies, due 
processes are needed to transform them into outputs. To do that, effective management 
and structures, together with strong voices and participation from citizens, are called 
for. The third block of a capable state refer to the existence of motivated and capable 
civil servants who are the 'lifeblood' of the system (World Bank 1997). 
States in many developing countries today are neither well-structured as expected by 
Weber, nor managerial in the NPM sense, nor capable enough. Their bureaucracies are 
loosely defined and poorly enforced. Patrimonialism is common. In some cases, 
patrimonial practice and rent-seeking become so entrenched and penetrative that the 
state is defined by some as a 'neo-patrimonial' state, referring to a situation in which: 
the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than 
through ideology or law... relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a 
formal politics and administrative system... leaders occupy bureaucratic offices 
less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The 
distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred...In return 
for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions 
upwards as a mark of deference to patrons (Bratton and van de Walle, 
1994:458). 
In this study, a weak state partly refers to a state with weak formal, legal bureaucratic 
elements . The term also implies a state which is severely penetrated by patrimony-
based institutions. Thus, the term 'weak state' used in this study is close to the neo-
patrimonial state above. However, this study refrains from making the implicit 
assumption that patrimonialism is always bad and anti-poor. Instead, patrimonialism is 
deemed here as a key element of forces often employed by a dominant party. 
The consequence of a weak state is its inability to meet some very basic needs of the 
poor such as education, health, security (Roberts 2008; Porter et al. 2010). The study 
however does not assume that such services can only be provided through formal state 
institutions alone, although that would be an ideal channel through which public service 
should be provided. 
In discussing a weak state, however, one should not focus only on the government, but 
also on the people. In a weak state, especially one that has just emerged from conflicts 
like Cambodia, the people tend to have had bad experiences and hold low expectation 
about the government. Their ability to hold the state accountable is also weak and 
fragile (Oosterom 2009). This means that to understand a people, it is important to look 
at what they have been through historically. And it is not just history, but other cultural 
factors (e.g. religion, social hierarchy) as well that matter (Vatikiotis 1998). This study 
attempts to account for these other factors when discussing a country's people and their 
perceptions and relationship with the state. 
2.2. Key factors for explaining a party's dominance 
This section will now focus on the literature related to dominant party politics. As 
indicated in chapter 1, dominant party politics refers to a situation where a political 
party stays on in power for three decades or more despite regular democratic elections. 
In such a system, the incumbents play the game of multiparty elections by holding 
regular elections, yet they violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and 
fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of 
authoritarian rule rather instruments of democracy (Schedler 2002:3). 
16 It should also be noted that the terms 'developing country' and 'weak state' are used interchangeably 
in the study. 
The term 'dominant party,' however, does not mean the party never loses an election. 
In some cases, the party did lose the election and power (as in Mexico), in some others, 
it lost but managed to come back to power (as in Japan, Taiwan and Korea), while 
some others have never lost at all (as in Singapore and Malaysia) (Friedman and Wong 
2008b). The literature on dominant party politics considers all these groups in order to 
understand how the party manages to stay in power. While different studies have 
focused on different explanatory factors, their findings can be summed up in a broad 
framework composed of two groups of factors: (i) foundational elements of control; 
and (ii) adaptive capacity. 
The first element of control of a dominant party is its tight control over state apparatus 
and resources. This is called 'incumbency advantages.' Being in power, the ruling party 
can seek to politicize public resources, i.e. the state budget, the administrative apparatus 
and media, allowing them to outspend opposition parties within an electoral politics 
(Schedler 2002; Green 2009). The second element is the party's ability to form an elite 
coalition. Ambitious elites see their interest in being with the party, while the party also 
tries to benefit from the resources and skills that those elites bring in. This creates a 
mutually beneficial relationship between the party and elite (Brownlee 2007:12). 
Forming a coalition of elites is a process that constantly adjusts itself. Therefore, it is 
important to look into the history of the party, dividing it into two parts: early regime 
formation, and medium term institutional building and legacies. The emerging years of 
a party are the formative years, defining its subsequent stability and durability 
(Brownlee 2007:37). Once formed, the ruling party seeks to expand its power base, 
bring new elites into the ruling group (Brownlee 2007). In the government, these elites 
typically control key cabinet posts such as military, finance and industry. 
Although in the same party, it is not uncommon to see these elite compete to advance 
and protect their domains of power (Aldrich 1995:22). In these cases, the role of the 
party is to adjudicate among these contestants, assuring those who do not get ahead 
today will still have a chance and thus have incentives to stay on with the party. In 
addition, the party and its leaders also work to create a sense of collective interest and 
lead those elites to cooperate on issues that transcend factional advantages (Brownlee 
2007). 
To keep the party strong, other important elements are needed. A strong and skillful 
leadership is very important in most dominant parties (Crouch and Morley 1999; 
Friedman and Wong 2008b). But no matter how smart a leader is, the endurance of the 
party and its regime depends very much on the third element of control: organizational 
strength. Comparing the durability of authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Malaysia, and 
the weaker one in the Philippines, Brownlee argues that the difference is that, in the 
first two cases, the parties are better institutionalized and organized (Brownlee 
2007:202-11). Such an organizational foundation, other scholars also agree, helps 
regulate conflicts among elites, encouraging them to think of not just the immediate but 
longer term benefits from staying loyal to the party (Scheiner 2006; Grzymala-Busse 
2008b; Green 2009). 
Another important criterion of an enduring dominant party is the capacity to adapt. 
Different scholars have approached this question of 'adaptive capacity' differently. 
Friedman and Wong (2008b) emphasize the party's ability to face and deal with 
political contingencies and crises; to manage and use the resources at its disposal; to 
build new images and appeals; and to deal with its internal faction problems. Schedler 
(2002) similarly equates a party's adaptability to its ability to use various manipulative 
strategies — a menu of manipulations, he calls it — to ensure its electoral victory and 
control. 
Those strategies, according to Schedler, include re-invention of the party's identity and 
appeal, expansion of its support base to a new constituency while minimizing losses to 
the existing ones, improving its internal structure, thinking about leadership succession, 
promoting (or inhibiting) intra-party democracy (Friedman and Wong 2008b). The 
party might also resort to using some of the more tricky and repressive strategies such 
as weakening, intimidating, or restricting opposition parties' freedom to campaign and 
solicit votes, vote buying, and exerting controls over print and electronic media 
(Schedler 2002; Schedler 2006). 
While the list of strategies provides a better understanding of how a party can stay 
dominant, this study argues that the listing is not systematic enough and does not tell 
much on how and why those strategies are used. More importantly, if a dominant party 
tends to use not one, but a combination of strategies, it is important to understand how 
they complement or create trade-offs among one another and why. 
Schedler (2009) addressed this question of 'trade-off,' using a model called the 
'dilemma of manipulation'. He argues that in winning an election, the party 
manipulation and popular support and legitimacy are substitutes17. The ruling party, he 
explains, can use various manipulative strategies as listed earlier, but it needs to be 
careful not to use them to the point where it might hurt its own legitimacy (Schedler 
2009). His argument can be interpreted as meaning that, a skillfully adaptive party is 
one that knows how best to avoid such point. 
But Schedler's dilemma of manipulation model includes only two variables 
(manipulation and popular legitimacy), and not other factors such as state control and 
elite coalitions. These other factors are already included his 'menu of manipulations'. 
But even so, this study still argues that the 'dilemma of manipulation' model is too 
narrow to systematically capture the mechanisms by which the different strategies are 
chosen and used, how they complement or off-set each other, and why they are chosen 
and made possible in the first place. 
Besides the internal strength and capacity of the ruling party, the weaknesses of the 
opposition parties also explain the former's dominance. While an opposition can be 
weak due to its internal problems (e.g. weak leadership, internal factions), it can also be 
weak because the ruling party intends to keep it weak. As will be discussed in more 
detail later, the incumbency advantages of the ruling party also imply the opposition's 
lack of access to state resources (both finance and administration), which in turn 
prevents it from effectively forming elite coalitions, building the party's administration, 
and winning the voters' trust (Rakner and van de Walle 2009) 
To sum up, a number of key variables help explain a party's enduring dominance. They 
are: (i) the party's control over the state; (ii) its ability to form and gain support from 
elite and patronage networks; (iii) its administrative network; (iv) its adaptive capacity, 
and (v) a weak opposition. On the adaptive capacity, the literature seems to focus on the 
ability of the incumbent to balance manipulation and legitimacy. So, 
'Manipulation<=>legitimacy' (the <=> sign indicates 'balancing') is used in place of 
'adaptive capacity' in Figure 2 below. 
17 Legitimacy here means the right to rule (more discussion on legitimacy will be presented later) 
Figure 2: Key factors for explaining a party's dominance 
The literature, and the set of explaining factors derived from it, however, is not 
systematic enough in the ways it captures the dynamics of a party's dominance. For one 
thing, it neither captures the relationships between the different elements, nor explains 
the underlying dynamic that triggers those relationships. For the purpose of this study, 
furthermore, the set of factors still needs contextualization in the case of a weak state. 
In the next section, this study takes another step by bringing the discussion about a 
weak state and reflecting it through each of the factors above. To link back to the 
questions posed in Chapter 1, it will frame the discussion in three areas: (i) state 
budgetary management and reform, (ii) people's perceptions and legitimacy questions, 
and (iii) managing inter-governmental relations, i.e. centralization versus 
decentralization. 
2.3. Controlling the state budget and sustaining elite coalition 
In controlling the state, a dominant party seeks to control the state's resources and 
budget (Brownlee 2007). Budgetary control gives the incumbent comparative fiscal 
advantages compared to the opposition (Green 2009). A ruling party, Green argues, can 
capture the state resources by diverting funds from state-owned enterprises, creating 
and distributing state jobs through party patronage, demanding kick-backs from 
business people, and using the state's apparatus and employees for its campaign, voter 
mobilization and surveillance (Green 2009). 
The state resource capture by the ruling party was found to exist in both developed 
(such as in Japan (Scheiner 2006)) and developing countries (as in many African 
countries (Rakner and van de Walle 2009)). This study focuses on the latter group of 
countries. In line with the existing literature, this study argues that to understand how a 
ruling party captures state resources in a weak state, first, it is important to understand 
what a budgeting system in such a state is like. 
Ideally, a government needs to put in place a reliable institutional set-up to ensure that 
revenues are properly collected, then transparently and effectively spent to finance 
basic services for the people (World Bank 1998). In reality, though, many developing 
countries do not have the required institutional capacity to manage their own budgets. 
Consequently, they tend to have low collected revenue, irrational allocation of 
resources, and rampant corruption associated with budget management (IMF 2004a; 
Allen 2009). 
Usually, in a weak state, the government's revenue tends to come from a small tax base 
and tax administration is weak (Moore 2004). This however does not mean a weak state 
does not extract resources from the society. Actually, it does, probably even more than 
a tax can impose. Extraction in this context takes the form of rent-seeking, natural 
resource exploitation, abuse of regulatory power, and demanding kick-backs from 
business. The problem is that the revenue does not come straight into the national 
budget but individual pockets or a 'secret box' reserved for special interest or political 
purposes, and their transactions are usually non-transparent to outsiders (Dorotinsky 
and Floyd 2004). 
A weak state usually experiences various budgetary reforms, many of which are driven 
by donors (Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi 1999; Schiavo-Campo 2007). Experience, 
however, shows that donor-driven reforms have been slow; some say this is because 
there are simply too many things to reform (IMF 2004a), while others put the blame on 
politicians in those countries for accepting the reform only to ensure legitimacy and 
external support, and not to increase the fiscal efficiency of the state (Levitsky and Way 
2006; Andrews 2009). These more pessimistic views suggest that, while some ruling 
regimes appear to reform their budgetary systems, those reforms are only on the 
surface, allowing the real patronage-based practices to influence how national resources 
are actually allocated and spent (Rakner et al 2004). 
This donor-driven literature tends to view state budget management in a weak state as 
either being in line with their ideal path of budgetary reform (see for instance Schiavo-
Campo and Tommasi 1999) or as misuse of public fluids, i.e. corruption. This 
perspective, this study argues, is too normative and provides only limited insight into 
the strategic intentions of politicians, those in a dominant party included. 
On this point, Goetz (2009) and Robinson (2009), provides a different perspective. 
They argue that reforms (budgetary reform included) needs to be understood in term of 
their impact on the existing patronage interest and legitimacy of a ruling party. They 
argue further that a reform, while might go against patronage interest, is still possible if 
it helps prevent legitimacy erosion of the ruling party. This argument implies that, for 
considerate politicians, reform is not so much about right or wrong, but a balancing act 
to weigh the pros and cons of losing patronage support on the one hand, and popular 
support on the other. 
However, the record shows that budgetary systems and reforms in many African 
authoritarian regimes, for instance, have been consistently weak and slow (Andrews 
2009; Rakner and van de Walle 2009). A question arises: with a weak state budgetary 
system, how can those regimes meet the demands of the people and build their own 
legitimacy? According to the literature, a broad answer to this question is those regimes 
do not depend only on their on-budget but also on various forms of off-budget spending 
to satisfy (or at least appear to satisfy) their people's demand. 
One example of such off-budget support is from Ghana. In that country, in the absence 
of central funding from the state, Members of Parliament (MPs) have resorted to 
extracting resources from other sources to finance their campaigns, and to sustain their 
patronage networks by, for instance, paying individuals' school fees, electricity and 
water bills, funerals, and wedding expenses, and the distribution of various types of 
hand-outs. These, it is noted, are not just one-off vote-buying, but institutionalized 
behavior, seen as an act of taking of care of the people (Lindberg 2003). 
On a related subject, van de Walle (2007) observes that, to win votes, ruling parties in 
Africa have used their patronage in ways that account for the voters' preferences, thus 
becoming more mass-responsive. This change is in contrast to a pure predatory state 
where interests of only a small group of elite are taken of. Becoming more mass-
responsive, he continues, entails certain fiscal and redistributive implications. First, it 
becomes more expensive to address the needs of a wider group of people. This might 
mean more resources have to be extracted either from economic development or natural 
resource exploitation (van de Walle 2007). 
Second, it is not just more resources that are needed, but also a different way to re-
distribute them. The personal and informal relations of a traditional patronage network 
would not be adequate for such re-distribution. For this purpose, the party structure 
itself can be used to re-distribute resources to voters. This re-distribution however is not 
done through formal taxation and public spending! that is, it is off-budget. Moreover, 
the off-budget re-distribution is done only to the extent and in ways that will attract 
votes. 
While his notion about ^distributive roles of the patronage is plausible, van de Walle 
(2007), however, does not say much on how those re-distributions are usually done, e.g. 
in what ways, at what scales, their timing and sustainability and trends over time. These 
specific questions need answer. For instance, it is useful to know whether such re-
distribution is limited only to direct vote-buying during election time, or how widely or 
discriminatingly such re-distribution is in term of its targeting. Understanding all these 
details, this study argues, will provide insights into the changing nature of the patronage 
itself. 
Another question arising from van de Walle's (2007) findings is, does patronage-based 
re-distribution constitute a more legitimate state? And because the re-distribution is not 
done through the normal state budget, does off-budget support bring more legitimacy to 
the ruling party and the elite, and does it further weaken state budgetary system? Or 
does it not make any difference at all in the real world, given that the close relationship 
between state, party and elite is very common in dominant party politics? 
Another factor that should not be overlooked when addressing budgetary concerns in 
developing countries is aid dependency18. Donors obviously provide a big pool of 
money, which can become the target for rent-seeking and exploitation by politicians 
and patronage. For instance, when aid is tied to specific projects, this in effect becomes 
political resources, either in terms of new jobs to be given away, and/or new money to 
be distributed (Brautigam 2000). Besides, a ruling party can also take political credit 
18 This is particularly relevant to the case of Cambodia, where 40% of the total budget (about 75% of its 
development budget) comes from foreign aid (Pak and Craig 2008). 
from donor projects by being present at ribbon-cutting ceremonies, giving the 
impression they are the ones who brought the projects to the people (Brautigam 2000). 
To sum up, existing literature indicates that a dominant party in a weak state seeks 
control over the state budget which is generally poorly managed, and slowly reformed. 
But despite the weak formal budget, the ruling party can still seek popular support and 
votes by resorting to using off-budget re-distributive channels. The literature however 
offers little insight into the mechanisms by which all these are operationalized, i.e. how 
the ruling party manages the state budget to accommodate patronage interest, how 
specifically it affects budgetary reform, how the off-budget support funded and 
distributed, and whether it helps build state legitimacy. This study will seek answers for 
these questions using the case of Cambodia. 
2.4. Popular perception and the question of legitimacy 
Legitimacy is important because, as the literature makes clear, a dominant party needs 
to gain a certain amount of legitimacy to balance its control. Actually, legitimacy is 
central to authority and ruling (Weber 1966, quoted in Alagappa 1995:1). In other 
words, authority can only exist when the ruler 'possesses an acknowledged right to 
command' and the ruled have 'an acknowledged obligation to obey.' (Alagappa 
1995:1). Such rights to rule are the bases of legitimacy. 
Dominant parties tend to manipulate elections for their political interests and, in this 
way, they expect to obtain at least a semblance of the democratic legitimacy needed to 
satisfy both external and domestic actors (Schedler 2002). But if electoral victory is 
delivered through manipulation, what kind of legitimacy is it that is being delivered? 
Two related points are pertinent here. One, legitimacy as a value is subjective and 
depends on people's perceptions. Two, electoral legitimacy is not the only claim that a 
dominant party uses to justify its long reign; another type of legitimacy known as 
performance legitimacy (Alagappa 1995) is also very relevant. 
In SEA, the dominant parties, in addition to manipulating elections (Case 2005), have 
worked to build their performance legitimacy by ensuring political stability, security 
and the development of their countries. President Suharto's New Order, for instance, 
ruled Indonesia from 1966 to 1998 based on this 'development-based' legitimacy. 
Many Indonesians, while aware of electoral manipulations used by the regime at the 
time, were living quite comfortably with that knowledge, according the regime its 
legitimacy for its developmental achievements (Liddle 1996). This importance of 
'development' in legitimization is also noticed in other SEA countries including 
Malaysia, Thailand, and socialist Vietnam (Kingsbury 2005). 
But it is dangerously misleading to assume that the incumbents' seeking to establish 
legitimacy would tend to deliver development and prosperity. Many ruling parties in 
Africa have manipulated elections (Rakner and van de Walle 2009), have been elected, 
but failed to develop their country's economy, leaving millions of their people in 
poverty. So, while people in SEA vote to endorse a regime's ruling to achieve security 
and economic prosperity (Rowen 1998), people in some African countries vote for the 
incumbent governments because they have no choice, and see the voting as the only 
chance to solicit material rewards to meet their confronting needs (Manzetti and Wilson 
2007). 
The difference between the SEA and African examples raises more questions about 
what legitimacy means. The literature suggests that, to understand legitimacy, one also 
needs to understand people's perceptions and their expectations about the state. Such 
perceptions are shaped by historical and certain cultural contexts that a population has 
gone through. For a post-conflict context (as in Cambodia), people tend to feel 
powerless, marginalized and humiliated. In such cases, compliance and even support of 
the status quo is a common coping strategy (Oosterom 2009). Cultural values such as 
hierarchy and benevolence are also key factors shaping people's perceptions about the 
state (Rowen 1998; Vatikiotis 1998; Case 2002). 
Besides people's perceptions about the state, another relevant concept is symbolic uses 
in politics (Geertz 1980; Edelman 1985; Brysk 1995). These scholars argue that people 
are not always rational in perceiving what they have and have not received from the 
state. Instead, their perception is shaped by symbols and interpretative meanings that 
they derive about the state. 
For instance, Geertz found petty states in Bali (called Negara) to be like theatre states 
governed by rituals and symbols played out through various ceremonial events to send 
messages and gain legitimacy from the people (Geertz 1980). Geertz's argument points 
to the importance of culture and its symbolic significance. Other Asian scholars later on 
emphasized this symbolic aspect, arguing that for many SEA people, the state carries 
the symbol of a father, of the beholders of religious values, and of benevolence (Pye 
1985; Vatikiotis 1998). 
Given the importance of symbols in politics, politicians, including those in a dominant 
party systems, seek to maintain social orders and legitimacy through the projection of 
symbols from the top down (Brysk 1995). But unlike the rulers in the 19 t h century 
Negaras in Bali, modern politicians do not just use ceremonies but also the media to 
manage flow of news and political information to the mass, emphasizing the good 
things about their regimes, and bad things about the opposition (Schedler 2002). The 
effect of this 'mouthpiece' strategy, it was found, tends to be greater among populations 
that are moderately knowledgeable about politics, i.e. those who pay enough attention 
to be heavily exposed to the government line, but who are not sophisticated enough to 
be able to resist it (Geddes and Zaller 1989). 
In addition to the media, the ruling party also relies on its administrative networks at 
the local level to exercise voter mobilization and surveillance. Because it tightly 
controls the state, the ruling party tends to use the state administrative apparatus for its 
own political purposes. In Ghana for instance, the ruling party used local police, the 
military and bureaucrats to mobilize people to vote for them (Lindberg 2003). Similar 
practices were also found in Indonesia during Suharto period and in Singapore (Sidel 
2005; Grzymala-Busse 2008a). 
The use of state administration for political control is more common in former 
Communist countries in Eastern Europe. In Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and 
Hungary, for instance, the former Communist parties that had controlled the state 
during the communist era, have managed to strengthen themselves along with the 
expansion of the state administration itself. By doing that, they practically intertwine 
their own party structure building with state building. Thus, expansion of the state 
bureaucracy since 19990 was also of advantage to the parties (O'Dwyer 2004). 
People's perceptions are shaped and their voices made heard by their ability to group 
together and form themselves into a strong civil society (Diamond 1999). However, 
especially in a post-conflict context, the word civil society is often used to mean NGOs 
who are funded and accountable mainly to donors, and/or small community-based 
organizations (CBOs) which are still too weak to make their voice heard and be acted 
upon by the state (Oosterom 2009). 
Opposition parties also seek to shape and influence people's perceptions in their favors. 
However, in many developing countries dominated by a single party, voters still do not 
see the opposition as a good alternative. These opposition parties tend to be weak and 
less capable to gain trust from the people (Rakner and van de Walle 2009). Such 
weakness comes from their lack of access to the state resource and vulnerability to the 
buying-off, divide-and-rule and other strategies deployed by the incumbent party 
(Green 2009; Schedler 2009). 
To sum up, people's perceptions and expectation about the state need to be understood 
within the country's wider historical, cultural and social context. However, the ruling 
party also seeks to shape and control such perceptions by various means including its 
administrative and surveillance networks and the media which the party can partly do 
by using the state administration system. Of course, these factors and strategies vary by 
countries. So, this study will look at the case of Cambodia and the CPP. 
2.5. Inter-governmental relations and decentralization 
Managing inter-government relations (i.e. between the centre and the periphery) is a 
key dimension of a state control (Hutchcroft 2001). This study looks at such relations 
because they are crucial to a party's dominance and yet have not been much discussed 
in the literature. Decentralization, moreover, is central to that relations, and therefore 
should be examined (Smith 1985; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). 
Generally, there are two main types of decentralization: political and administrative. 
Political decentralization occurs when power and functions are transferred from central 
to local government. With decentralization, local government is based on political 
representation, in which councilors are locally elected representatives of the people 
who live in the area of territorial jurisdiction of the local government (Manor 2003). 
Administrative decentralization, also known as "de-concentration", refers to delegation 
of tasks and transfer of authority from central government to sub-national governments 
which are the branches of the central government (Cohen and Peterson 1999). De-
concentration happens in forms of central ministries transferring roles and authorities to 
their respective sub-national departments. In this sense, the sub-national agencies are 
not locally representative institutions, i.e. not elected by the people but employed by 
sectoral ministries. De-concentration may allow locally placed state officials to make 
decisions over service delivery, and these officials may also create important links 
between local and central government (Cohen and Peterson 1999). 
Different levels of sub-national administrations can be put through decentralization, 
depending on the objectives of the reforms. In Uganda, for instance, the reform in 
1980s started with a local election at the lowest tier. That was partly done as a political 
solution to post-conflict nature of the country and partly as a way to consolidate power 
of the ruling party at the time (Ndegwa and Levy 2003). In Vietnam, however, the 
Communist Party has paid more attention on the de-concentration part, especially on 
the provincial level and district levels. Only recently that political element was 
introduced to the reform at the commune and village level. The focus on these middle 
levels (i.e. provincial and district levels) in Vietnam aimed more at improving 
administrative effectiveness and less on political reforms (Martinez-Vazquez 2004). 
Decentralization is relevant here not only because it is a common type of reform 
worldwide, but also because, by nature, it can have direct impacts on the two central 
elements of a party's dominance: legitimacy and control. The literature claims that 
decentralization can help build legitimacy of the state in two ways: first, it helps build 
'output legitimacy' which is fostered by government outputs in service provision, small 
scale projects and local development processes; second, it promotes 'input legitimacy' 
which is fostered by the shared ideas, values and participation that the people hold 
about what government should look like and consent to live by the rules set by 
governing institutions (Brinkerhoff and Johnson 2009; Oosterom 2009). Building on 
this expectation, decentralization can bring about both local development and local 
democracy. 
Given the democratizing effect of decentralization, it is reasonable to expect that an 
authoritarian regime/ dominant party would rationally oppose the reform. On the 
contrary, though, there are various cases where authoritarian regimes have pushed for 
decentralization. One of the main reasons is because decentralization in most cases is 
advocated by international donors. With that pressure, a dominant party regime that 
relies on donor support tends to undertake the reform as an exchange for foreign aid 
and by extension, a secure international legitimacy especially among donors from the 
West (Levitsky and Way 2006; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). 
Besides international legitimacy, there are other reasons why an incumbent government 
would agree to decentralize: with the reform, while some powers are taken away, the 
central governments are also more able in establishing their legitimacy and open up 
new ways of control. Uganda is one of such cases (Ndegwa and Levy 2003). Other 
authoritarian regimes even push for decentralization (especially administrative 
decentralization) so that they can use sub-national governments as a vehicle to carry out 
the central government's development plan, as in Vietnam (Martinez-Vazquez 2004). 
Political parties play important roles in decentralization (Manor 1999). The current 
debates about politics of decentralization, however, does not give much attention to the 
roles of this particularly important actor (see for instance Eaton et al. 2009). What is 
already known on this point are some broad indications which are discussed as follows. 
First, it is indicated that decentralization can be attractive to both the ruling and the 
opposition parties. For the opposition, participating in sub-national elections can 
strengthen their party organizations at the local level (Manor 1999:74-76). 
But experience also shows that even ruling parties can benefit from decentralization. In 
Cote d'lvoire, for instance, decentralization first helped enhance the legitimacy of the 
ruling regimes by creating some modest openings for local sentiment and small 
opportunities for aspiring but frustrated political activities at the lower level. On top of 
that, decentralization has also helped the incumbent to further strengthen its 
organizational capacity by using the electoral process to purge undesirable personnel 
and party members (Faure 1989:71). 
While decentralization is good for legitimization, if not well managed, it can destabilize 
the ruling regime as already happened in Poland and Slovakia. In these two countries, 
the former Communist parties intended to design organizational changes to build 
broader support through decentralization. The strategy did not work and, instead, led to 
the over-empowering of regional leaders who demanded more and more. The result was 
rampant corruption and tensions within the parties (Grzymala-Busse 2008a). 
This fear of instability explains why the Communist Party in Vietnam has been so 
careful, striking a balance between 'letting go' and 'keeping control' in its 
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decentralization process. Despite various decentralization initiatives, Vietnam is still a 
centralized state in the sense that the national government still control the budget and 
personnel decisions (especially for appointments and dismissals) of the sub-national 
governments (Martinez-Vazquez 2004). 
Vietnam is also centralized because the Communist Party, a powerful parallel system to 
the state from the central to the grassroots, is actually very influential amidst this 
decentralized system. At the provincial level, to which more power has been 
transferred, the real power has been said to belong to the party apparatus. The party 
reviews any decisions before they can be implemented by these different levels of 
government (Dinh 2003). 
As well as through state and party control, the central government and elites can also 
keep the sub-national and local levels in check by using the more patronage-based 
networks. In Indonesia under Sueharto from 1966 until 1998, for instance, the central 
government, while giving more power to the military to eclipse the role of the regional 
and local parliaments, sought to ensure that these individuals are not independent but 
acted as their line of patronage command (Sidel 2005). 
In sum, the current literature points out the importance and relevance of inter-
government relations and decentralization in state control. It however offers only 
anecdotal and indicative evidence on how such relations might strengthen or weaken a 
ruling party's dominance. The literature seems to suggest that to understand such 
effects, one needs to see decentralization as both a legitimization and a control 
mechanism which the party can choose to deploy. How the party actually uses it is of 
course contextual, and this study is curious to learn about this particular issue within the 
case of Cambodia's decentralization reform and the CPP. 
The current literature, it is noted, rarely refer to the roles of political parties when 
discussing decentralization (see for instance Cheema and Rondinelli 2007; Bahl 2009). 
In dominant party politics, however, ignoring the role of the party would mean taking 
out a big actor from the picture. 
2.6. A derived framework: Party domination as a system 
After briefly discussing some key concepts, this chapter has carried out two tasks: (i) it 
derives a set of key factors useful in understanding a party's dominance; and (ii) it 
discusses those factors in the context of a weak state, focusing on three important areas, 
namely: budgetary management, legitimacy and inter-governmental relations and 
decentralization. From these two tasks, this section takes the discussion further by 
deriving an analytical framework which will guide for the rest of the thesis. 
As indicated in Figure 2, various factors have been identified as important for a party's 
enduring dominance. However, a number of gaps are argued to exist in the literature. 
First, it seems to emphasize one or two of those factors. For instance, Brownlee (2007) 
emphasizes the importance of elite coalition, Scheiner (2006) and Green (2009) the 
incumbency advantages that come from the party's control over the state apparatus and 
its resources, and Alagappa (1995) on the importance of legitimacy of the party's 
ruling. Such a narrow focus, while helpful for in-depth analysis, runs the risk of losing 
sight of the bigger picture and the broader dynamics of a party's domination. 
Attempting to derive an alternative analytical framework, I argue that to understand 
dominant party politics, it is important to see it as a system. By that, I mean one needs 
to identify the different key actors involved, how they interact among themselves, and 
the changing context within which such interactions take place. The strengths and 
weaknesses of the actors shape their relationships and the contexts in which they 
operate, and vice versa. For a dominant party, the study argues, its very adaptive 
capacity reflects directly how well it manages those relationships and its surrounding 
context. 
To further my argument, I propose a diagram in Figure 3 below. Unlike Figure 2 which 
is a listing of what could be the key explanatory factors for a party's enduring 
dominance, the diagram in Figure 3 depicts a party's domination as a system. That 
system includes key actors (grouped into dominating forces, countervailing forces and 
voters) operating within dominant party politics and their various relationships (i.e. 
relation 1 through 7). In addition, following Easton (1990: 118-33) about a political 
system analysis, the study does not just seek to identify different actors and their 
interactions, but also to examine the dynamics of such interactions and the results and 
changes that they generate. 
Figure 3: Party domination as a system 
The dominating forces, depicted on the left hand side, include the dominant party, the 
elites, the state, and relationships among them (see sections 2.2 and 2.3). The party here 
refers mainly to its 'administrative networks' which exist alongside those of the state. 
Reflecting the usually close relations among the party, the state, and the elite/patronage 
(which is seen here as the 'foundational elements of control' of a dominant party), the 
diagram makes no explicit distinction among elites, government officials and party 
officials. However, reflecting the importance of inter-government relations (section 
2.5), the diagram distinguishes between elites at the central level from those at the sub-
national and local level and suggests that relations between the two (Relationship 2) be 
studied. 
On the right hand side, the diagram shows what is grouped as 'countervailing forces.' 
The current literature usually focuses on the opposition as a key actor in this group. 
However, in the case of a weak state, donors and civil societies should also be included. 
Another actor on the right-side is the voters. As discussed in section 2.4, a party can 
stay dominant partly because of its popular legitimacy which relates directly to voters' 
perceptions and expectations of the state. The framework suggests these countervailing 
forces/actors and voters themselves need to be understood, along with, of course, their 
interactions with the dominating forces. 
The relations between the dominating and countervailing forces occur at both the 
central and sub-national/local levels. At the central level (Relationship 5), a dominant 
party not only seeks control over the state and form elite coalitions, but also uses 
manipulative strategies to weaken the oppositions both by denying them access to the 
state, and interfering in their internal affairs (see sections 2.2 and 2.3). But as Schedler 
(2009) argues, such manipulation can be used only to a point where legitimacy of the 
incumbent is not undermined. Donors and civil societies sometimes can be of help to 
the dominant party (e.g. they provide financial aid and international legitimacy), but at 
other times, their interests diverge and present challenges to the party (e.g. the donors 
and civil societies put pressure on the ruling regime to reform the state and respect 
human rights). 
With decentralization being a popular reform (see section 2.5), the party, and the state 
and elite that it controls, also interacts with the countervailing forces at sub-national 
and local level (Relationship 4). While possibly allowing the ruling party to extend its 
control down to local level, decentralization also represents a new opportunity for the 
opposition, donors and civil societies to establish and expand their presence and have 
more direct contact with voters (Relationship 7). For the dominant party, this means 
that it needs to have a separate set of strategies to deal with these countervailing forces, 
not just at the central but also at sub-national/local level. 
In a democratic system, even a hybrid one, the ruling parties interact with voters from 
whom they expect their votes, and by extension, popular legitimacy. As sections 2.4 
and 2.5 indicate, a ruling party needs to establish legitimacy not only for its central 
ruling but also at the local level. At the same time, the party, through the state it 
controls, needs to deliver services and meet the demands of the voters (Relationship 4). 
Of course, this is the case of an ideal responsive government. But as section 2.3 
suggests, when the state is weak, the party might use patronage-based redistributive 
channels to provide support to voters and thus gain their support. It is also possible that 
the party wishes to use its sub-national and local administration as medium for better 
service deliver to voters in exchange for their support (see section 2.5). 
As discussed in section 2.4, gaining popular legitimacy might also involve the 
incumbent using manipulative, or even oppressive, measures such as control of the 
media, direct vote buying, surveillance and intimidation. These measures, together with 
the incumbency advantages enjoyed by the ruling party, present a set of serious 
challenges for the opposition to reach and gain support from voters (Relationship 7). 
The way in which an opposition deals with this challenge is also a reflection of its own 
adaptive capacity or lack thereof. 
The framework suggests that these actors and their relationships constitute a system of 
party domination. The framework also suggests that one way to assess a dominant 
party's adaptive capacity (which is a key factor for its dominance) is by assessing how 
well it has managed the state, the elite, and other actors, and more importantly, how 
well it has managed the ever-changing relationships among them. These relationships, 
the framework further implies, do not operate separately but in ways that create 
synergies and/or tradeoffs. How well a party manages to find the right balance to 
maximize the synergies and optimize the tradeoffs is a reflection of its adaptability. 
This study uses the framework to guide its inquiries about dominant party politics in 
Cambodia. The next chapter will discuss the approach further and show how the 
framework is operationalized in the context of this study. 
Chapter 3: Research design and field data collection 
This chapter discusses research design and the methods that the study uses to apply the 
framework on 'Party domination as a system' to the case of Cambodia. The research 
design has three main parts to it. 
• First, in examining the way the CPP has managed to stay in power, this study 
uses a single country study approach, with a comparative perspective. The first 
section will discuss the pros and cons of this approach. 
• Second, this study examines the CPP's dominance by looking into the four early 
observations (see section 1.3), namely, budgetary management, rural 
administration, off-budget spending and decentralization. Section 2 will discuss 
these points, and 
• Third, the study conducted an extensive fieldwork to obtain new pieces of 
empirical data to support its arguments. The details of the fieldwork are 
discussed in section 3. 
3.1. A single-country study with a comparative perspective 
In doing comparative studies, a researcher can choose to compare many cases, few 
cases, or even a single case country. Each method has strengths and weaknesses and 
choosing one over another is a function of the particular research questions, the time 
and resources of the researcher, and the method with which the researcher feels most 
comfortable (King et al. 1994; Landman 2008). 
When comparing many countries, it is most suitable to use quantitative methods of 
analysis of the aggregate data collected for those countries (Lijphart 1971). The 
strengths of this method come from its ability to use statistical controls to rule out rival 
explanations and control for confounding factors, the broadness of its coverage, all of 
which contribute to its inference and generalization ability. The availability of data on 
many countries is, however, often the biggest challenge for those attempting such a 
comparison. Plus, some see this method as not particularly promising when trying to 
capture and explain complex causal mechanisms, historical processes, and the 
contextual specificity of a political phenomenon (Landman 2008). 
Comparing few countries (from two to fewer than 20 countries), on the other hand, 
involves intentional selection of the cases. Unless there is a clear rationale as to why 
certain cases are selected, such a study can produce incorrect inferences (Lijphart 
1975). This kind of study, however, is better at capturing the multi-causalities 
embedded in an observed phenomenon. It is said to be 'case-oriented' in the sense that 
it takes a country as the unit of analysis and its attention is often focused on the 
similarities and differences between or among the selected cases (Landman 2008). 
The last method, which this study adopts, is a single-country study. A single-country 
study is considered comparative, Landman (2008: 28) argues, 'if it uses concepts that 
are applicable to other countries, and/or seeks to make larger inferences that stretches 
beyond the original country used in the study'. An inherent limitation of a single-
country study is that any inference drawn from it is less generalizeable, consequently, 
carries less weight in the world of publishing agencies and dominant journals (Lees 
2006). 
However, as other research design scholars (for instance King et al. 1994; Gerring 
2007; Landman 2008) argue, some prominent single country studies have made 
considerable contributions to the field of comparative politics. The strength of this 
approach lies in its ability to examine intensively a political phenomenon. While less 
able in measuring and estimating causal effects, a single case approach is more 
promising when it comes to capturing the causal mechanisms, i.e. how and why a 
relationship takes place (Gerring 2007). Therefore, a case study is a good choice when 
the researcher is interested in documenting and explaining the dynamics of a process or 
the manner in which a phenomenon has emerged and evolved over time. 
Based on the above argument, this study justifies its using a single country case arguing 
that such approach is appropriate because this study does not intend to test hypotheses 
but seeks to explore and explain the causal mechanisms of how the CPP has managed 
to stay in power. The most obvious limitation of this study is the lack of 
representativeness; however, even then, the study attempts to maximize its ability to 
make inferences to the broader literature by adopting a comparative perspective in 
going about explaining the case of Cambodia. 
3.2. Key aspects of the CPP's dominance to be researched 
There are different aspects of party's dominance that a study can look into. For 
instance, it can focus on the way it seeks to dominate business activities within the 
economy, how to handle and co-opt the military, how to control the state, etc. This 
study however, focuses on the four areas as observed at the start, namely, state budget 
control, off budget spending, administrative control and decentralization reform. These 
areas of focus, in addition to limiting the study to a manageable scope, are argued to 
give insights into different aspects of the CPP dominance. In the following, each of 
these areas is discussed as to why they are relevant and what kind of questions should 
be asked about them. 
Key aspect 1: The CPP's management of state budget and patronage interest: From 
the literature discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.3), it is clear that a dominant party needs 
to control state resources and uses it to accommodate elite/patronage in exchange for 
their support. In the case of a weak state, the ruling party also needs to face the fact that 
a large share of the state budget comes from donor support, and that it has to reform the 
budgetary system, partly as a condition of foreign aid. So, the questions to be asked of 
Cambodia in this context are: 
• How has the CPP managed budget and budgetary reform? 
• How has the CPP managed to use state budget control to accommodate elite 
interest in exchange for their support? 
Key aspect 2: The CPP's local administration and rural voters' perception: 
Literature discussion in Chapter 2 (section 2.4) indicates that a dominant party cannot 
rely on state control and elite coalition alone; it also needs to win popular support and 
build its own legitimacy. People's perceptions, the discussion shows, are a key factor 
shaping the kind of legitimacy being valued. The perceptions are in turn shaped by 
specific historical and cultural factors. In addition, a dominant party, as one of its main 
strategies, seeks to influence these perceptions either through both its surveillance 
administrative network and the media. In Cambodia, most voters, in both national and 
local elections, reside in the rural area. So, it is interesting to ask further questions: 
• How has the CPP built its administrative capacity, especially in the rural areas? 
and 
• How has the party sought to shape rural people's perceptions and win rural 
votes? 
The questions about the CPP controlling the state, patronage, and rural voters are all 
addressed in Chapter 5. Opposition parties are also addressed in the discussion. 
Key aspect 3: The CPP and off-budget supports for rural infrastructure projects: 
A key question about a dominant party in a weak state is that: if the state budget is so 
weak and unable to meet popular demand, how can the rulers establish their own 
legitimacy besides being elected? Experience from some African countries has shown 
that the party can use the same elite network that it allows to seek rents from the state to 
respond to some of the popular needs, and in that way, establish its legitimacy. Based 
on this study's early observations, the case of Cambodia provides particularly 
interesting answers to this question. While the state budget is still too small to meet 
many of the people's needs (chapter 5 will show this), it was observed that the CPP has 
been vigorously trying to use its own off-budget spending mechanism to meet 
especially the needs for rural infrastructure. So the questions that this study will ask are: 
• How has the off-budget party support been arranged and given by the CPP? 
• What more can we learn about the CPP from the off-budget support, especially 
in term of its relation with the state, the elite/patronage? and 
• What have the people perceived about the off-budget support and what it means 
for the CPP's legitimization effort? 
These questions will be addressed empirically in chapters 6 and 7. The findings will be 
based on the original empirical data collected for this study. These two chapters 
complement previous chapters in the sense that they zoom in from the bigger picture 
already presented, to focus on the specific mechanisms which the CPP has used to 
manage elite and patronage, and legitimizes itself in the eyes of the voters. They also 
represent the new contribution of this study in term of its empirical findings. 
Key aspect 4: The CPP's management of inter-governmental relations and 
decentralization: Decentralization, the literature review has shown (in chapter 2, 
section 2.5), can be used both to advance local democracy or to further strengthen a 
ruling party. This lies in the reform's potential for local legitimization. However, the 
ruling party can still ensure central control while decentralizing. To deepen its 
knowledge about the CPP, the study plans to answer in chapter 8 the following 
questions about decentralization in Cambodia: 
• What have been the CPP strategies toward decentralization? and 
• How have local legitimization and central control been applied through those 
political strategies? 
Any discussion about these four areas, however, must be carried out within broader 
historical context. Therefore, before focusing on the specific areas, the history of the 
CPP's rise to power since 1979 will be laid out. In that, the historical roots and 
evolution by which a dominant party has mobilized and maintained elite coalitions, the 
way it came to control the state, strengthen its administrative structures and how it has 
managed its relationship with the masses will be presented. That means asking some 
specific questions about the CPP's past, as follows: 
• How was the CPP formed and organized? 
• From historical discussion, what can we learn about the party's relationship 
with the state, patronage and the people? 
• What has the broader political and economic situation been evolving under the 
CPP's rule? 
These questions about the history, together with political, social and economical 
changes will be addressed first in chapter 4 in order to lay out the context in which the 
subsequent chapters will be placed. 
Figure 4: The logic of the study's research design 
3.3. Fieldwork 
The fieldwork undertaken for this study lasted from April 2008 to January 2009. 
Because this study is interested in both the CPP and its relationship to the weak state of 
Cambodia, the fieldwork was designed to focus on both, i.e. on the party and on the 
state. Therefore, it was seeking to collect information about (i) the CPP's administrative 
structure and off-budget support for rural infrastructure, (ii) the government's 
budgetary management and decentralization reform, (iii) people's perceptions about the 
party and its support, and (iv) other contextual information needed to better understand 
the CPP's dominance. 
My fieldwork adopted a number of data collection methods, including: (i) secondary 
data collection, (ii) key informant interviews at central level, (iii) key informant 
interviews at sub-national levels, (iv) a survey with local people, (v) media 
observations, and (vi) direct involvement in the policy process. This study tried to use, 
cross-check and complement the different pieces of information collected from these 
different sources. 
Being a Cambodian, I was able to interact directly with my key informants, most of 
whom are Cambodians, in our mother tongue, Khmer. Having worked as a researcher 
about Cambodia's governance and public sector reform since 2003,1 was familiar with 
the particular cultural sensitivities associated with fieldwork and interviews. This 
allowed me to dig deeper into certain questions or issues, while staying alert and 
respectful of the respondents' concerns and of my own personal safety. 
My previous experience as a researcher in Cambodia provided me with another 
indispensible advantage: my networks with important key informants. My fieldwork 
involved talking to people about certain less-known issues regarding the operation of 
the CPP. Therefore, a certain amount of trust needed to be in place, and my previous 
networks that included these people allowed me to establish such trust with them. This 
trust also came with responsibilities on my side to ensure that I keep strict 
confidentiality of their identities. 
While in my field notes I keep records of all the names of the key respondents, along 
with the date, place and content of my interviews with them, no names have been or 
will be revealed in my writing or any related published documents. I reveal the dates of 
my interviews, and sometimes, the places and official titles of my key informants. I, 
however, took strict precautions not to allow such revelations to be used to uncover my 
informants' identities. 
3.3.1. Secondary data collection and interviews at the central level 
In addition to collecting and reviewing relevant studies, surveys and articles, this 
study made an effort to collect relevant policy documents and data on both the CPP and 
the government. On the CPP, through my key informant networks, I was able to collect, 
amongst other things: 
• Political platforms of the CPP for national development and protection 2008-13: 
72 policy points for the implementation of CPP policy platforms (CPP 2008c), 
• Forty two policy points for the implementation of the CPP policy platforms for 
the development of communes/sawgfetf 2007-12 (CPP 2008d), 
• The CPP' s Statute (CPP 1997) 
• The CPP's data and analysis of election result from 1998 to 2008 (CPP 2008a) 
• The CPP's membership of the Party's Working Group by provinces (CPP 
2008b) 
19 Examples of those useful existing surveys include IRI (2008), Pact (2007), EIC (2008) 
• The CPP's membership by provinces (CPP 2010) 
• The CPP's list of members of the Central Committee and of Permanent 
Committee (CPP 2009), and 
• Gifts of the Samdech Prime Minister Hun Sen and Lok Chumtiev to the people 
throughout the country as of April 04, 2008 issued by the Cabinet of the Prime 
Minister (Cabinet of Prime Minister 2008) 
These documents provide a very good overview of the CPP's structure and its 
management. For instance, I learnt that the CPP has a very detailed document showing 
electoral results for each district and even each commune. In this way, the Party at the 
central level easily linked the results to the specific party members who were assigned 
to take care of specific constituencies. Later chapters (especially chapter 7) will 
elaborate on this. I also learnt that the Party's platforms bear a lot of resemblance to the 
government's formal development policies. 
However, these documents do not tell much about the CPP's actual operation. For 
instance, the Party's 1997 statute tells very little about the real 'budget' of the party and 
how it finances its campaign (CPP 1997). Thus, these documents needed to be 
complemented by key informant interviews at various levels. Later section will 
elaborate more on this. 
On the government, collecting relevant policy documents and data sheets is more 
straight-forward. Some of the key pieces of data collected included: 
• The Government's development policies, budgetary reform documents, and 
policy documents on decentralization (various years of publication), and 
• National budgets from 2008 to 2010, national budget analyses from previous 
years, and budget allocations to sub-national and local governments since 2002 
The government's actual operations, as with the case of the CPP, do not usually reflect 
what is stated in the formal documents. On the contrary, reflecting the neo-patrimonial 
nature of the state, a lot of informality was observed. This required that I do key 
informant interviews with various government officials to understand how such 
'informal business' was actually done. For instance, through interviews, I was able to 
capture the complexity of the budget preparation process, find out how the central 
people had tried to hold on to certain budgetary powers, and how the people at the 
Ministry of Interior and of Finance interacted on the question of decentralization. 
It should be noted that, because the government has been dominated by the CPP, most 
of the government officials I talked to are also CPP party members. Although some of 
them tried to participate in the interviews as government officials, the party-state 
inseparability was still an undeniable contextual background to our discussion and to 
my probing. 
I also talked to two senior officials of the opposition party. Like the CPP, the opposition 
kept some very loosely elaborated formal documents about its arrangements and 
operation. Therefore, I had to rely more on information gained from my interviews to 
learn of its actual operation, and about the achievements and challenges they think the 
party is facing. I also talked to a number of donor and NGO officials who had 
experience working with the government on various reform issues, and/or with political 
parties on the ground. 
3.3.2. Primary data collection and interviews at sub-national levels 
Information collected at the central level helped form a macro-level picture, but it was 
far from being sufficient in providing the details needed about the on-the-ground 
mechanisms to answer the research questions. This was why sub-national and local 
visits were needed. At those levels, I tried to do three things. 
First, I wished to understand the perceptions of the people at the sub-national level of 
the same issues I had investigated with the people at the central level, i.e. the issues of 
budgetary management, of decentralization and of the CPP's off-budget support. As 
with the case of the central level, sub-national government agencies are 
overwhelmingly dominated by the CPP. Therefore, by talking to these people, I 
expected to obtain their perspective not just about the state, but also the party, and the 
relationship between the two. By placing the answers from both the central and sub-
national level together, I expected to better comprehend the central - sub-national/local 
relationship within this CPP-dominated administration. 
Second, I expected to learn more about the CPP's operation on the ground, especially 
the way it had created administrative networks and interacted with local voters. As 
chapter 1 indicates, the CPP was known to have strengthened its grip in the rural areas 
by tightening up its administrative network. So, by talking to party officials on the 
ground, I was seeking to understand how this administration had been set up, and what 
kind of incentives local party officials had received. 
Third, and most importantly, I sought to understand and describe the arrangements of 
the CPP's off-budget support to rural infrastructure. From my interviews at the central 
level, together with selected key documents such as the Prime Minister Cabinet report 
and the list of members in Party Working Group, I had learnt that such off-budget 
support was distributed throughout the country. But to better capture its dynamics and 
mechanism, visiting the 'base' - as the CPP people often say when they go to the the 
local level - was necessary for me. I visited 11 districts, and in those districts, 15 
communes were selected. The selection was made largely to serve the third purpose 
above (more on this in a moment). 
When I started to visit the district and the communes in early April 2008,1 chose to go 
to two districts with which I had very close contact. I expected that the local authority 
and the CPP members there would be open and comfortable enough to share 
information with me. From the two cases, I learnt a lot about the CPP's administrative 
structure and especially about its off-budget support. 
As of May 2008, the fieldwork revealed some primary findings, or hypotheses, which 
were useful for further exploration. On the off-budget spending, I learnt that its 
operation has been expanding over time covering the whole country and has become 
increasingly systematic, but was still kept shadowy. Such shadowy arrangements are 
called 'the Party's Working Groups for Helping the Base,' hereafter referred to as 
PWG. 
Second, contrary to my own initial expectations, I found that, to party officials (almost 
all of whom are also government officials) whom I interviewed, the party's off-budget 
support through the PWG is not something that they need to hide from the outsiders. In 
fact, the support is considered among the achievements and contributions of the party to 
rural development. I also learnt that the locally elected officials have played very 
important roles in the PWG arrangement. 
Case selection - Rationale and methods 
These primary findings convinced me that it was both interesting and possible to 
expand the fieldwork to cover different geographical locations in order to come up with 
a more representative picture of the PWG and other aspects of the CPP operation. 
By that time, I also developed a hypothesis to examine the variation of the PWG 
support and functioning. The hypothesis is that such variation comes from two key 
factors: the remoteness of the locations, and the 'resourcefulness' of the PWG heads 
and key members (chapter 6 has more on the PWG). 
First, the study chose cases to contrast the remote areas (which are mainly located in 
higher land areas), with the lowland, more accessible areas. Such contrast was intended 
by the study to observe the difference in the arrangements and functioning of PWG and 
their interactions with local people in areas where people are more accessible and those 
where people are far from the centre. 
The 'resourcefulness' refers to the PWG's ability to help finance local projects. I 
observed from the early cases that the resourcefulness of a PWG reflects a link between 
two factors: First, it depends on the resourcefulness of its heads and key members. 
Second, the resourcefulness of these individuals depends in turn on their positions 
within the government. This reflects my observation that most of the PWG members 
are government officials, and that the more lucrative a government position is, the more 
rent he might seek, and thus the more he is expected to contribute. This specific 
observation reflects the neo-patrimonial nature of the Cambodian state (Pak et al. 
2007). The following diagram simplifies these links. 
Figure 5: Determination of PWG resourcefulness 
Resourcefulness of Resourcefulness of PWG Resourcefulness of 
government positions • heads/key members 
• PWG 
Based on the above reasoning, the study ranks the resourcefulness of PWG's heads and 
key members as high and low/medium. These individuals' resourcefulness, this study 
argues, depends mainly on which ministries and which positions those people hold 
within the government, as follows20: 
Table 1: Government positions of PWG members and resourcefulness 
Government and other positions Resourcefulness 
Those from Cabinet of Ministers, Ministries of Finance, 
Commerce, Agriculture (especially forestry, fishery), 
Interior, and various revenue-generating and semi-
autonomous authorities 
High 
Those with positions associated with the Prime Minister High 
Those from Ministries of Education, Health, Social 
Affairs, Women Affairs, Information and other non-
revenue generating ministries 
Low/Medium 
Those from legislative branches (including the National 
Assembly and Senate) 
Low/Medium 
The above classification inevitably involves a certain amount of subjectivity, which can 
lead to possible bias in the selection of cases and variables to understand and 
distinguish those cases. Despite such limitations, however, the methods as employed 
can be justified on two grounds for the purpose of this paper. First, the aim of the study 
is not to present a statistically significant sample of PWG. Instead, it aims at describing 
and analyzing the little-known arrangements and functioning of the PWGs and drawing 
their implications on both the evolution of patronage networks and rural development. 
For this purpose, the intentional selection of cases to capture variations around PWGs is 
justified. Second, the cases, and the variables selected to observe them, should be seen 
as guiding signposts aiding the more explorative purpose of the whole study. 
When came to the actual fieldwork, the planned case selection was to some extent 
compromised by the availability of the interviewees. During the fieldwork, some cases 
had to be dropped because some local authorities were too busy preparing for the 
election that was coming up in July 2008, while some others, while they did not feel the 
research topic was too sensitive to give interviews, were asking for formal approval 
20 This ranking also partly reflects the findings from a corruption study by Nissen (2005) which asks 
respondents what groups of people in the government they think are the most and least corrupt. The study 
also reflects on observations made in the unpublished study by Hughes and Conway (2004) on the policy 
process in Cambodia. 
from the central CPP office - something I could not afford at the time. So the study 
ended up choosing those who were available and could make the time. 
In all, I visited 15 communes, in 11 districts, within ten provinces. Table 2 below 
breaks down the eleven district cases by the two criteria mentioned above: 
resourcefulness of PWG and remoteness. 
Table 2: Case selection 
Criteria for case selection # of case districts 
(Total = 11) 




Not remote 8 
Remote 3 
For the cases visited, I was less successful in meeting with provincial level respondents 
(mainly because most of them were busy), but found the party people at district and 
commune levels more welcoming and cooperative. At the district and commune levels, 
I asked to meet the district governor and commune chief, who usually serve as the 
chiefs of the district and commune party branch respectively (which, organizationally, 
is distinct from the PWG). 
Besides the qualitative information obtained from interviews, two other pieces of 
information were provided by district and commune level respondents: 
• Lists of key members of the district and commune PWG, and 
• Lists of the projects provided by the PWG. 
The list of support varies in terms of its completeness: in a few cases, the records are 
complete enough to allow estimation of the dollar value of the PWG supports, while in 
some others, they only show the types of number of projects provided, e.g. number of 
classrooms, length of roads and irrigation channels, and number of times supports were 
provided to a pagoda. As a supplement method, where plausible, I asked the district 
governors and commune chiefs to use their own personal observations and recollections 
to come up with their own estimated values of the support. 
Research ethics are very important to the kind of fieldwork I undertook. First, I fully 
recognized that the topic being studied was sensitive in nature - at least, that was what 
was expected at the start. Thus, confidentiality was treated as the most important ethical 
concern when conducting the interviews. All the names of people interviewed and 
places visited, (with exception of provinces because they are big enough to hide 
specific identity of selected cases) have to be kept confidential. 
Second, it was learned that PWG support is viewed differently by different people: for 
the CPP officials, it has been an act of nation-building and generosity of their party and 
leadership, while for the opposition people, it is viewed as something close to using 
corrupt money to buy votes. Knowing such conflicting views exist, I was very prudent 
not to make the research be seen as taking sides. 
3.3.3. Survey with local people 
The records and all the key informant interviews as described above focus on the 
supply side of the PWG. Another part of the study was intended to understand the 
demand side, i.e. what local people know and think about the party support. To do this, 
a small survey was conducted covering ten of the 15 communes, or in seven out of the 
eleven districts visited21. 
Using semi-structured interviews, the survey was carried out in two groups of 
electorate. The first group is called 'ordinary people,' which refers to local people who 
hold no significant jobs within their community besides the usual farming, laboring and 
running small businesses. About 520 of these people, equivalent to 45 to 55 people 
from each of the ten surveyed communes, were interviewed. In each commune, they 
were selected from three villages with different levels of remoteness. 
The respondents in this group comprised about 55% male, and 45% female, mainly 
from 20 to 60 years of age; about 75% are farmers. Demographically, this group 
represents typical voters in Cambodia, and so, despite its statistical insignificance, the 
survey provides a rough idea of how voters perceive the party financing. 
21 The funding for the survey came from a local institute called Cambodia Development Resource 
Institute (CDRI) 
Table 3: People survey 
Groups of respondents Number of respondents 
Ordinary people 520 
Better informed people 200 
A second group of respondents were those who might be called 'better informed 
people'. About 200 of these respondents were surveyed (or about 20 in each commune). 
Predominantly male, these people were selected according to their types of work which 
gave them some unique influence within their community. Such types of work included 
being members of a pagoda committee, school directors and teachers, vendors, village 
chiefs and deputy village chiefs. 
These people were separately selected for the survey not only because they tend to be 
better informed about development and other affairs within their communes, but also 
because they are the so-called 'head of the wind' {me kjol), who can exercise a certain 
amount of influence on voting decisions of the 'ordinary people.' Historically in 
Cambodia (see for instance Chandler 2008) and in many other developing countries 
(See Case 2002; van de Walle 2006), ruling parties have tried to co-opt such me kjol 
groups to help them deliver votes and ensure their local control. 
3.3.4. Direct involvement in policy process and media observation 
In the field, I had a chance to become directly involved in the policy process relating to 
decentralization reform in Cambodia. Working in my capacity as a part-time fiscal 
decentralization expert in the formulation of the National Program for Sub-National 
Democratic Development (NP-SNDD) from September 2008 to January 2009, I was 
given a rare opportunity to sit in various government and donor-government meetings. 
In these meetings, I made a lot of observation on the administrative process of the state 
management and reform. These events also allowed me to meet more people whom I 
asked for interviews for this study. 
Through these observations, I learnt at first hand about the kind of politics played out 
through the interactions of key stakeholders' interests and their power, such as between 
the Ministries of Interior, Finance, and other line ministries, and the typical and varied 
attitude between central and sub-national level people. While observing these 
individuals, I learnt that these key people do not just play a role representing particular 
governmental levels or agencies; instead, they also have a role in the long chains of 
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patron-client relationships and domains, which overlap with the realms of the state and 
the party. Moreover, many of the government people I observed are also known to be 
heads or key members of the PWG of the CPP. 
To complement the data collecting activities described above, I had also carried out a 
media observations which included my taking notes about CPP activities broadcast on 
TV in the six months prior to the election days in 2008 and my regular updating of local 
newspapers when I was conducting fieldwork. Thanks for the ever-increasing and 
timely updates of local news from Cambodia on the Internet, even during my writing 
period, I also picked up some of the latest developments about the CPP and Cambodian 
politics which further helped with my analyses. 
Having discussed research methodology and fieldwork, this study proceeds to chapter 4 
looking at the historical path of the CPP's rise to dominance. 
Chapter 4: Introducing the CPP and its path to 
domination 
Brownlee (2007) argues that to understand a dominant party, its history has to be 
understood. This chapter, in agreement with Brownlee's argument, takes a historical 
perspective to better understand the CPP's path to dominance. Its objective is to answer 
the questions posed in Chapter 2: 
• How was the CPP formed and organized? 
• From historical discussion, what can we learn about its relationship with the 
state, the patronage and the people? 
• What has the broader political and economic situation been evolving under the 
CPP's rule? 
This chapter provides the context within which the more specific issues to be discussed 
in following chapters are placed. Opposition parties are also included in the discussion. 
The chapter shows that, over time, the CPP has become softer and less violent in its 
approach to ruling. Increasingly, the party has recognized the importance of legitimacy 
and re-inventing its own image from that of a violent and intimidating party to one that 
has brought stability and development to Cambodia. 
This chapter relies more on secondary data and historical analysis to better understand 
the path through which the CPP has journeyed to domination. Yet, what is new about it 
is that it attempts to analyze those data in a framework derived from the literature in 
chapter 2, i.e. focusing on the formative and institutionalized stage of the CPP, its 
relationship with the state and patronage, the building of its administrative structure, 
and equally important, its proven adaptation to electoral politics. In addition to 
providing the context for subsequent discussion, this chapter also points out what is 
already known about Cambodia and the CPP, what is not, and how the following 
chapters will fill in the gaps based on the primary data collected by this study. 
4.1. The CPP from 1979 to 1993 - Survival amidst chaos 
Although it claims to have been established since 1951 (CPP 2008c), the root of the 
CPP as it is known today can be traced back to 1979 when it took power from the 
Khmer Rouge, with backup from the Vietnamese. In post-Khmer Rouge period, 
sometimes described as 'Year Zero', Cambodia was in ruins, both physically and in 
terms of human resources. Against this background, the CPP, then under the name of 
the 'People's Republic of Kampuchea' (PRK) started from scratch, putting in place the 
structure of the state and the Party. Following the Vietnamese model, the Party then 
was structured in ways that penetrate ubiquitously within the states at all levels. 
Scarcity of financial and human resources presented a big challenge at the time. The 
process, it seemed, was done in haste, with the idea that let's first have something in 
place and then let's improvisation took on the task (Gottesman 2003:48-60). 
During that earlier 1980s, setting up the party and state was not the only challenge. The 
PRK's very survival was threatened from the on-going civil war with the Khmer Rouge 
and other resistance groups. These groups, the Khmer Rouge included, were supported 
by the West, while the PRK received its backup from the Vietnamese and the East. The 
imperative of war very much defined the development of the Party and the State 
structure at the time. At the central level, the building of state bureaucracy was not 
given much attention; various ministries were set up, but were hardly given any clear 
functions, let alone sufficient resources and people (Gottesman 2003:48-60). 
With the war going on in the rural areas, it was important for the PRK to establish a 
loyal sub-national administration whose jobs was to execute directives sent from the 
central level. The village however was left mostly autonomous of the centre: village 
chiefs and deputies were appointed because local people knew and trusted them, not 
because of their political affiliations (Slocomb 2004). 
The history of the CPP during the 1980s indicated the inevitability of the conflation 
between the party and the state. The belief that strong local administration is important 
to the power base of the Party also has its root in that period. What is important to note 
was that the development of the state, the Party, and the entanglement between them 
were developing in a hasty manner (Gottesman 2003). With loosely defined and 
implemented rules and structures, it did not take much time even during that early time 
for corruption to become a concern for the party. The recruitment and distribution of 
benefits to party and state officials before long were filled with problems of nepotism 
(Gottesman 2003:48-60). 
But, given the desperate economic condition, most of the corruption was petty 
(Gottesman 2003:223-237). The more serious activities came from the military which, 
with its loosely defined discretion, was using its power to seek rents from the timber 
business, smuggling goods, and extorting money from merchants. The leadership at the 
time was well aware of these problems, but was willing to overlook them for the sake 
of the war itself. The leadership, moreover, was willing to push ahead some other 
unpopular policies including military conscription and forced labor, which led to 
violence and intimidation by the military, police and local authorities of local people 
(Gottesman 2003:223-237). 
In term of the leadership of the party, the period leading up to 1989 witnessed the rise 
and fall of particular individuals and groups, who later on represented different factions 
(or networks) within the Party. The first group whose influence was in decline after 
1979 comprised the former communists who fled to Vietnam during the 1970s war and 
returned to the country to help oust the Khmer Rouge. This group, it was said, was seen 
as not being obedient enough to the Vietnamese. As early as 1982, a new group of 
revolutionaries came onto the power scene, including Heng Samrin, the first head of 
state, Chea Sim, the Minister of Interior, and Hun Sen, who started as the Minister of 
International Affairs, and later on became Prime Minister (Gottesman 2003:223-237). 
These three men are still in power today: Hun Sen is the Prime Minister and the 
strongman of Cambodia, Chea Sim is the President of CPP, and Heng Samrin is the 
Honorary President of the CPP and President of the National Assembly. Nowadays, the 
photographs of these three men are presented together along with the CPP logo. 
Chea Sim was at the time considered the most influential, preferring to wield his power 
through personal connections and appointing his people to key positions. Among those 
people was Sar Kheng, Chea Sim's brother-in-law, who not long after Chea Sim's rise, 
was made the chief of the cabinet of the Central Committee (Gottesman 2003:214-217). 
Sar Kheng is currently the first Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. Until 
today, Sar Kheng is still thought to be in Chea Sim's faction. While Chea Sim was the 
first to practise the art of building patronage networks, it was the strongman-to-be Hun 
Sen who took such practices to another level. 
At the start of the PRK, Hun Sen was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He 
was known to be good at appeasing the Vietnamese and a quick learner, especially 
when it came to maneuvering through the bureaucracy. One thing he learned at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that, given the loosely defined structure and procedures 
at the time, the ministry was a fertile place to build a patronage system. As a Minister, 
Hun Sen saw the importance of this, and was more successful in attracting many 
intellectuals to work for him (Gottesman 2003:207-8). 
In 1982, Hun Sen was appointed the Deputy Prime Minister, a new post which allowed 
him to further extend his network. By the time he was appointed Prime Minister in 
1985, Hun Sen had already created his own base of power using his personal 
connections in the Council of Ministers (CoM) (Gottesman 2003:211). Hun Sen 
strengthened his base within the CoM and expanded the size and responsibility of the 
CoM itself. He was also active in recruiting educated Cambodians who had returned 
from Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. In the next four years (i.e. until 
1989), Hun Sen's role became increasingly significant, driving a number of key 
policies including that on the unpopular military conscription as well as the economic 
liberalization that took place in 1989 (Gottesman 2003:212-34). 
Through these years, Hun Sen was seen by some people as a reformist and a pragmatist. 
Not very ideological to begin with, Hun Sen was quick to understand the changes 
taking place elsewhere in the socialist world. It was clear to him that, with the Eastern 
bloc now crumbled, PRK would soon be on its own. Once again, the survival of the 
regime itself was at stake. The leadership then, with Hun Sen playing a leading role, 
was pushing to reform both its war strategy and economic development. The results of 
these reforms were Hun Sen's negotiation with King Sihanouk, and economic 
liberalization in the late 1980s (Gottesman 2003:276-79). 
The move to a free market economy was one of the first examples of the CPP's 
adaptive strategy and a good example of the thinking of the Party's leadership. The 
economic reform was a survival strategy adopted to respond to the most urgent needs. 
As such, it was not carefully planned, leading to a lot of corruption in privatization and 
other liberalization policies. The reform brought corruption to a new level, accelerating 
the practice of rent-seeking among public officials who used their authority to exploit 
privatization transactions and colluded with private businesses. 
Three points are of importance about this change. First, all the corrupt activities were 
happening within a patronage way: profits earned by state and party cadres in the free 
market filtered upward to powerful patrons and those with the authority to give 
permission for private business ventures (Gottesman 2003:276-300). Second, this 
period also saw the rise of economic elites within the ranks of the party. This new 
group, unlike the military and older generation comrades, knew better how to deal with 
private business people both within and outside the country. Third, this period also saw 
Prime Minister Hun Sen accumulating his influence rapidly by mobilizing and 
embracing this new group of economic elites (Gottesman 2003:276-300). 
The rent seeking that was unleashed led to an even weaker state bureaucracy, where 
low-paid state officials were widely involved in taking bribes, and powerful officials, 
confronted with a new amount of wealth, were seeking rents for personal enrichment. 
Provincial authorities were also let loose, colluding with private businesses and keep 
tax money for both themselves and their patrons at the higher level. In Gottesman's 
words (2003:329), 'local positions were valued according to their revenue-generating 
potential... authority was handed down; money was passed upward'. 
In other words, the rent accumulated was shared among a small group of people who 
held or had access to the state authority. The rent was not translated to any development 
on the ground. On the contrary, local people were experiencing exploitation and 
suppression resulting from the predatory acts of state officials. That was the image of 
the state and the CPP that stuck in people's minds from that period. 
What happened to the Party amidst all these changes? How involved was the party in 
all these rent-seeking and patronage network expansions? Members of several party 
committees such as youth, women and propaganda who were not part of the state 
apparatus found themselves cut off from the new game of self-enrichment, as they did 
not possess any potential for revenue generation. Provincial level party officials, most 
of whom also held state positions, however, stayed relevant, busying themselves with 
new opportunities for making money. By that time, then, it was already clear that the 
party as an institution was already changed, for it was personal relationships rather than 
an ideological strand that held people together (Gottesman 2003:329-30). 
At first, the patronage was mainly focusing on personal enrichment. However, in 
expectation of election that was about to be held (and eventually took place in 1993), 
state officials also started to think of how to manage their patronage networks for the 
benefits of the Party (Gottesman 2003:329-30). This subtle change can be seen as an 
early instance of patronage evolving to be more tied up with the Party's interests in 
order to respond to electoral pressures. The Party and its leadership saw the value of 
patronage-based support, and thus allowed them to benefit directly and personally from 
the local economy. This strategy was devised and pushed particularly by Prime 
Minister Hun Sen, who believed that 'if there aren't any [profits, the system] won't 
work.' (quoted in Gottesman 2003:299). 
Although there was some mentioning of party member making contributions to help 
prepare the Party for the election (Mehta and Mehta 1999), it was at the time not really 
a systematic mobilization of resources to fund rural development projects as would 
occur from 1995 onward. What the Party seemed to focus on then was strengthening 
the administrative structure at the local level and using mainly violence and 
intimidation (Heder and Ledgerwood 1996). The thinking at the time was consistent 
with the CPP's background as a Communist party which normally relied on its rural 
base to stay in power. Thus, building local administrative networks was accelerated. In 
doing that, the CPP was also working toward including the military, police and local 
authority as part of its system to mobilize people and conduct surveillance at the local 
level, all of which was put into use to obtain votes in the 1993 election (Gottesman 
2003). 
4.2. The CPP from 1993 to 2008 - From losing to dominating 
The CPP's organizational capacity proved inadequate and it lost at the 1993 election. 
Democratic elections, together with the unprecedented involvement of the West, 
changed the rules of the game. To rule a country, a regime now had to win the election. 
And the CPP had just lost that election. However, the party had other more forceful 
elements of power: its control over the loosely structured state apparatus, especially at 
the provincial level downward, as well as the penetrating patronage networks that ran 
through it. The CPP first rejected the results of the election, but later on, was able and 
accepted a uniquely arranged coalition government, wherein Prince Ranaridh of the 
winning Royalist Party was to become the first Prime Minister, and Hun Sen the second 
(Mehta and Mehta 1999:111). 
A brief discussion about the Royalist party is necessary here. Commonly known as 
Funcipec (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et 
CooperatiJ), the party was led by Prince Ranaridh, Sihanouk's son. Funcipec emerged 
out of the National United Front, which was founded on March 21, 1991 at the 
Cambodia-Thai border to 'liberate Cambodia from Vietnamese occupation' (Kovick 
and Emling 2003). In 1993, although Funcipec's ability to campaign in rural areas was 
restricted due to intimidation and violence perpetrated by the CPP, the party's 
connection with the former King who was still popular, gave it a competitive edge. It 
also campaigned on the basis that it was a fighter against the Vietnamese occupation 
and that CPP's leadership were themselves Khmer Rouge (Sullivan 2005). Funcipec 
brought along a new type of elite into Cambodia, including many Cambodian 
diasporas, who had fled the wars. These diasporas were later labeled by the CPP as 
people who were always ready to flee (Hughes 2009). 
The coalition was the first government elected after Cambodia had reverted to a 
monarchy. The well-liked and missed King Sihanouk returned as the King. The senior 
partner in the coalition at the time, Funcipec, was enjoying its 'sweet time,' although it 
did not last long. Besides the popular Royalist brand, Funcipec was not administratively 
strong even when it had just won the election. Right after coming to power, the Royalist 
party's main concerns were not only to compete with its coalition partner, but also to 
manage its own internal affairs. In addition, despite holding a majority of the 
ministerial portfolios, the Royalist party as a winner was not successful in penetrating 
the CPP-controlled sub-national administration. Every time the Prince complained 
about his inability to appoint even a normal bureaucrat, Hun Sen responded with a 
politically correct statement about the separation between political and bureaucratic 
spheres, while he himself knew perfectly well that such a separation did not exist in 
Cambodia (Mehta and Mehta 1999:113). 
As with the CPP, internally, in the wake of the electoral defeat, rumors were heard that 
Hun Sen's authority and leadership style were being questioned within the Party. The 
Party congress held in 1996 led to speculation that factions existed within the Party, 
especially between those of Hun Sen and Chea Sim. Hun Sen came out quickly to 
scotch those rumors (Mehta and Mehta 1999:113). As with the party-based patronage 
network, although there was no specific evidence about its changing nature at the time, 
anecdotal evidence suggested that it did not shrink with the party's defeat; instead, it 
was expanding itself quietly to cover private Cambodian businessmen and tycoons 
(Mehta and Mehta 1999:113). 
The power sharing between the CPP and Funcipec did not turn out well. An event 
which occurred in 1994 is worth mentioning here: the Royalist finance minister, Sam 
Rainsy, was dismissed in 1994. His dismissal was said to be the result of both the 
CPP's strategy to divide the Royalists, and the Prince's personal resentment of him 
(Mehta and Mehta 1999). In 1995, Sam Rainsy went on to form his own party, the 
Khmer National Party (KNP). Despite significant legal obstacles and political violence 
the KNP had to face, its popularity grew rapidly. The party was however still small in 
term of membership and was weak in term of organizational structure. 
Politics at the time continued to be dominated by the power struggle within the 
coalition, which eventually led to factional fighting in 1997. Prince Ranaridh was 
ousted from the country. The CPP claimed the fighting was its pre-emptive action 
against the Royalists who were alleged to have cooperated with the former Khmer 
Rouge to overthrow the coalition. The Royalists called it an outright 'coup' (Roberts 
2001). Regardless of the accusations, what the CPP had done in 1997 and afterward 
was quite successful in putting itself back onto the path to domination. 
The 1997 victory was the result of not only the CPP's military strength, but also its 
strategy of divide-and-rule aiming at weakening the Royalists. Prince Ranaridh at the 
time was not only facing a military defeat, but was also charged by the CPP-dominated 
court for illegally importing weapons. His party was drastically weakened, being split 
into at least nine factions. The Party had been having internal problems since the 1993 
government formation (Mehta and Mehta 1999:119-20). In addition to internal 
conflicts, the CPP was reasonably suspected of being behind the split (Mehta and 
Mehta 1999:250). Since then, CPP has repeatedly used divide-and-rule strategies to 
weaken the opposition (Blue et al. 2009). 
Right after the 1997 fighting, the CPP was making efforts to restore its own legitimacy 
in the face of international donors, some of whom were withholding their support for 
Cambodia, but none had so far as to call the fighting a 'coup.' After a period of 
diplomatic effort, the CPP was able to win back the support of the regional and 
international community who understood that the CPP, given all of its less democratic 
characteristics, was the only party able to bring stability to this war-torn country 
(Sullivan 2005). But the CPP knew it had to do more than that to ensure both external 
and domestic legitimacy of its rule. In addition to stability, the CPP after the 1997 
incident had to hold a free and fair election in 1998, as expected (Sullivan 2005). 
The CPP, and Prime Minister Hun Sen, tend to think like chess players, planning 
several strategic moves at the same time. In parallel to defeating the Royalists using 
outright military strength and the divide-and-rule strategy, the CPP also managed to 
neutralize the monarchy, particularly King Sihanouk himself. By the time Prince 
Ranaridh was ousted, the ailing King had already acknowledged Hun Sen as 
Cambodia's strongman. After the fighting, he no long supported his own son, the 
Prince, but backed Hun Sen's claim to the UN seat after the 1997 fighting (Mehta and 
Mehta 1999:250). The King was trying to save the monarchy itself, and taking side 
with Hun Sen was his survival strategy, something that Sihanouk has been particularly 
good at. From then on, the monarchy ceased to be the CPP's problem, but its source of 
legitimacy. 
In preparing for the 1998 elections, CPP and its leader were trying to adapt and strike 
an appropriate balance between control and legitimacy in winning and ruling. The fear 
that his CPP might lose the 1998 election was very real for Hun Sen at the time. 
However, the CPP leadership also understood that it could not just rely on its 
administrative ability to mobilize votes (which involved some amount of intimidation 
and vote-buying) to deliver victory. Doing that, even if the party did win, would not 
make the election free and fair enough in the eyes of international community. 
Consequently, other strategies were initiated. First, the party was trying to gradually 
soften its image and broaden its appeal (Mehta and Mehta 1999:247). It did that by 
intensifying its support for rural infrastructure projects as a way to restore and invent a 
more favorable image. Such support, as chapters 6 and 7 will show, has been expanded 
and arranged around the so-called Party Working Group (PWG) of the CPP. In addition 
to this, it also became more vigorous in using its divide-and-rule strategies to weaken 
its opposition, which then included both the Royalists and the KNP. 
In 1998, a KNP senior official, allegedly paid off by the CPP, formed a splinter group 
and claimed the party's name. Sam Rainsy filed a complaint to the Ministry of Interior, 
but to no avail. Sam Rainy was eventually forced to adopt his own name for his party 
ensuring that voters could identify the party with himself, and thus called the party the 
Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). 
The CPP did win the 1998 election, with 41.4 % of the votes. The Royalists got 31.7%, 
and SRP 14.3 %. The level of electoral violence was still high especially in some rural 
provinces (Sullivan 2005). However, the result of the election was accepted by the 
international community. But the result was not all positive. Hun Sen was losing in two 
of his strongholds: his birthplace province, Kompong Cham, and Kandal where he 
lives. Hun Sen since 1993 had been pumping in a lot of his personally-raised funds to 
support development in these two provinces. Losing them, therefore, was a personal 
disappointment, and a somewhat negative rating for Hun Sen as an individual politician 
(Mehta and Mehta 1999:247). But, as will be shown in later chapters, he would not be 
deterred. Instead, over the years, he and his party would increase its support for such 
development activities, in order to build its image. 
The Royalists and the SRP at first rejected the electoral result. But after a period of 
political deadlock, with pressure from both the international community and the King 
himself, Prince Ranaridh agreed to form a coalition government with the CPP, this time 
as a 'junior' partner. SRP was left alone as an opposition party. Sam Rainsy, the 
President of the SRP, never trusted the Prince, so when the Prince left him to form the 
coalition with Hun Sen, Sam Rainsy felt he had been betrayed for the second time. The 
lack of trust between the two opposition leaders worked only to the advantage of the 
CPP, which was restlessly working to consolidate its power in virtually every aspect of 
the state (Un 2006). 
As the winning partner in the coalition, the CPP controlled most of the key ministries, 
including the Ministry of Interior, Finance, CoM, Forestry, etc. some of which used to 
be in the hand of the Royalist (Roberts 2009). Ministerial takeover completed the 
domination of the CPP whose control over provincial, district and commune had never 
been challenged. Another important development was the creation of the Senate, to be 
presided over by the CPP's President Chea Sim. Chea Sim before 1998 was the 
President of the National Assembly, but the position was now given to Prince Ranaridh. 
The Senate was a new 'post' created to accommodate the growing number of 
politicians wanting titles within the government (Roberts 2009). This study argues that, 
given the usual weakness of the legislative branch in Cambodia, the Senate was 
intended to be a place where mostly the 'old guard' were 'kicked upstairs.' That Chea 
Sim was being put up as the President of this new legislative body was a clear 
indication of his declining influence. 
Partly to appease the international community and partly in its own interest, the CPP 
after 1998 launched various institutional reform programs, ranging from military de-
mobilization, civil service reforms, and more noticeably and particularly relevant to this 
study, decentralization. In 2002, the CPP-led government held elections at the 
commune level, which until then was controlled by CPP-appointed chiefs, most of 
whom had been holding the posts since before 1993. The CPP won more than 98% of 
the chief positions at the commune election. This meant that, with the election, the 
CPP, while losing only less than 2% of its control, now ruled the Cambodian 
countryside, this time with electoral legitimacy. 
The Royalists continued on to lose dramatically in the 2002 election, polling half a 
million fewer votes compared to 1998, while the SRP was emerging to replace the 
Royalists as an opposition party (Rusten et al. 2004; Sullivan 2005). The second 
commune election was held in 2007 and the result was the same major victory for the 
CPP. 
The next national election was in 2003, and expectedly, the CPP won even more votes, 
but not enough to control two-thirds of the parliamentary seats to form the government 
on its own. The SRP and Royalists once again used this Constitutional requirement to 
prevent the CPP from creating the government. The deadlock went on for about a year. 
The CPP and Hun Sen were arguing that, without a new government, the existing one 
would have to continue as a 'house-keeping' government (Sullivan 2005). During that 
period of deadlock, a few interesting points emerged. 
First, the demand from the SRP and the Royalists together indirectly indicated the 
importance of Hun Sen as an individual politician within the Party. The SRP and the 
Royalist specified that they would join the government only if there was no Hun Sen. 
The opposition was also staging various public rallies attacking the Prime Minister 
(Sullivan 2005). The opposition, this study reflects back, was expecting that by blaming 
Hun Sen as the cause of the problem, they would subtly ignite the long-suspected 
factional problems within the Party, especially between Hun Sen and Chea Sim 
factions. 
Confronted with this deadlock, the CPP and Hun Sen, surprisingly, showed a lot of 
restraint and went along with a series of negotiations demanded by the opposition 
(Sullivan 2005). With all the power it had by the year 2003, it was quite tempting for 
the CPP to use a rather openly coercive method to suppress the opposition. But it did 
not. Instead, it chose the more patient approach of breaking up the opposition by luring 
the Royalists to join the government, with the alleged offer of bribes to its key officials. 
Complementing that, the CPP was also using support from King Sihanouk to indirectly 
pressure the Royalist party to give in. Consequently, in mid 2004, the Royalists agreed 
to the CPP's favorable terms for joining the coalition (Sullivan 2005). The attempt by 
the opposition parties to ignite factional problems within the CPP back-fired. Confident 
now that they could go alone ruling the country, the CPP proposed in 2005 to amend 
the two-thirds majority requirement in the Constitution. The SRP, which believed it had 
been betrayed for the third time by the Royalists, supported the proposal. 
The amendment made the political future of the Royalists very bleak. But it was not 
just the amendment. The Royalists' internal crackdown continued to worsen. Just 
before the 2008 election, Prince Ranaridh himself was voted out of the Party. He went 
off to form a new Party and named it after himself. In their 2008 campaign, the 
Royalists had almost nothing to offer but the promise that the Prince would bring 
prosperity to Cambodia just as his father did during the 1970s22. The SRP seemed to be 
a stronger opposition. It was campaigning strongly on the land grabbing issue, the high 
price of gas, corruption, and the border problem23. But it was suffering from many 
internal problems as well, reasonably believed to have been caused by CPP's divisive 
strategies. In the three month period before the election, its President was sued by the 
CPP, and some of its parliamentary members and activists were bought off (Thayer 
2009). 
22 Personal TV broadcast observation from April to July 2008 
23 ibid 
Only a few cases of violence and intimation were reported during the 2008 election 
(Blue et al. 2009), an improvement which suggested that the CPP has become softer in 
its strategies for winning votes. Rhetorically, the CPP in 2008 was campaigning more 
on a platform of development and stability, and less on its name as a savior of 
Cambodian people from the Khmer Rouge24. This is different from the previous 
elections: in 1993 its rhetoric emphasized its savior role, in 1998 it was hammering 
security and stability, and now it was development that it was taking the lead. By 
development, the CPP was actually emphasizing the fact that in the last 15 years or so, 
its members, particularly the Prime Minister Hun Sen, had been increasingly helping 
build roads, schools, irrigation projects, and pagodas all over the country. This was a 
very innovative and effective strategy that the CPP has increasingly come to rely on 
building its image and creating legitimacy in the eyes of the rural people. This claim 
will be substantiated with empirical data and analyses presented in chapters 6 and 7. 
From my media and field observation, the CPP campaign was also replete with gift 
giving. Everywhere the CPP people went, in the 2008 or previous elections, rice, soaps, 
MSG, sarongs were distributed. The SRP equated such practices and the giving of 
development projects with vote buying. More discussion on these CPP's controversial 
practices will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7. However, from my field visits, the SRP 
was also involved in such gift giving. In some communes, visiting SRP officials 
provided 15 packs of vitamins for each household. 
SRP has also been accused of promising its local activists the positions of district and 
provincial governors should SRP win. The CPP saw this practice and used it to attack 
the SRP for running a scam. In some districts, the Prime Minister Hun Sen recently 
recalled, people were selling their cattle and rice fields to finance the (SRP) party, but 
then found out that at least ten to 15 people in the same districts were promised the 
same governor position25. However, this study argues, given the lack of resources 
afforded by the SRP, and the existing domination by the CPP, such false promises and 
small gifts from the SRP are on a minor scale. In spite of allegation about vote buying, 
the 2008 election was run with fair normality. 
24 Personal media observation from April to July 2008 
25 Hun Sen, broadcast on TVK, February 24, 2010 
4.3. The CPP from 2008 until now - Alone in the driving seat 
The CPP won in 2008 - more than it had expected. When the CPP was proposing to 
have the two third majority requirement of the Constitution amended, it could be 
argued that the Party was rather unsure of its ability to win two thirds of the 
parliamentary seats. However, in 2008 the CPP won 90 out of the 123 parliamentary 
seats, more than the two thirds needed. The SRP managed to win 26 seats. Prince 
Ranaridh got only 2 seats, a result so devastating that it forced him and other Royalist 
members to resign from politics altogether. The CPP went off to form a government on 
its own for the first time. 
However, the CPP ceded some posts (some as high as Deputy Prime Minister) to some 
individuals who used to be Royalist members but who have been more 'amicable' with 
the CPP in the last five or ten years (Thayer 2009). While the CPP was on the rise, 
King Sihanouk abdicated and won support from the CPP-controlled Council of the 
Throne to appoint his 50 year-old bachelor and soft-spoken son, Sihamony, as the next 
King (Thayer 2009). 
With its ever-expanding domination, the CPP as a political organization has also been 
transformed. Typical of a political party in a developing country, the CPP is non-
ideological, but pragmatic in shaping its appeals to the voter. Its logo is a Khmer-style 
angel wishing people good luck and prosperity. It has also tried to associate itself with 
local development, depicting its logo and the photos of its leadership along with 
pictures of infrastructure projects it has helped to build in the last 15 years or so. In this 
image building, the Party also continuously strove to strengthen its tight and well-
organized administrative network. 
From the fieldwork conducted for this study, it was observed that the CPP structure as 
of 2008 had come closer and was more identifiable with the state structure. The party 
now has a structure that reaches down to lower than the village level. That level is 
called 'group' which consists of eight to ten households. Heads of the 'groups,' 
working under the supervision of CPP-appointed village chiefs and elected CPP 
commune chiefs, are responsible for maintaining the current members, attracting new 
members, conducting surveillance, and mobilizing people for party-related activities26. 
When agreeing to be a member, a villager would be given a party photo-ID. Being a 
26 Fieldwork interviews with CPP provincial party chief, May 17-18,2008. 
member means that the person somewhat agrees to be seen as a part of the CPP's 
network, a key benefit of which is that he or she will not be identified as a target for 
abuse or to be excluded from whatever benefits that come through the network itself 
(Hughes 2003; Hughes 2006). However, being a member, it should be noted, does not 
mean that the person will vote for the CPP. 
Prime Minister Hun Sen stood out amidst the rising domination of the CPP. Like his 
party's image, his image too has been changing, but in less obvious and rather 
contradictory way. As his biographer summed up about ten years ago, Hun Sen the 
strongman is a different person to different people: reformer, democratic, a dictator, a 
strategist (Mehta and Mehta 1999). Such conflicting images of him still persist -
probably intentionally. To the local people, this study observes, he tries to portray 
himself as one of them by harvesting rice, walking barefoot with his entourage in the 
rice fields; to the donors and some ministerial officials, he portrays himself as a reform-
minded leader. 
Sometimes, he claims he might run for at least two more terms, at others, he talks about 
preparing the next generation for leadership; to some of his subordinates, he is a strict 
boss, scolding them on TV for some wrongdoings, and to his opposition, he wields 
words used by street gangs to attack them27. Lately, he has even tried the ideas of 
making the rural people believe he is the incarnation of a glorious peasant king28. With 
his rising influence, it seems also that any potential within-party challenges have been 
minimized29. 
After winning the 2008 election, the CPP, as one long time political observer plainly 
put it, 'controls virtually everything.'30 Even so, domination is a process, not an end 
state, and the CPP, intentionally or not, continues to adapt itself to the changing 
environment. Two recent trends to further the CPP's domination have been observed. 
First, it is increasingly evident that the CPP is now working to co-opt more private 
interests, either local or foreign investors to come under its umbrella. It is a common 
understanding that in Cambodia, anyone who wants to do business must have good 
27 Personal media observation from April to July 2008 
28 TVK, November 30,2009 
29 Just in 2008, Hun Sen ousted a four star general known to be closely tied with the ailing Chea Sim on 
the charge he was involving land grabbing problem, Cambodia Daily, Jan 23, 2009 
30 November 06,2009 
connections with the CPP and its influential elites (Cock 2010). Many of CPP elites and 
their families have also become more involved in business, opening new hospitals, 
private schools, and farms 1 Some others however have been involved in the 'less 
normal' businesses, namely, land speculation, with some even accused of land 
grabbing . 
With the Royalist now gone, the only noticeable opposition party remaining is the SRP. 
In the 2008 elections, despite all the political interference from the CPP, it still 
managed to win an additional two seats, increasing its number from 24 to 26. However, 
for the CPP, the SRP is still too small to present any immediate political threat. It is not 
only small in terms of parliamentary representatives, but also (or, more importantly) 
small because it has no place in and no access to the executive branch. That means it is 
not only small but also poor. CPP politicians, during the recent electoral campaign, 
mocked the opposition when they said to the people: 'How can they deliver you a car 
when they themselves ride a bicycle?33' In addition, the CPP national politicians, 
attempting to prevent their people from defecting to the opposition, sometimes uses a 
line like: ' Who would want to leave a villa to stay in a hut?'' 
However, when meeting with some national and sub-national activists of the SRP, I 
noticed a sense of optimism among them35. Of course, who would want to say in an 
interview that his or her party will remain a loser for as far as they can see? Yet, their 
optimism is not entirely an illusion. Compared to the 1998 election, the SRP in 2008 
increased its votes from 14.3% to 22% or from 700,000 to about 1,320,000 votes. With 
the decentralization reform (chapter 8 has more on this), SRP had managed to win 
16.7% of the votes in the 2002 commune elections and 25.2% in the 2007 elections 
(CPP 2008a). 
Now, the SRP has about 2,660 councilors at the commune level, equivalent to 23.5% to 
total number of commune councilors. As a result of the 2009 elections at the district 
and provincial levels, the SRP also managed to win 61 (16.31%) of provincial council 
seats, and 518 of district council seats (18.1%). The Royalist gets around 3% of total 
31 The example is the family of the Minister of Defense whose family started a hospital close to his 
residence (Personal observation) 
32 Cambodia Daily, Jan 26,2009; Personal observation of the author 
33 Note from the fieldwork, April to June, 2008 
34 Fieldwork interviews, July 24,2008 
35 Interviews with SRP officials, April 03,2010 
seats on both provincial and district councils36. Once again, however, because the 
executive branches of the provinces and districts are appointed by the central level, the 
SRP still does not have its people within the administration, and thus, still has no access 
to the state at the sub-national levels. However, the SRP leadership, with such an 
electoral record, does have a reason for some optimism — or at least something to tell its 
supporters. 
4.4. Political and economic situation under the CPP 
State governance under the CPP has been weak and corruption rampant. Transparency 
International in 2008 ranked Cambodia the 14th most corrupt country out of the 179 
nations surveyed. Corruption has also been consistently pointed out as the biggest 
detriment to business and investment activities in the country37. Recently, however, 
there seems to be increasing recognition within the CPP about the corruption associated 
with own officials. At its 35th annual Central Committee Congress, for instance, Hun 
Sen, who was confirmed as the candidate for Prime Minister in 2013, warned that he 
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would not provide protection to any party officials committing illegal activities . How 
this warning will turn out in reality remains to be seen. But it is expected to be a very 
difficult task, trying to curb systematic corruption in Cambodia. 
Despite that, however, Cambodia under the 
CPP has experienced unprecedented 
political stability and security for the last 
10-15 years, which seems to have increased 
in parallel with the party's sense of security 
of being in power. This improvement has 
obviously been felt among people 
especially those in rural areas (Meerkerk et 
al. 2008). Economic growth has also been 
impressive. Starting in 1999, the economy 
began to accelerate in parallel with political stability and the CPP's increasing 
dominance. Up to 2007, average growth was calculated to be almost 10% (9.8% to be 
exact) per annum, with inflation below 5%. The growth has increased GDP per capita 
36 Neak Kloamtneul Bulletin, No. 38, Year 11, June 30,2009, based on NEC data 
37 Cambodia Daily newspaper, June 16, 2008 
38 Phnom Penh Post newspaper, July 23,2010 
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from US$285 in 1997 to US$593 in 2007, and contributed to reduction of poverty from 
39% in 1994 to 34% 2004, and 31% in 2007 (RGC 2008b; Guimbert 2010). 
The Cambodian economy has been driven by four sectors: garments, tourism, 
construction and agriculture. The industry and service sectors annually account for 4.5 
and 4.8 points of growth, respectively, while only 2.0 for the agriculture sector. What 
this means is that the economy has undergone a significant change: in 2007, agriculture 
ranked behind the other two sectors, a situation of complete opposition to that of the 
year 1993. Such speed of transformation makes Cambodia one of those countries 
experiencing sustained economic growth over the past half century (Guimbert 2010). 
The rate of growth is even more impressive given the fact that Cambodia is a post-
conflict country. 
While the economy has been growing, so has inequality, the World Bank reported in 
2007. In the period from 1994 to 2004, the average living standard measured as 
consumption of goods and services per capita per day rose by 32%. However, for the 
poorest fifth of the population, the rise was only 8%. The Bank also found that the 
inequality rise has been driven mainly by increasing intra-rural inequality, which in turn 
was pushed up in the period from 1993 to 1997. The magnitude of inequality is noted to 
be most alarming when the issues of land ownership and land grabbing are considered 
(World Bank 2007). 
Donors have become key influential actors in Cambodia, watching the rise of the CPP. 
The donors' importance derives directly from the amount of money they have poured 
into this post-conflict country. For the period from 1992 to 2009, Cambodia received 
US$9.79 billion in foreign aid. Aid per capita increased from US$40 in 1992 to US$80 
in 2009 (RGC 2010a). This is more or less the same as the government revenue per 
capita which amounted to about US$75 in 2008. The relationship between donors and 
the RGC has been mixed: on some policies (such as decentralization) they are partners, 
but on some (such as on forestry) they are harsh critics of each other. It is also noted 
that, despite their long working experience with the same government led by the CPP, 
the donor community in Cambodia seems to have little understanding of this dominant 
political organization. A prominent scholar of Cambodia, Caroline Hughes, put that the 
CPP is still like a 'black box' to outsiders such as donors, especially Western ones 
(Hughes 2009). 
Despite the large volume of aid and the years of reforms, Cambodia's public 
administration is still weak. State budget resources are still small, which in turn leads 
to, among other things, low salaries for state employees. While the government has 
been working to increase average salary from about US$30 per month in 2004 to 
US$64 in 2008 (RGC 2008b), this level is very low, much lower than what is required 
to earn a decent living. The low salaries have led to high absenteeism among teachers 
and health workers, police taking bribes along the streets and many other everyday 
forms of petty corruption. 
Since 1993, another hard-to-miss fact about Cambodian governance is the surging 
number of international and local NGOs within the country. These NGOs are mostly 
funded by donors, and are working on various activities ranging from human rights 
advocacy to direct service delivery at the community level. However, the relationship 
between the government and the NGOs has been an unfriendly and untrusting one 
(Hughes and Un 2007). Some NGOs, especially those in advocacy work, have been 
criticizing the government on the issue of human rights and corruption. The 
government responds, claiming that those NGOs do the talking only to get money from 
donors and that the NGOs too are corrupt. Recently, the government made public its 
plans to introduce a new law to regulate the activities of about 3,000 NGOs working in 
the country39. 
Cambodian people in general are still very quiescent in their interactions with the 
government and state agencies. Firstly, there is still limited demand for information 
relating to public matters, and the government has not been accustomed to the culture 
of information sharing either (Malena and Chhim 2009). Paternalistic attitudes between 
citizens and authority, citizens' lack of awareness of information rights and a general 
sense of disempowerment contribute to their reluctance to demand information. It is not 
that people do not feel they need to know about what is going on around them. 
However, their curiosity is still limited by matters that can directly and immediately 
affect their lives, which include security and health (CAS and World Bank 2007). 
Cambodian people are well aware that the government is corrupt. For example, they 
know that to get a job within the government, one needs spend at least $100 to become 
even a normal policeman (PACT 2007). People experience corruption through their 
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interactions with state authorities, including policemen, teachers, and health workers. 
People seem to grow rather accustomed to corruption, and, in some instances, even find 
small corruption normal and helpful, allowing them to get things done quickly when 
dealing with the government (PACT 2007). This does not mean that people like being 
asked for informal fees; it is just that they have no choice but to pay the small amount 
of 'gratitude money' to get things moving. However, corruption can have severe impact 
on poorer people's daily lives (Nissen 2005; EIC 2006). 
The realization about corruption and its ill-effects has, however, rarely led to people's 
outright protest. Rarely that people take up collective action to demand for better 
education and health services, for more support in agriculture and irrigations, etc. 
However, lately, there have been more popular protests, most of them related to 
questions of land conflict and disputes between people with private companies or with 
state agencies (Adhoc 2009). This means that people are triggered to take action only 
when the foundations of their own survival (such as land) are threatened. When such 
protests happen, there have often been crackdowns by the military or police. 
Increasingly, complaints filed in courts by the people go un-answered. Increasingly, 
too, people who do not trust the court system turn to the patrimonial way of expressing 
their grievance, protesting in front of the Prime Minister residence, asking for his 
support, while also praising him and saying that only he can help them (Adhoc 2009). 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter concludes that the CPP rise to domination is attributed to many factors, 
some are easy to explain and identify, some are not; some are internal to the CPP as a 
political organization, and some are external. Luck, although not much mentioned 
earlier, was an unexplainable factor in the CPP's rise amidst Cambodia's up and down 
recent history. Most of the CPP high ranking people, the top leadership included, came 
to power seemingly by a twist of fate - or at least, that was their starting point. Most of 
these people were peasants whose fates were changed because of the coup that ousted 
King Sihanouk in 1970, the Khmer Rouge, and all the civil wars and chaos that these 
events entailed. The coming to power of the CPP as a political organization was the 
result of these beyond-control factors. 
The existing literature also points out that the CPP had a timing advantage in being the 
first to come to control the state, if compared to the Royalists and the SRP. Actually, it 
did not just come to control, but also put in place the state structure with a virtually 
clean slate. On top of that, the fact that the CPP was established as a communist party 
further enhanced its control over the state right from its formation phase (1979 - 1993). 
This makes the state-party overlap a more expected phenomenon - even a natural one, I 
would say. 
Being a Communist Party at the time directed the CPP to control the state not only at 
the central but also sub-national levels, working slowly to put in place very tightly knit 
local administrative and surveillance networks. This, together with the fact that many 
CPP were themselves peasants, or at least from peasant origin, not only enhanced the 
party's control over, but its understanding about rural people and rural politics. All 
these are the CPP's strengths over the Royalists and the SRP who were not only late-
comers, but also unfamiliar with rural Cambodia. 
The CPP in its early years, moreover, did not only control the state bureaucracy. 
Instead, it had also in the process nurtured and put into use patrimonial practices and 
rent-seeking activities that run through the state. Given the reality of the 1980s, such 
patronage networks, which seemed to be so naturally attached to the CPP, emerged and 
expanded as a way to keep the state itself functioning and surviving. However, 
patronage was also nurtured to serve individuals and their groups' interest. At the 
leadership level, from the examples of Cheam Sim in the 1980s to Hun Sen, building 
patronage networks has been seen as the real power base for these individuals. And 
from this reality, it seems that if any factional conflict has existed in the CPP, it has 
surely been patronage-based. In addition, reflecting the pyramid shape, the patronage 
base under the CPP has been expanding and penetrating the state and party structures 
from the top to the bottom. 
Controlling over the state and handling the patronage networks constitute the 
foundations of control for the CPP. However, since 1993, the CPP also shows an 
increasing amount of adaptability to the new rules of the game brought in by elections 
and international community demands. The existing studies, together with this study's 
empirical evidence, broadly indicate that the CPP firstly has recognized the importance 
of winning an acceptable election. Secondly, it worked to change its image by resorting 
less to the violent methods of ruling and winning elections. At the same time, the party 
has opted to manipulate and use divide-and-rule and bribing strategies to weaken the 
already weak Royalists and the newly-emerging SRP. 
The CPP's rise has been accompanied by many other political and economic changes, 
including more stability and security and economic growth. The CPP should be given 
some credit for these positive changes. However, governance problems such as 
patronage and corruption are also seen to have accompaned and contributed to its rise. 
Donors and other societal actors such as NGOs have pushed for various governance 
reforms, but successes seem to be limited. People, on the other hand, seem to have 
been passive in exerting demands and pressure on the ruling party to fight the problems 
of corruption. 
The story told in this chapter of the CPP is based mainly on existing Cambodian 
scholarship. It has been useful in providing a rough picture of this party's journey to 
dominance. It seems to also confirm the existing literature about dominant party politics 
(as discussed in Chapter 2) in the sense that all key foundational elements of control 
such as state control, elite coalition and administrative networks, can be identified 
along with the CPP's rise, and that over time, the party also shows signs of adaptation 
to democratic electoral politics, especially in terms of building and maintaining 
legitimacy. 
What the existing literature fails to deliver is a detailed account of how all these events, 
i.e. control over the state, accommodating elite interests, adapting to the demands of the 
people and other requirements such as those imposed by the donors, actually took 
place. In other words, the literature seems to be sufficient in showing the outer features 
of the 'black box' (i.e. the CPP and its strategies) and how they seem to have changed 
over time, but it stills shed little light on the inner mechanisms of the box itself. It is the 
knowledge about such mechanisms, this study argues, that can allow a researcher to 
gain a better understanding of the dynamics of dominant party politics such as that of 
the CPP. The subsequent chapters attempt to open the box wider and analyze what lies 
inside. 
Chapter 5: The CPP controlling state budget and 
strengthening rural administration 
This empirical chapter seeks to provide more in-depth understanding of how the CPP 
has managed to stay dominant. As discussed in Chapter 2, a typical dominant party 
makes efforts to achieve various objectives, including controlling the state, maintaining 
elite coalitions and support, establishing administrative networks and building 
legitimacy among voters. Chapter 4, based mainly on existing literature, suggests that 
the CPP, since its coming to power in 1979, has worked and learnt how to 
simultaneously achieve all these objectives. Yet, the chapter still offers little insight on 
'how' the Party has actually done it. 
This chapter zooms in on the CPP's detailed mechanisms and relationship with the 
state, the elite, and the mass. It attempts to answer two questions posed in chapter 3: 
• How has the CPP managed to use state budget control to accommodate elite 
interest in exchange for their support? and 
• How has the CPP built and strengthened its local administrative networks to 
control and shape rural voters' perceptions? 
To answer the above questions, this chapter uses both secondary and primary data 
collected from the field. In most cases, the primary data not only confirms but also 
provides more details on what has already been said in the existing studies. Moreover, 
it attempts to frame those pieces of empirical evidence using the framework and 
research design derived in chapters 2 and 3 and aims to better understand the CPP's 
dominance, rather than just provide descriptive accounts of budgetary reform and rural 
politics. 
What the chapter will show is that under the CPP, budgetary control has remained 
centralized, and poorly managed. This has allowed high ranking officials at the centre 
to use the centralized authority for their own self-enrichment, leaving those at the sub-
national level with little budgetary authority and thus much less opportunity for similar 
self-enrichment . At the same time, the party has been aggressively building up its 
administrative and surveillance networks, and co-opting various forms of traditional 
institutions and leaders at local level. The result is a system characterized by centralized 
budgetary control on the one hand, and a poorly financed, but highly penetrative 
organizational structure at the local level on the other. 
5.1. State budget and budgetary reform - A brief overview 
This section and the next focus on the question of budgetary management and reforms 
and how they relate to the CPP. There are two related questions on this. 
• How has the CPP managed state budget and budgetary reform? and 
• How does that allow the party to use the budget to accommodate elite interest in 
exchange for their support? 
Since the formation of the 1993 government, with assistance from donors, development 
plans have been prepared and put into implementation. Those plans were prepared to 
ensure better service delivery to the people and to meet the requirements imposed by 
donors40. As part of the plan, the government needed to commit to reforming its 
budgeting system so that it could better mobilize revenue and spend it to achieve 
development objectives (RGC 2005a). 
In Cambodia, as in many other countries, the MEF is charged with the task of 
budgetary management (RGC 2008a)41. In 1993, the MEF was headed by the Royalist 
Finance Minister, Sam Rainsy. Conflict over power sharing between the CPP and the 
Royalists, together with Royalist internal conflict, led to Sam Rainsy's dismissal in 
1994. Since then, the MEF has been controlled by the CPP, i.e. headed by a CPP 
minister. Also, from those early days, budgetary reform has been on the agenda pushed 
by donors. 
This study argues that the progress of the budgetary reform in Cambodia falls into two 
different periods: the first from 1994 to 2000, and the other from 2000 up to now 
(2010). In the first period, the political competition between the CPP and the Royalists 
40 In 1994, Cambodia adopted the first Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP I, 1996-2000), 
outlining what needed to be achieved by 2000 and the resources, both domestic and external financing, 
required. It then adopted SEDP II for the period from 2001-2005. In addition, the Cambodian 
government, in line with the global initiative of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) also developed 
its own CMDGs, focusing on poverty reduction and human development. More recently, the RGC 
adopted the National Strategic Development Plan for 2006-2010, emphasizing the importance of 
improving people's living standards and better public service delivery. 
41 Article 37 of 2008 Public Finance Law 
was still prominent, while in the second, the CPP was already on the rise to its 
dominance and becoming increasingly secure in its power seat. 
From 1994 to 2000, Public Financial Management (PFM) reform had not received 
much attention although institutional weaknesses were identified in almost all areas 
ranging from revenue mobilization to oversight and audit (World Bank 1999). On the 
revenue side, the RGC adopted the Law on Taxation only in 1997. Trying to attract 
FDI, the government at the time was granting tax holidays in almost every sector, 
making the overall revenue low. Taxation administration had been particularly weak, 
leading to low tax revenue. Domestic revenue in 1998 was 8% of GDP, about half of 
the average for low income countries. Had the tax and customs collection capacity been 
higher, Cambodia would have collected about two-thirds more of the actual revenue at 
the time (World Bank 1999:iii-iv). 
Another challenge was the revenue loss from forestry exploitation. During the 1990s, 
illegal logging was happening at an alarming rate in Cambodia. It was estimated that 
illegal logging in 1997 alone totaled around three to four million cubic meters, that is, 
three to eight times higher than the level considered sustainable. In the same year, the 
government was said to have lost about US$60 million from illegal logging, equivalent 
to about 2 % of GDP (World Bank 1999). Corruption in the forestry sector was 
rampant, often involving military, police and other vested interests (Cock 2007). Other 
non-tax revenues (e.g. passport and visa fees, profits from state owned enterprises, 
public land sales) were not monitored transparently either. These revenues were 
collected and partly spent by line ministries, without fully depositing it in the Treasury. 
Although revenue retention was supposed to be a good incentive for line ministries to 
perform, the problem then was that it was collected and used without transparency 
(World Bank 1999). 
Some recommendations were provided by donors on how to improve the budget, but 
these only led to minor changes. The main reason, some argue, was that at the time, the 
CPP and Royalists were more occupied with competiting to control the state, and thus 
did not give budget reform high priority (Taliercio 2008). The CPP in particular was 
managing state resources to strengthen rather than weaken its own patronage-networks, 
and to cement its political control, rather than to enhance service delivery efficiency' 
(Taliercio 2008). I agree with this argument, based on my overall hypothesis that the 
ruling party would not consider reforms if they appeared to threaten its patronage and 
elite coalitions, which is considered as its key power base. 
From 2000 onwards, donors were pushing harder for budget reform. First, they 
introduced a technical assistance project called Technical Cooperation Assistance 
Program (TCAP) in mid-2001. The program lasted for 2 and a half year, using USD 6.7 
million worth of technical assistance and training and relatively high salary supplement 
for a small group of MEF officials. TCAP achieved very little, however (Taliercio 
2008). Problems including lack of political will, non-functioning civil service, and 
politicization of the bureaucracy were all raised by donors as the main causes (IMF 
2004b). Based on the experience of the TCAP, a more integrated budgetary reform was 
introduced by the government, with the support of donors, in 2004 (RGC 2004). 
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As of 2008, positive changes have been made on various fronts. Total revenue which 
stood at 4.3 % of GDP in 1993, rose up to 9.8 % in 2003 and 12.5 % in 2008; more 
public spending was allocated away from defense and security to social sectors, 
especially education and health (ADB 2009). Overall, the progress with budgetary 
reform was rated as 'satisfactory' by the IMF report (IMF 2009a). This progress, some 
argue, are the result of the CPP's developing a higher sense of ownership over the 
reform program, as well as the donors' being more coordinated and cooperating with 
the government (Taliercio 2008). While agreeing to both of these propositions, this 
study further argues that the CPP became active in the reforms partly to gain further 
support from donors and partly because it has become more secure in its dominance 
42 Some government officials (quoted in Taliercio 2008) argue that, although what they did was not 
helpful for service delivery, it was helpful for stability and security. 
and therefore could focus more on the reform and less on political competition with the 
opposition parties. 
Despite recent progress, comparatively, though, Cambodia's budgetary performance is 
still very weak, even by low income country standards. An assessment done in 2007 by 
the IMF indicated that it had passed only 5 out of 16 points intended for a good 
budgetary system. This is even lower than the average of low income countries which 
usually met 6 to 7 of the points (IMF 2007). Tax revenue, although increasing from 
8.0% of GDP in 1998 to 9.9% in 2008, is still lower than the regional level (which 
stood at 12 to 16 % in 2006) (IMF 2007; IMF 2009b). Corruption is still a big problem 
in tax collection, attributed largely to the low government official salaries, smuggling, 
inequitable application of the tax system (depending on who the owners are) and the 
culture of intervention to acquire tax exemption (IMF 2007). 
The issue of foreign aid is also important in the Cambodian budget. From 1992 to 2009, 
Cambodia received US$9.79 billion in foreign aid. As the figure 9 below shows, not 
only has the absolute amount of aid been increasing, but its per capita amount has also 
risen, from just US$ 40 in 2000 to about US$80 in 2010. This is more or less the same 
as the government revenue per capita, which amounted to about US$75 in 2008. With 
the fast growing economy, though, foreign aid as percentage of GDP has been 
decreasing, from around 12% to less than 10 % in the last ten years (RGC 2010a). 
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Foreign aid to Cambodia has come from both bilateral and multi-lateral donors. 
Summing up the period from 1992 to 2009, Japan stands as the biggest bilateral donors. 
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significant. This aid has been spent on various sectors, with health, transport, education, 
rural development and agriculture receiving the highest share (RGC 2010a). NGOs 
have been particularly active in the social sectors. In health alone, there has been more 
than 130 service delivery NGOs collaborating with the Ministry of Health (Pak 2009b). 
In response to the institutional weaknesses of the government's budgetary system, 
donors opted to create numerous parallel project implemented units (PIUs) and initiate 
salary supplementation for government staff who worked in donor projects. All these 
actions constitute the commonly known aid problems, namely, aid alignment, 
ownership and coordination (Taliercio 2008). Donor preference for using a parallel 
system was also among the key motives to create a separation between annual budget 
and the so-called Public Investment Program (PIP) (Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi 
1999). This led to persistent separation between recurrent and development budget in 
Cambodia (Pak and Craig 2008). Since 1994, a rough picture of that separation 
remains: the national revenue mobilized is only a little more than enough to cover 
recurrent spending, leaving about 70% of the development budget to be financed by the 
donors (Pak and Craig 2008). Thus, it appears as if Cambodia's development has been 
pretty much run by donors. 
5.2. The CPP, patrimonialism, and the budget 
After the brief discussion regarding Cambodia's budget and its reform, this section 
focuses on how the CPP has managed to use budget control to accommodate elite 
interest in exchange for their support. Three important issues, this section argues, relate 
directly to this question. They are (i) the patrimonial practice within the state, (ii) 
budget centralization, and (iii) budget fragmentation. 
In Cambodia today, patrimonial practice is very widespread and systemic, making the 
state in this country a neo-patrimonial one. The party and the state are hardly 
distinguishable, and this situation has become even more so as the CPP becomes more 
dominant. For instance, it was learnt that the CPP strictly requires that public officials 
must be CPP members, or they were not treated favorably. This is true not only at the 
central, but also (or even more so) at the provincial and district levels (Pak and Craig 
2008). Data collected during the fieldwork confirm that within each ministry, the 
minister and key department heads are also key officials within the CPP's central 
committees. 
Another blurred distinction is that between the bureaucratic and political spheres. 
Controlling the state apparatus, and through that, demanding loyalty from bureaucrats is 
central to the CPP control. Since 1993, the CPP has been very careful, persistently 
refusing to allow the opposition parties (the Royalists in particular) to share 
bureaucratic control. This refusal handicapped the Royalists even in ministries with 
Royalist ministers. This is because the key bureaucrats there (i.e. Director General and 
department directors) did not obey anyone but only those from the CPP. 
The CPP not only formally controls, but has also allows and nourishs its own patronage 
networks to penetrate the state's bureaucracy. The result is the lack of separation 
between the personal and public sphere, a key attribute of a neo-patrimonial state. The 
use of administrative positions among state employees engaging jointly or individually 
in economic activities in which the abuse of their position constitute the profitable 
element has been common (Hughes 2003; Calavan et al. 2004). The mutually beneficial 
relationships embedded within the patronage has given rise to a strong and cohesive, 
but informal, state apparatus, making it politically challenging to discipline any 
questionable entrepreneurial activities of state officials (Hughes and Conway 2004). 
Because patronage and its rent-seeking has become so widespread and mixed with 
politics, and because the CPP itself has become increasingly dominant, various 
powerful patrons have created and presided over their own domains. For instance, it is 
observed that each ministry is to a large extent like a domain presided over by the 
minister who is like a patron. The resourcefulness of the domains, this study observes, 
can be represented quite fairly by the scope of the resources and authorities vested in 
the formal authority of the ministries. For instance, Ministries of Finance, of Interior, of 
Agriculture (especially Department of Forestry, and of Fishery), the police, and the 
military tend to be much more resourceful than, say, Ministry of Education, Health, etc. 
The resourcefulness 4 3 of a domain is in parallel with that of the patrons or key people 
dominating it. This observation is consistent with findings by Hughes and Conway 
(2004), and of the Corruption Perception Assessment (Nissen 2005). 
These different patrons, while tied together in an upward line towards a more powerful 
patron (taking a shape of a pyramid), also compete and protect their interests from one 
4 3 In the following chapters, this notion of resourcefulness is particularly helpful for this study in its 
assessment of the resourcefulness of the Party Working Group (PWG) whose heads are usually 
resourceful government officials. 
another. Such competition has made the central government hardly a homogenous 
entity. At central level, competing interests exist not only among ministries but also 
sections and departments with the same ministry. And what is even more interesting to 
note is that such conflict is not driven by so-called bureaucratic interests as often 
projected in the first world's bureaucracy (Brinkeroff and Goldsmith 2002), but by 
much more personal and patronage-based interests. 
In budgetary matters, such patronage is even more common. However, when talking 
about budgets, this study argues that it is important to look at two other important 
aspects: budget centralization and budget fragmentation. Centralization is the first and 
most persistent feature of Cambodia's current budgeting system. After the formation of 
the 1993 government, budgetary authority was centralized under the MEF (RGC 1993). 
This centralization was necessary at the early stage of reconstruction of a post-conflict 
country like Cambodia (IMF 2004a). But there were also political motives for it. For 
the Royalists who won the election at the time, centralizing budgetary power under the 
MEF was in its favor, because the ministry was headed by its own minister. For the 
CPP, budgetary centralization was acceptable partly because it helped address the 
problem of overly-autonomous provincial people who in the period prior to 1993 were 
collecting, but not reporting nor sending revenues to the centre (Gottesman 2003). 
After the ousting of the Royalist finance Minister in 1994, however, the CPP came to 
control the MEF. Centralization since then has been strengthened, giving increasing 
power to the MEF. The MEF people since then have had the most say from annual 
budget allocation, execution and oversight. This, formally, is not exceptional for a 
finance ministry. The challenges, however, came from the fact that, centralization, 
rather than being used to ensure fiscal discipline, has been used to create gate-keeping 
and opportunities to demand informal payments (World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank 2003; Pak and Craig 2008). 
This study learnt that every year, when line agencies prepare their budgets, they have to 
negotiate with the MEF. It is well known that these negotiations involved a lot of 
informality and under-the-table deals. When the budget is executed, following the pre-
audit approach, line ministries are required to ask for approval from the MEF and its 
financial controller before spending allocated budget. MEF also controls most of the 
procurement works44. Such centralization makes it hard for some line agencies such as 
education and health to spend their own budgets, partly because the rigid spending 
procedures. 5 
Over-centralization is also evident across tiers of administration. The 1993 reform 
significantly stripped provincial, district, and commune levels of their budgetary 
authority and resource. It was not until 1998 that some budgetary powers were given 
back, allowing the provincial level mostly recurrent budgets, and a very small 
provincial development budget (RGC 1998). Under this set-up, provincial and district 
governors were reduced to only delegated officials of the Ministry of Interior (Mol 
1994). Even after the decentralization reform, started in 2002, which created an 
unconditional transfer known as the Commune/Sangkat Fund (CSF) for communes, 
budgetary control is still kept centrally. As Table 4 below shows, provincial/district and 
commune administration budget altogether accounted for only about 6% from 2008 to 
2010. Even after adding up provincial vertical line department budget, the percentage 
goes up to only about 20% for the three years. 
Table 4: Intergovernmental budgetary allocation (Million Riels) 
2008 2009 2010 
(1) Total national spending 5,573,383 7,259,566 8,299,773 
(2) Provincial spending 206,776 356,950 326,370 
(3) CSF from national budget 91,000 107,000 142,424 
(2+3)/(l) 5.34% 6.39% 5.65% 
(4) Provincial line dept budget 857,645 1,059,122 1,209,431 
((2) + (3) + (4))/ (1) 20.73% 20.98% 20.22% 
Sources: RGC 2008c, 2009, 2010b 
State control reflects elite control (see chapter 2 on the concept of elite and patronage 
network), this study argues. Centralization of budgetary authority therefore implies that 
the central elite, rather than those at sub-national level, have had more opportunity for 
rent-seeking and benefiting personally from the state budget. If the elite coalition 
constitutes a significant part of the CPP's power base, from the current pattern of 
44 As expected, procurement, when non-transparently carried out, can be a big source of corruption. It 
was learnt, for instance, that the price of standard A4 paper procured through a MEF-system could be 30 
to 60% higher than the retail market price. Recently, the MEF started to de-concentrate more 
procurement authority to line ministries. Budget oversight and auditing have also been under the 
authority of the MEF. And, very often, auditing, which is supposed to be a control mechanism, has 
become just another opportunity for money-making by covering up non-compliance (World Bank 2005; 
IMF 2009a) 
45 The author's personal experience working with (not for) both ministries from 2003 through 2009 
resource control, it also means that for the CPP, the elite refers mainly to the 'central' 
elite, i.e. those with positions within the central government.46 
Because fewer opportunities for self enrichment are given to party officials at the sub-
national level, this study argues that, although local base is important for the CPP, that 
base has not been well financially supported and incentivized. Lately, there have also 
been more complaints from the local party officials about this incentive issue. 
Commune councilors, for instance, complain about their low salaries (about US$16 to 
US$25 per month) and those of their village chiefs (about US$10 per month)47, saying 
that what they get is not commensurate with their services to the party and the 
48 government . 
The budgetary reform in 1994 gave rise to another persistent budgetary problem: 
budget fragmentation, especially in relation to the non-tax revenue collection. While the 
1993 Budget Law requires that all revenue and expenditures need to be captured under 
one budget (the principle of 'unity'), much of the non-tax revenue was kept outside the 
reach of the MEF and the Treasury. As discussed earlier, various line ministries have 
been collecting revenue from whatever resources placed under their jurisdiction. As a 
result of this fragmentation, hundreds of accounts were created under the names of 
these various line ministries. More importantly, these accounts are not linked and 
reported to the Treasury. Moves have been made to eliminate these accounts and 
integrate them under the normal budgeting regulations and single treasury account, but 
little progress has been made on this so far (RGC 2007). 
This study further contends that eliminating such outside-the-budget accounts will be 
difficult because it would effectively mean undermining the entrenched 'domains of 
power' of other key elite networks besides the MEF. In a way, this study sees that 
budgetary fragmentation serves the purpose of rent-sharing which helps maintain the 
(central) elite coalition in serving the interests of the CPP. Fragmentation of revenue 
collection means multiple domains are being created, each placed under different elite 
46 This logical inference is confirmed by a recent study which found that basically, sub-national level 
officials, be them provincial governors or heads of line departments, had heavily relied on, and thus 
needed to build good relationships with, people at the central, especially those at the MEF (Pak and Craig 
2008). 
47 These figures of commune and village salary are based on the fieldwork interviews, April to June 
2008. Recently, the salary for the commune councilors is increased to US$37 for commune chief and 
US$24 for councilors, US$15 for village chiefs, and US$10 for village authority members (RGC 2010d). 
48 Commune Councilors 5th Seminar, Kampong Cham, December 21-22,2009 
groups. In addition to that, to reduce conflict, it was important that the CPP leadership 
create an informal rule or understanding which would prevent people from encroaching 
upon other elites' interests and make those people feel secure as long as they are still 
part of the party. 
Fragmentation of resource control might also serve the interest of the CPP leadership, 
for it helps ensure that at any time, there is no single elite (whether ministers, military 
officers or governors) that could become strong enough to be a challenger. For instance, 
although the Ministry of Finance is said to be the most powerful ministry, it does not 
hold a monopoly over state resources. The party leaders, when in financial needs, can 
always reach out to other line agencies such as agriculture, mines and industries, and 
the various autonomous agencies which have been created to control revenue from 
other sources such as tourism and natural resource royalties. This way, the elite group 
immediately under the leadership level appears to act as countervailing forces 
preventing one another from becoming too strong. This, of course, is good for the 
stability and security of those in the higher leadership ranks. 
However, this does not mean that those within the elite group do not compete to build 
up and expand their power and domain. From my experience working and sharing 
information with government officials, there have often been rumors about ambitious 
individuals bribing and fighting to get certain 'fat' posts which are currently held by 
another ambitious person. Such competition exists not only within the same, but also 
cross-ministries. From time to time, for instance, there have been rumors about a senior 
officer from the Ministry of Interior maneuvering to get a post in the Minister of 
Justice, or a high ranking official from Ministry of Commerce wanting to put more 
money into the pipeline to 'kick out' a guy in the Finance. Some recent studies also 
point to the existence of such intra-elite competition (Cock 2010). 
My interviews with party officials 4 9 confirm that such conflicts do happen, and when 
they did, depending on the seriousness of the problem, the party jumps in to ease the 
tensions. In the same interviews, I learnt that the most active person in conflict 
resolution is the current Secretary General who is well-known for his modesty, integrity 
4 9 Fieldwork interviews, provincial party official, July 06, 2008 
and seniority. Of course, the final say on high profile conflicts rests with the top 
leaders, particularly the Prime Minister and the Party President, Chea Sim50. 
Another explanation for the CPP's effective management of conflict among its own 
people is that, owing in large part to the impressive economic growth in the last decade, 
more wealth has been created, allowing more room for more peaceful rent 
accumulation and extraction, and less need to collide. Part of these available rents come 
from natural resource exploitation, starting with forestry, then fishery, and more 
recently, land (Cock 2010). From the study's observations, however, this does not mean 
all the people are equally happy with the rent-sharing. Yet, who wants to rock the boat 
especially when there is no other boats as big as the CPP floating around? Or, like the 
CPP people often said, 'who would want to leave a villa to stay in a hut?' (quoted in 
Pak and Craig 2008). 
The CPP leadership, on the one hand, knows that it cannot appease all of its elites. On 
the other hand, it has also been cautious about not causing unnecessary resentment 
among them. That caution is reflected in the Party's (and the government's) tendency to 
avoid dismissing any party (government) officials who become less useful or not fully 
supportive or obeying the leadership. Kicking them upstairs, or 'creating a box for 
them', as it is commonly known, has been the preferred option. This option is also used 
to avoid a situation where there is 'a worm coming out of your own flesh', a phrase 
referring to a time when a former party member talks about party scandals after being 
let go. Creating them a box, supported by proper titles and a certain amount of financial 
support is a strategy that has been repeatedly used by the CPP. The result has been the 
ever-increasing size of the cabinet, and more people promoted but with no specific 
authority within the politicized bureaucracy . 
Another interesting point about the CPP is its own financial management and 
regulation. For a 2003 report, the Secretary General of the CPP was interviewed and 
asked about the party budget. First, the Secretary General asserted that the CPP is not a 
wealthy party. When still a socialist party, he continued, the Party could use the state 
budget for its own purposes. But it could no longer do that after 1993 (Kovick and 
Emling 2003). He continued that now, the sources of the CPP financing are: funds from 
50 Fieldwork interviews, June 6,2008 
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party officials 'according to their status,' personal contributions from party members 
and supporters, legal business operations of the Party, property owned by the Party, and 
other forms of charities. The party has two committees that control funds and 
expenditure: the Permanent Control Committee and the Finance Commission. The 
Finance Commission reports on the party's financial accounts and business holdings to 
the party's Central Committee. Party financial information is not made available to 
members of the party, or to the public (Kovick and Emling 2003). 
The response provided by the Secretary General is a literal reading of the Statute of the 
CPP (CPP 1997). It is noted that since 1997, the Party has not made changes to its 
Statute, however. And by just quoting the formal Statute, the Secretary General does 
not tell much about the real 'budget' that the party has. In reality, this study argues (and 
as later chapters will show), the CPP's budget goes beyond just the formal 
contributions of its members and the assets it owns. The state budget and all the 
resources under its authority, as well as the wealth accumulated by its elites (especially 
those at the central level) can all be considered a reserve pool saved for the party's 
needs. 
To sum up, while it also has a formal budget, the CPP's real resources come directly 
from its control over the state and state budget. This control is exerted through its vast 
and ever-expanding patrimonial practice which penetrates the state apparatus to such an 
extent that is comparable to a neo-patrimonial state. As far as the budget is concerned, 
the CPP appears to accommodate more the interests of the central elite, and uses 
budgetary fragmentation to allow the different factions of the central elite to benefit 
from the state. What is seen then is a kind of intra-party vertical fiscal imbalance where 
party members at district, district and commune levelp who are like the 'foot soldiers' 
of the CPP - have received much less financial rewards and fewer opportunities for 
rent-seeking. So, what does this mean for the CPP's sub-national and local 
administration? Has it been weak because there have not been many resources given? 
And if so, how can the CPP manage to stay dominant? These questions are addressed in 
the next section. 
5.3. The CPP and its rural administrative networks 
This section focuses on the two questions posed in chapter 3: 
• How has the CPP built its administrative capacity in rural areas? And 
• How has the party sought to influence rural people's perceptions and ensure 
their votes? 
Before focusing on its local administration, this section begins with a description of the 
overall organizational structure of the CPP. The 1997 Statute is the key formal 
document outlining the organizational structure and relevant procedures of the party. 
According to the Statute, the highest body of the party is the Party congress which 
meets every five years. The congress elects the members to the Central Committee, 
which then elects the chair, vice-chair, honorary chair, and members of the Permanent 
Committee (CPP 1997). As of 2003, it was reported that the CPP has 75 members in its 
Central Committee, and 19 in the Permanent Committee (Kovick and Emling 2003). 
From this study's fieldwork, the number has increased to 232 for the Central 
Committee, and 35 for the Permanent Committee (CPP 2009). It is not known why 
such a dramatic increase has occurred. 
Organizationally, the party is divided into four levels: central, provincial and 
ministerial, district and grassroots (CPP 1997). From provincial level downward, this 
study found that, in parallel to each level of state administration is the party branch. It is 
common that provincial and district governors, as well as commune chiefs are heads of 
the respective levels of party branches. The CPP, it was also learnt, has been vigorous 
in recruiting new members. To be a member, a person needs to be 18 years of age or 
older. As of 2010, the CPP report to have almost 5.3 million members countrywide, 
50.43% of who are female (CPP 2010). It is important to note that being a member of 
the CPP does not mean the person actually vote for the party. For instance, the CPP in 
2008 elections got only about 3.5 million votes, equivalent to about 65% of the above 
membership size (CPP 2008a). 
Grassroots administrative network is a key strength of the CPP. By grassroots, I mean 
commune, village and group level. Before the commune election in 2002, all commune 
chiefs were CPP-appointed officials who were usually the heads of the Party's 
respective commune branches. After the 2002 commune election, the situation did not 
change much because the CPP won 98.6% of the chief positions (see chapter 8 for more 
on decentralization). 
The village level, until now, has been controlled by a CPP-appointed village chief, a 
deputy chief and an assistant. Below the village is a 'group' level, which is like a sub-
village unit, each has from eight to twelve households. The head of the group is 
responsible for making sure that the current CPP households keep supporting the party, 
and convincing the non-CPP ones to become CPP's supporters. Having been in power 
and staying close to local level since, the CPP is also said to be much more advanced 
compared to the Royalists and the SRP in recruiting 'active and popular people' to 
work in its administrative networks52. 
Except for the commune chiefs and councilors who are paid about US$16 to US$25 per 
month, and village chief who received about US$10 from the government53, all the CPP 
activists, especially the heads of the groups, are not entitled to any formal salary. The 
only occasional support, in cash or in-kinds, they receive is given by central party 
officials who come down to visit their localities. 
Without real financial support, it is hard to comprehend why those activists are 
committed to the party. However, anecdotal evidence collected during fieldwork 
suggest that a mix of motives is involved, including: desire to build an image and 
influence among their local peers, opportunities to be connected with party officials 
from the central level, genuine affection and gratitude to the CPP for saving them from 
the Khmer Rouge's genocide54. The above observation leads this study to argue that, to 
really understand the CPP's operation at the local level, it is important to look also at 
other non-financial factors that help the party operate at that level. 
Because the ultimate objective is to win votes from the people, it is also important to 
understand better the characteristics of Cambodian voters, especially about their 
perceptions about those in state authority positions. As of 2008, about 80 % of the 
eligible voters (18 years or older) were older than 30 year old (NIS 2009). This means 
people who had been eligible to vote were pre-dominantly those who had lived through 
wars and the period of desperation. These periods give the Cambodian people a very 
terrifying image of state 'authority.' Although throughout history, until Cambodia 
52 Fieldwork interviews, March 26, 31,2010 
53 These figures of commune and village salary are based on the fieldwork interviews, April to June 
2008. Recently, the salary for the commune councilors is increased to US$37 for commune chief and 
US$24 for councilors, US$15 for village chiefs, and US$10 for village authority members (RGC 2010d). 
54 Results from the fieldwork interviews with local party officials 
gained independence from France, the Cambodia people had been largely passive in 
their roles as citizenry, and although certain forms of suppression were present during 
the colonial time, village life before 1970 was rather peaceful (Ebihara 1968). 
War from the 1970s to the 1990s changed all these peaceful elements in people's 
minds, memories and landscapes. The civil war, the coup that ousted King Sihanouk 
and the Khmer Rouge's horror have been too much for any generation to bear, or at 
least to stay survive without having their psyches affected and social cohesion impaired 
(Chandler 2008). While people in democratic countries are talking about holding their 
governments accountable, Cambodian people who have been through such a horrifying 
experience would already feel grateful if the state just leaves them and their families 
alone. 
Going through more than 30 years of war and unrest, however, does not mean that 
certain social values and patterns that existed before the war all evaporated. Religion, 
hierarchical notion within society, patronage, and other traditional values still persist 
and/or have been actively re-created. Such persistence is particularly noticeable in the 
countryside, where economic development and modernization have been limited, and 
where the large majority of voters reside55 (about 80 % (CPP 2008a)). 
Existing Cambodian scholarship provides an insightful account of decision-making in 
rural Cambodia. First of all, patronage customs are central to relationships among rural 
Cambodians (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). These relationships are not fixed, but 
driven by constant negotiation between a patron and his clients, and like the usual 
patronage practices, it involves exchanges, protection and benefits from the patrons, 
and support from the clients (Maston 1997). Cambodian people cannot live without 
patrons. He or she needs 'someone behind' them (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). 
Traditionally, the patrons were also fellow farmers. However, with the administrative 
presence of the state and economic activity expansion, there have been more forms of 
patronage whose networks and influence and exist beyond a village. 
55 This study focuses on rural politics, however, does not mean urban politics is not important. On the 
contrary, urban politics is very important as far as regime change is concerned. In many countries, such 
as Indonesia and the Philippines, regimes changes often came as a result of urban people going out to 
protest with the incumbent rulers (Case 2002). However, such urban riots, while also happening in 
Cambodia in the last ten years (Hughes 2009), has not really shaken up the power base of the CPP. In 
other words, rural politics is still a key factor shaping national politics in Cambodia, and therefore, 
should deserve more attention in this thesis. 
These patrons can be grouped into 'domains' (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). The 
first is the administrative domain, which comprises people who hold formal authority 
such as village, commune, district and provincial officials. Second is the religious 
domain, referring mainly to both monks residing in pagodas, and the members of 
pagoda committees which serve more or less like as the executive branches of the 
sangha. Third refers to the knowledge domain which includes teachers, nurses, 
traditional birth attendants, and traditional (or even spiritual) healers. The fourth refers 
to local rich people, and the fifth to the development assistance domain. This last 
domain became noticeable after 1993 with the influx of aid money which was 
translated into public services through the ever-increasing number of community-based 
NGOs (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). 
Patrons from these domains play a key role in shaping people's perceptions about 
public decisions, and most relevant, about who to vote for. That is why they are called 
'heads of the wind' (mekhjal). Such perception-shaping influence, from my 
observation, is strongest in the case of the village chiefs (given that they are the closest 
to the people), and the pagoda-related people (given their moral authority). The sangha 
is an important force making patronage relationships within Cambodian village not 
only instrumental but also moral to some extent. Merit making and benevolence for 
instance, are prominent in people's thinking (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). My 
fieldwork interviews and observations also show that, despite all the positive and the 
negative things that have happened in the last 30 or 40 years, Buddhism is still 
influential, especially in the minds of those 50 years or older. 
The influence of Buddhism in Cambodian people's mind was evident through the zeal 
with which the people were working to restore this traditional institution right after the 
demise of the Khmer Rouge. Before the Khmer Rouge (1975), there were about 88,000 
monks and around 3,500 serving monasteries for a population of about seven million. 
The Khmer Rouge gave the religion horrible treatment, calling monks 'leeches,' 
demolishing numerous pagodas (there is no statistics on this), and turning many of 
them into prisons. Only two years after the Khmer Rouge, though, with the Cambodian 
people contribution, about 700 of the monasteries were restored, and were quickly 
filled with hundred of monks (Kent 2003). 
Now with a population of about 13 million, Cambodia has about 4,400 pagodas and 
56,000 monks (CPP 2008c). As the next chapter will show, a lot of resources have been 
spent on building pagodas, some of which look very luxurious. Contribution comes not 
only from wealthy believers, but from the local poor as well. As one commune chief 
vividly describes, 'Our people, especially the elderly, might think twice before giving 
contribution to schools, but they would walk the distance across rice fields to pagodas 
with their rice bowls carried on their heads as contributions for merit-makings,'5 
Compared to the Royalists and the SRP, the CPP seems to be very knowledgeable 
about these characteristics of the rural Cambodian voters. A number of points are 
relevant here. First, the CPP also has an interesting 'demographic characteristic' which 
gives it a big edge compared to the opposition and the Royalists when it comes to 
dealing with rural people: the CPP's elites themselves, predominantly, used to be 
peasants or at least have peasantry roots (Hughes and Conway 2004). My fieldwork 
confirms that these elites still keep regular contact, in one form or another, with their 
kin from the village. Plus, among these party people, there is still a strong sense of 
'place of origin,' i.e. their (or their parents' and spouses') places of birth, or places 
where they had particular memories and affiliations (e.g. during wartime). This 
characteristic makes the CPP a real people's party in the sense they know the people 
well Bat least, comparatively. 
Second, understanding the importance of the mekhjal (heads of the wind), the CPP has 
sought to control and co-opt them. First, the party has sought to control the 
administrative domain by ensuring that its people control state apparatus from 
provincial down to village level (Pak and Craig 2008). Among these sub-national 
people, the village authority plays a very important role linking the party to the people. 
Besides voter mobilization and surveillance, the village authority is the transmitter 
through which information from the centre is led down to the people (e.g. on how good 
the CPP is at building infrastructure) and back from the villagers to the centre (e.g. on 
the various tactics used by the opposition to attack the government, and people's 
concerns and potential threats from it). The CPP's control over the administrative 
domain is even more dominant, when considering the fact that the party also controls 
all the local police. 
56 Fieldwork interview with commune chief, October 20,2008 
The CPP, like many political parties and politicians in previous regimes (Chandler 
2008), also seeks to gain support from the sangha. When the Royalists were still strong 
in power, the CPP had to compete hard to win favor among Buddhist-related 
institutions. But now, with the Royalists out of the way, the CPP seems to be in secure 
control of this influential source of legitimacy. The head monk at the national level has 
long been suspected of being pro-CPP (Kent 2003), while many monasteries at the 
local level have turned one by one to accepting the CPP's patronage. 
According to the fieldwork, there are usually four to six pagodas in one commune, and 
it was common for people to know about the persons who come to support the pagodas 
(i.e. patrons) and their political affiliations. Before, in each commune, there might be 
three CPP and three Royalist pagodas, or four CPP and two Royalist. But now, it is 
common that out of the six pagodas, five or all six of them are supported by CPP 
people. The fieldwork also indicated that the CPP in addition to making large material 
contributions to the pagoda (see chapters 6 and 7 for more on this), also seeks to co-opt 
the 'executive branch' of the sangha, i.e. the pagoda-committees. 
Besides the more hands-on and direct strategies just discussed, the CPP has also been 
aggressive in using the media - TV and radio in particular - to send out its political 
messages and shape people's perceptions. Rural people do not usually have access to 
newspapers, but most of them have a radio and more and more of them have a TV 
(Malena and Chhim 2009). There are no opposition TV channels, and only a few less 
pro-government radio broadcast. These few radio-broadcasts have been limited in term 
of their reach. The only TV and radio channels that are able to reach the most remote 
areas are the pro-CPP ones. Besides the regular news, social events, and commercial 
programs, the most noticeable events broadcast by these TV and radio stations is about 
what the government has done well, and the Prime Minister's speeches57. 
People's perceptions are also the result of the people themselves being rather passive 
and less demanding of information relating to public affairs (Malena and Chhim 2009). 
It is not that people do not feel they need to know about what is going on around them. 
However, what they are interested in are still those matters that can directly and 
immediately affect their lives - especially about security and health issues (CAS and 
World Bank 2007). 
57 Media observations conducted by the author during the period from March to June 2008. 
Moreover, partly because of the lack of more subtle and detailed information about the 
government's activities, people tend to form their judgments based on what their eyes 
can actually see. This is confirmed by a recent study which found that a large majority 
of people in Cambodia (almost 80%) base their judgment that the government is 
heading in the right direction on the fact that many infrastructure projects had been 
built (IRI 2008). 
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Figure 12: Why people think the 
country is moving in the right direction 
More roads built • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 7 7 % 
More schools built 
More health clinics built • • • • 2 3 % 
Moie pagodas built • • • 2 0 % 
More bridges built M M 17% 
More irrigation built • • 1 4 % 
Improved Inirtg conditions • • 1 1 % 
More built (other) M 1 0 % 
Good business enwonment h 9 % 
Nation at peace H 7 % 
Source: IRI 2008 
Besides the CPP, there are also a few other actors who try to make their presence felt at 
the local level. The first is the opposition. Because the Royalists have almost 
disappeared altogether, it is more relevant to focus on the SRP. From an interview with 
high ranking SRP officials, the party now has about 700,000 members nationwide. It 
has also tried to put in place its organizational structure at all levels, from the central 
down to the group (sub-village) level5 . In this respect, it is noted that the SRP actually 
tries to learn from the CPP by organizing various party wings such as youth and 
women's groups. It is hard to assess the efficiency of the SRP's emerging 
organizational capacity, but from its electoral result (i.e. from 700,000 votes in 1998 to 
1,320,000 in 2008), it is fair to say that it has been working quite well. 
In the interview, an SRP official recognized that it has a lot more to do with its 
organizational building. The biggest challenge thing for the party is its lack of financial 
resources. It has had a hard time recruiting and incentivizing its people on the ground. 
Even tougher has been the fact that recently, more of its people have been bought off 
and defected to the CPP. Facing such challenges the party has become more cautious in 
58 Fieldwork interview, April 03, 2010 
managing its activists, preferring to promote people based on their background and how 
much of a hardliner he or she has been. Despite all these measures, though, according 
to NGO people working closely with political parties at the local level, it will be a long 
time before the SRP can put in place as strong administration network, and attract as 
many good people, as the CPP has 5 9 . 
With all these constraints, the SRP has been trying to win popular support by picking 
up on issues most directly affecting people daily lives. From my media observations in 
2008 and later on, the SRP has consistently focused on the problems of the high 
gasoline prices, and more recently, on the issue of land conflicts and land grabbing. 
Advocacy and human rights NGOs have also joined efforts on these issues. However, 
they have been less effective in the face of powerful vested interests (Adhoc 2009). 
To sum up, the CPP has put a lot of effort into strengthening its local and rural 
administrative capacity, extending it down to the household level. However, a closer 
look reveals that this administrative capacity has not been fueled by financial 
incentives. On the contrary, reflecting the overly-centralized nature of state resources, 
local party officials have been given little financial reward. 
It seems also that the CPP's local administrative capacity comes from its control of 
other non-financial aspects of rural politics. These include the party's control and co-
optation of not only administrative domains, but also the more traditional and informal 
ones, especially the sangha and other so-called 'head of the wind' elements. With such 
direct controls, together with its control over the media, the CPP has sought to shape 
people's perceptions. Such shaping has also been the result of the people's general 
quiescence when it comes to demanding information about public affairs. The people's 
perceptions are also formed by what they can actually see, particularly infrastructure 
projects such as roads, schools, canals, and pagodas. 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to answer two related questions about the CPP's strategies for 
dominance. 
5 9 Interview with NGOs officials, March 26, April 01,2010 
• How has the CPP managed to use state budget control to accommodate elite 
interest in exchange for their support? and 
• How has the CPP built and strengthened its local administrative networks to 
control and shape rural voters' perceptions? 
To conclude the chapter, the key answers to the questions are as follows. As with the 
budget, the fact that Cambodia's budgetary system was weak reflects its post-conflict 
situation: low revenue with a small tax base and a weak administration; high aid-
dependency and weak management of spending. Like many other post-conflict 
countries, one of the key reforms pushed by the donors is on the budget. Very little 
progress was however made before 2000, mainly because the reform was clouded by 
the political struggle between the CPP and the Royalists. Since 2000, some progress has 
been made and rated as satisfactory by some donors. However, the reform has done 
little to change three important features of Cambodia's budgetary system: the 
prevalence of patronage, budgetary centralization and fragmentation. These points 
relate directly to how the CPP seeks to control the state budget and accommodate 
patronage interests. 
Centralization and fragmentation persist because they are the two important strategies 
used by the CPP not only to help the elite seek rents, but also to ensure rent-sharing and 
preventing any particular factions or domains from becoming too strong. In ensuring 
elite coalition and control, the CPP pays much more attention to the elite at the central 
level, giving its foot soldiers, i.e. party activists at the sub-national and local levels 
much less budgetary authority, and thus, much less room for rent-seeking. It is still to 
be seen whether the party sees this vertical imbalance as a problem that needs to be 
addressed internally. 
So why has the CPP still been quite effective in dominating rural politics and ensuring 
rural votes? The answer is that the CPP's rural administrative machinery has been run 
not just by financial incentives, but also by other non-monetary factors. Its control over 
key rural 'domains' of power and 'heads of the wind', is the key. However, people's 
passiveness in general and the opposition and other civil society's limitations in 
exerting their influence at that level are also contributing factors. 
In the next two chapters, the study will take the analysis of these budgetary issues to 
another level. This time however, rather than focusing on the formal budgetary system, 
or the formal administrative networks, the two chapters will look at the off-budget 
channels which the party has used to raise funds to support rural infrastructure 
throughout the country. It should be noted that such off-budget support was a key early 
observation which led this study to focus on the CPP in the first place. One specific 
argument that will be made and that relates to this chapter is that, under the CPP, the 
notion of formal, or on-budget, is not that clearly separated from what is informal, or 
off-budget. The fact that the party is able to bring together and make use of both formal 
and informal budgetary systems is in itself what makes it so strong and dominant. 
Chapter 6: The CPP's off budget support for rural 
infrastructure projects 
This and the next chapter discuss an interesting political strategy of the CPP: its raising 
and spending of off-budget money to support rural infrastructure projects. The last 
chapter showed that people (especially those in rural areas) gave high approval to the 
CPP-led government for the numerous tangible infrastructure projects that were built. It 
can be said that many of these projects must have been built with state budget and 
donor money budget. But on top of those financing sources, as already discussed in 
chapter 4, the CPP and Prime Minister Hun Sen since 1993 have also been increasingly 
involved in supporting infrastructure projects such as building schools, roads, canals, 
and pagodas. 
From my observation, the support has been given off budget, meaning not through the 
formal state budget. This chapter and the next seek to understand how the party has 
done this by answering the following questions (as posed in chapter 3): 
• How has the off-budget party support been arranged and given by the CPP? 
• What more can we learn from such off-budget party support about the CPP, 
especially in terms of its relation with the state and the elite/patronage? and 
• What have people perceived about this off-budget support and what does it 
mean for the CPP's legitimization effort? 
In answering the above questions, the two chapters rely almost entirely on primary data 
gathered during my fieldwork in Cambodia in 2008 and early 2009. For many years, 
the CPP's off budget support has been heard and noticed, but there has not been any 
systematic study on how this is done. This study is the first to address this gap, 
providing new empirical findings about the subject. 
Moreover, understanding the CPP's off-budget spending does not just serve the purpose 
of having more empirical data generated. It is also particularly helpful for this study to 
better understand the CPP's strategies of domination, for it promises to shed new light 
on the relationship between the party and its elite, the relationship among elites, and the 
party's views about legitimacy and its relationship with the masses. In other words, 
understanding the off-budget operations allows this study to look further into the CPP 
as 'a black box.' In doing that, new insights will also be provided into the relationship 
between the central and sub-national/local level within the party. 
The division between this and the next chapter is as follows. This chapter focuses on 
discussing the mechanisms by which the off-budget support is arranged, while the next 
chapter will present more empirical data collected about the type and size of support 
given, its variation, its correlation to number of votes, people's perceptions of this 
practice, and its contribution to rural development. The conclusion for both chapters is 
presented at the end of Chapter 7. 
6.1. Introducing the CPP's Party Working Group (PWG) 
The CPP's support for rural infrastructure projects has been carried out through a 
mechanism called the Party Working Group, shortly referred to as PWG. The PWG is a 
systematic and yet rather shadowy arrangement created in 1993 that exists at national, 
provincial, district and commune level. The PWG, it should be noted, is not the same as 
the formal administrative structure of the Party. It is rather like a task force composed 
of party officials at the different levels. The PWG's main objective is to mobilize 
resources from both its members and outside networks and spend that money to 'take 
care' of and ensure votes from the provinces, districts, and communes they are assigned 
to. The PWG is sometimes referred to by CPP officials as 'networks of donators 
|soboroschuny who make contributions to help rural development. 
The PWG and its functioning, this study argues, is like a 'play' performed by the CPP 
for voters, a 'play' that brings together many key actors (the CPP leadership, the elites, 
the masses, the opposition) and many elements (election, finance, administrative, 
media, personal relationship, religion, and culture). In my media observations during 
the six months leading to the July 2008 election, it was noticed that everyday, about 30 
CPP official visits to rural areas were reported. During many of those visits, the 
officials either promised to build, or inaugurated already built, infrastructure projects in 
the localities visited. 
Prime Minister Hun Sen was probably the most familiar face seen during that period. 
But it was not just him; many other CPP high ranking officials were also shown on TV 
and newspapers visiting communes and villages throughout the country. Everywhere 
they went, the most common line they delivered to the people was that, whatever they 
gave to the people today was made possible by the brilliant leadership of the Prime 
Minister Hun Sen, and with less frequency, of the other two party leaders, Chea Sim 
and Heng Samrin. 
From my observations, as a standard protocol, the officials making such visits were 
shown accompanied by their entourages who sat behind when the official made 
speeches. Prime Minister Hun Sen expectedly would have the largest and most high-
profile entourage. Sometimes (and almost always for Prime Minister Hun Sen and a 
few other high ranking officials), to the side of the official entourage was also seen a 
group of monks who were there to do the blessing for the visiting officials. 
Before the visiting officials made their speeches, the local CPP chiefs would read a 
report on the increasing number of CPP membership in their localities, with particular 
emphasis on the number of people who had recently defected from the opposition. 
During the speech, the rural people, some wearing CPP shirts and caps, were shown 
sitting quite passively listening and clapping their hands when the speech ended. This 
passiveness, however, is not unique to CPP meetings. People in Cambodia, from what I 
have observed, do not like to participate when they attend meetings. At the end of each 
visit - or the ceremonial part of i tE the people were shown receiving the standard CPP 
gift packages, which include some cash ($1.5 to $2.5), some rice, a sarong, and 
monosodium glutamate (MSG). It is the responsibility of local authorities, police 
included, to arrange the ceremonies. 
The PWG support practice is very well known throughout Cambodia. Prime Minister 
Hun Sen, who is known to lead the movement, has developed a catch phrase for 
himself: wherever he went, people would make requests for support; he would read out 
such requests, and when he agreed, which was usually the case, he would claim, with a 
slightly joking tone, 'Choun tarn samnom-por' (meaning, 'granted as requested'). After 
the 'granting as the people wish,' sometime, he would turn back to his entourage, 
giving project so and so to be taken care of by Mr A, and so and so by Mr B. Mr A and 
Mr. B would stand up, smiling and showing respect, and happily agree to the 'taking 
care' responsibility. To them, it was a very prestigious - or powerful, to be more 
accurate - thing to be asked (or, commanded by) the Prime Minister to do PWG work. 
The scenes just described are common knowledge for Cambodian people. The 'play' 
has been going on for more than a decade, and yet there has not been any systematic 
study on it and that is why, in this study, an empirical data collection is conducted to fill 
in this gap. However, the PWG support and functioning are interesting to study not just 
because they have not been well studied. More important than that, the PWG is a 
political play which, if well understood, can serve as a unique window into which the 
C P P g a political black box, as Hughes (2009) calls it, can be better understood. The 
following are some of the rationales why the PWG is very important and relevant. 
First, the CPP and its leadership have increasingly relied on the PWG functioning and 
supports as part of the soft strategy for building its development-friendly image and 
winning the sympathy from the people. The CPP posters that dot the surface of the 
country show the CPP and its three leaders, alongside schools, roads, pagodas and other 
infrastructure projects, with a message that says: voting for the CPP, people will get 
infrastructure projects and development. As this study shows, that message seems to 
have got through to people's mind, the end result of which is the CPP controlling more 
than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in 2008. After the 2008 election, according to 
TV broadcasts and CPP website, the PWG activities still continued, although with 
much less intensity compared to the period before the election 
Second, as will be elaborated shortly, the PWG is like a massive personal network 
divided into provincial, district and commune level. With that functioning logic, the 
PWG is like an evolved and expanded version of the patronage networks adapted to 
serve electoral purposes. Chapters 4 and 5 have already discussed the patronage 
networks in Cambodia, and their relationship with the state and the Party. Thus, the 
PWG is a good case through which the evolution of the patronage can be studied in 
relation to electoral politics. 
Third, some recent developments indicate that what has been used by the PWG (i.e. 
reliance on personal networks and contribution to address development issues) has 
become not just the CPP's strategy to win votes and change its political image; it has 
actually become a kind of proven political philosophy and pragmatism favored by the 
Party and Prime Minister Hun Sen. 
60 The website address of the CPP is http://www.thecpp.org/ 
This is a typical CPP ceremonial set up. On the 
podium is the Prime Minister. Behind him is his 
entourages, with the monks sitting on the right 
side . 
A chain smoker, Prime Minister Hun Sen is 
shown here at one of hundreds of CPP 
ceremonies during a rural visit. Behind him are 
the Minister of Interior (on the right) and 
Minister of Finance (on the left)62. 
A head of a PWG is shown inaugurating a school. 
Behind him are CPP officials63. 
The Prime Minister has been trying to portray 
himself as a man for rural development. Here he is 
shown helping people in their rice field . 
A PWG head is shown distributing gifts to the 
disabled and senior people in a commune. This 
practice is very common throughout Cambodia . 
Giving medals to significant contributors to PWG 
is a common practice. Here, the Prime Minister is 
shown giving a medal to Mong Rithy, a business 
tycoon and a senator . 
61 Source: http://preahvihear.com/?p= 1448 
62 Source: http://unitedkhmer.wordpress.com/author/unitedkhmer/page/13/ 
63 Source: http://www.cpp.org.kh/categorv.php?cat=l&pos=l 3 
64 Sources: http://ki-media.blogspot.eom/2008/08/hun-sen-almost-authentic-prime-minister.html 
65 Sources: http://www.cpp.org.kh/category.php?cat=l&pos=7 
66 Source: http://ki-media.blogspot.com/2007/06/cpp-tycoon-senator-mong-reththys-shady.html 
The recent diplomatic row with Thailand over border disputes is a good example of 
how the PWG logic has been applied beyond electoral politics. Since 2008, Cambodia-
Thailand relationships have worsened because of a disagreement over an area around 
Preah Vihea temple located along the border (Thayer 2009). The content of the dispute 
is beyond the scope of this study. However, what relevant is my observation that, as a 
way to respond to the crisis, and to show that everyone is behind the government and 
the Prime Minister on this 'matter of national interest', all the central ministerial 
agencies had had fund-raising events in order to support the soldiers standing by in the 
dispute areas. 
This movement is very familiar to the PWG practice in the sense that the money was 
raised partly based on personal networks and each ministry has to take turns to visit the 
disputed area to show their active involvement in the issue. And like the PWG, each of 
such visits was broadcast on TV67. In this most-publicized conflicts with Thailand, the 
opposition parties, with no power and, more importantly, no money, have been left out 
almost completely from Cambodian politics. This conflict, as far as the fundraising 
went, indicates the belief of the CPP and its leadership in the effectiveness of personal-
network fundraising to address national matters, while at the same time, further 
building their (the Party and its leadership) profiles, and make the opposition irrelevant. 
6.2. PWG arrangement 
Having discussed the significance of PWG, this section discusses the arrangement 
itself. At the central level, the PWG is almost the same as the Central Committee of the 
party. At the provincial and lower level however, the membership is different (CPP 
2008b). According to the CPP list of PWG membership nation-wide, each province has 
one provincial PWG, under which one district PWG is set up for each district, and then 
one commune PWG for each commune. The PWG, for both provincial and district 
level, is composed of party members from central, provincial, district and communes. 
Usually, the high ranking government officials (prime minister, deputy prime ministers, 
ministers) are assigned to be the heads of provincial PWG, while lower rank central 
and, to a lesser extent, provincial officials are assigned as heads of district PWG. Such 
assignments, especially of the head of the PWG, for both provincial and district levels, 
67 This is based on my observation while working with ministries from September 2008 to February 
2009, and also on media observation by the author during the same period. 
are proposed and approved by the Central Committee of the party. The decisions, it was 
learnt, are made based on a number of factors, including the resourcefulness of the 
people to be assigned and their historical or personal affiliation to the area. Chapter 7 
will discuss more on this. 
Figure 14: PWG arrangement 
centre are assigned to be the head of provincial and district PWG. 
Despite being a mechanism established to provide financing for rural infrastructure 
projects country-wide, the PWG was designed not to rely financially on the party's 
central budget 6 8. Instead, it was designed as a collection of many smaller personal 
networks, each assigned to 'take care' of a province, a district or a commune. Each 
PWG is responsible for mobilizing resources to build roads, schools, bridges, pagodas, 
and other election campaign spending within their assigned areas. Within the current 
arrangement, a clear labor division is noticed: the heads and members of the PWG from 
the central (and less frequently, provincial) level are usually in charge of fund-raising, 
whereas those from districts and communes are responsible for identifying and 
proposing projects. 
A recent CPP's list of central people supporting PWG by provinces 6 9 show that the 
numbers of listed members vary a lot by province: It shows only 86 people for Kampot 
province, 150 for Phnom Penh, 319 in Kandal, and 648 in Takeo (CPP 2008b). The 
completeness of the record can be brought into question . However, at least, I learnt that 
there is such a record, which in turn supports my argument that the PWG is not just a 
6 8 Key informant interviews with a government officer, September 05,2008 
6 9 The document is not dated, but was assured by the key informant that it was developed in 2008 
one-off operation, but a nation-wide, half formal and half informal arrangement within 
the party structure. 
The central people's ability to raise funds for PWG70 depends mainly on the kinds of 
positions they hold in the government. Ministers and high-level officials have 
considerable advantages in cultivating personal networks and mobilizing resources to 
fund their PWG activities. They are more likely to include most people who currently 
serve within their ministries or departments in their PWG. These people travel with 
their bosses to the province and district levels, acting as entourages for their bosses. 
Being a part of the campaign means considerable contributions of time and money for 
those involved: even poorly paid central officials will contribute $20, $30, $50 a month 
to a fund held in the name of their PWG head. The head will also actively solicit money 
from their own networks, and supplement funds from their own (including family) 
resources. 
Confirming the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.2.) about the 
resourcefulness, during fieldwork it was found that the resourcefulness of the PWG 
relates directly to the resourcefulness of the heads and its key members. Because almost 
all of these people are government officials, their resourcefulness in turn depends on 
which ministries or agencies they are from. To recall from Chapter 3, those from the 
Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, of Commerce, of 
Agriculture (especially forestry, fishery or food quality departments), of Interior, 
various semi-autonomous authorities, are more resourceful than those from the Ministry 
of Education, of Health, of Social Affairs, or of Women Affairs. 
PWGs headed and/or supported by those with positions associated with the Prime 
Minister were found to be highly resourceful; and those supported by people from 
legislative branches (including the National Assembly and Senate) tend to be medium 
or low in their resourcefulness. But the PWG is like an octopus trying to reach and 
make uses of various sources of support. This means that the resourcefulness is not just 
the function of which ministries their heads are from, but also how widely connected 
these people are with various potential sources of funding. As the illustrative cases 
below will show, a PWG can extend its reach to tap into state budget, NGO's funds, 
70 In some cases, provincial level officials are also active in fundraising. But that is not very common. 
and private businesses, depending on the influence and connection of its heads and key 
members. 
The presence of businessmen with okhna titles and the so-called advisors is another 
interesting aspect of the PWG. In Cambodia, wealthy businessmen seek to have a 
prestigious title called oknha granted to them. The Okhna title is granted to those 
wealthy people who contribute more than USD 100,000 to national development and by 
that, it usually means building roads, schools, bridges and pagodas (Doung 2008). As of 
2008, there were about 220 oknhas, ten of whom were women. Some of them even 
make their way to becoming members of parliamentary members (three), and senators 
(six) (Doung 2008). These oknha are particularly wealthy: it is known that about 23% 
of land in Cambodia is controlled by them (Doung 2008). Of relevance to this study, 
almost all of the okhna are closely associated with the CPP, and the list of the PWG 
confirms this (CPP 2008b). 
Another popular title is 'advisor' (Tipreksa) which is one class lower than oknha. In 
Cambodia, many high ranking officials are entitled to many advisors. One high ranking 
official (who I cannot name) for instance has more than 100 advisors. But such 
'advisors' are not the one who actually give advice; they are just titles created for 
powerful government and party officials to mobilize resources from wealthy people, 
and for those wealthy people to get a title and attachment to the officials. In the case of 
the sample official, out of the more than 100 advisors he has, only twelve were counted 
as 'real' advisors (meaning those whose job is to give advice). The rest were 'advisors' 
based on contributions71. 
The price of the 'advisor' title depends on the perceived influence of the individual to 
whom the prospective advisor is attached. For the sample official, the price was about 
USD50,000. But if one knows the right channel, there will be 'people who run the 
business' (nak rot kar) who can help to get it only at USD20,000 to USD30,000. It was 
also learnt that once becoming an advisor, he or she will be automatically included in 
the PWG headed by the relevant officials 7 2. Normal government officials can also 
become an 'advisor' if they make the contribution, and many do seek to have one. This 
is because the title helps top-up their official title. For instance, a deputy provincial 
7 1 Fieldwork interview with a central CPP official, June 08,2008 
7 2 ibid 
governor was said during my fieldwork interview as being more powerful than the 
governor, mainly because he was a close advisor to an influential person at the central 
level. 
The study also collected data about PWG at district and commune level. Each district 
PWG is usually headed by high ranking (from Director General position and above) 
government officials. In addition to that, it might also have five to ten other people 
assigned from the central level and who are mostly responsible for raising fund. In this 
study, these people are called 'key members.' The district PWG (not the district 
administration) plays a very important role in the whole PWG hierarchy because it is 
the one which does the actual fund-raising, while the provincial PWG plays more of a 
coordinating role. 
The government position occupied by the head is usually a good indication of who else 
from the central level were sent to help his PWG: if the head is from the Ministry of 
Commerce, the other central members tend to also be the ones from that ministry; if the 
head is a high ranking policeman, his people would tend to be from the Ministry of 
Interior, and so on. And if the head is an influential person (for instance, someone in 
key position of, say, Prime Minister's Office, customs, Ministry of Finance), there tend 
to be more wealthy financiers in his PWG. 
While people from the central and provincial levels are responsible for fundraising, 
district and commune party officials are the ones who identify and propose projects. As 
with the implementation of the projects, the district PWG heads have the most say in 
contractor selection and payment. The communes in this regard will just wait to get the 
projects done. 
This limited participation, however, seems to be what the commune prefers. All the 
commune chiefs interviewed said they are not interested in directly managing the 
money of the PWG. 'We do not want to touch the money,' commune chiefs usually 
said of the support from the PWG, 'we just want to receive the schools, roads, or 
irrigations when they are finished.' To the commune chiefs, the party money is 'hot 
money,'' meaning they might get into big trouble if they are accused of misusing it. 
That said, however, in the shadowy arrangement of the PWG, the personal connections 
and the preference of the head of PWG play key roles, deciding who is more influential 
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than whom. In two districts visited, for instance, the district governors are very 
influential players in both project selection and implementation. One district governor 
is a friend and the other is a relative to the heads of respective PWGs. In two other 
districts, however, the district governors are much less influential. In another district, 
the head of the PWG relied on his nephew who runs a road construction company to 
take care of most of his PWG projects7 3. In the other two districts, the heads of the 
PWG chose neither the district governor nor his relatives but commune chiefs to 
directly supervise project implementation. 
However, during fieldwork, I observed that the head of the PWG relied heavily on the 
local level for some mattes especially for arranging local election campaigns and 
handout distribution. At the meeting, the head of PWG (who is also a minister) 
explicitly gave the local activists (the commune chiefs and councilors) a lot of 
discretion . This is how he put it: ' / bring money to all of you today so that you can 
spend it. Please save and use it effectively. We need to be innovative. I don % mind if 
you keep some of the money in your pockets, as long as you manage to win ' 7 5 . With the 
discretion, the commune people were also expected to deliver and be accountable to the 
electoral performance in their localities. 
The PWGs have been able to raise millions of dollars every year to support local 
development and infrastructure projects. An estimation of the value is provided and 
discussed in the next chapter. Covered here is an explanation of how it works. First of 
all, the arrangements of PWG have been made possible because the state and its 
resources have been largely controlled by CPP people. As discussed in chapters 4 and 
5, since the economic liberation in 1989, the CPP-controlled government has opened up 
a new phase in which state officials have been progressively involved in using their 
state positions to seek rents for personal and group benefits. 
The PWG is an example of how the CPP leadership uses the patronage and its 
accumulated wealth to advance political interest of the party. Such strategy has been 
masked by development and pro-poor agenda. Based on the speech by the Prime 
Minister and the report from his Cabinet, the whole arrangement of PWG is what he 
7 3 That PWG sometimes also contracted the Military Construction Group, a team which has been 
carrying out many of the Prime Minister projects. 
7 4 Fieldwork interview, June 18,2008 
7 5 Personal note-taking of the meeting on June 18,2008 
would call 'the innovative application of the culture of sharing' (Cabinet of Prime 
Minister 2008). In this sense, the party leadership has tried to show that they have been 
trying to take things back from the rich (their own rich people) and sharing it back with 
the rural people. 
In other words, the party leadership was trying to show that what it has been doing is 
essentially about income redistribution76. With that description, the PWG arrangement 
has been viewed (or at least, that is what the party wants the people to view) not within 
a framework of state-society obligations, but an elite-mass relationship where the 
former are expected to be generous and giving, and the latter to be loyal and 
appreciative. The Prime Minister has attempted to project himself as the intermediary 
who has made such generosity-loyalty relations possible. 
The PWGs, this study further argues, were put together in ways that appear sensible 
and even motivating within the context of Cambodian culture and tradition. For 
instance, in explaining what he means by 'culture of sharing,' Prime Minister Hun Sen 
compared PWG contributions to the cash contribution practice in Cambodian 
weddings 7 7. As a tradition, when a couple gets married, they will receive cash from 
each guest coming to their event. The cash contribution is meant to help the newly-
weds. 
This arrangement is practically an unspoken mutual agreement or generalized 
reciprocity, for the couple will have to make cash contributions back when invited to 
other people's weddings, especially those who had made cash a contribution to them. 
The comparison made by the Prime Minister seems not only to make sense to local 
people, but also conveys a message that they are bound to do something back for the 
party in exchange for all the support received. 
The arrangement also appeals to traditional beliefs of the elite themselves. Sentimental 
attachment with one's homeland, the desires to do merit-making and establish personal 
and family images, have been key motives for many elites to spend a lot of money 
building rural infrastructure projects, including pagodas. The CPP and its leadership 
have well understood this cultural belief and incorporated them into the PWG 
76 Cambodia Daily Newspaper, June 23,2008 
7 7 Prime Minister Hun Sen, June 05, 2008, as noted during the media observation by the author during 
fieldwork from April to July 2008 
arrangements. By so doing, the party has motivated their people to contribute not only 
on political and economical, but also moral grounds, making them feel they are being 
involved in a good cause that is sanctioned by beliefs, tradition and customs. 
Homeland attachment, merit-making and the like are however just the 'soft elements' 
which keeps the PWG moving. The hard elements, which include party obligations, 
financial rewards or lack thereof, promotion or demotion, are also prominently at play. 
From key informant interviews, all key government officials who are seen as 
financially able to fund projects are required to become the head or at least a key 
member of a PWG. It is not surprising then to rarely see any party officials, who are 
usually government officials, who do not have an assigned district or commune. 
Contributions to the party and electoral results in their assigned 'constituencies' are 
among the key performance indicators by which party officials will be assessed. The 
Central Committee keeps a detailed list of election results by commune, analyzing their 
trends since 1993. The party uses the analytical data as a reference check on people 
assigned as heads of PWGs in each area. Their performance at the election is used as 
one of the key criteria for decisions about where they will be placed, promoted or 
demoted in the new government. 
The party is less restrictive as to how the PWG operates. Unlike the more rigid party 
and government structures, the PWG is open to various types of people who are willing 
and see advantages in being attached and contributing to the party in the name of rural 
development. Businessmen, or even people working in some non-governmental 
organizations, now see opportunities in the PWGs as ways to enter the party and make 
their contribution known to the powerful individuals who are heading that PWG and to 
whom they want to get close. Some rising and ambitious government officials also use 
PWG as a mechanism to show their loyalty and competency to their (governmental 
bosses) by making themselves useful members of his (the boss's) PWG. 
As observed, there are many people who contribute to a PWG for rural development 
projects. However, only the few names of a few individuals are known, and these 
people tend to be the more powerful ones. The main reason is that these many other 
contributors are not primarily interested in building their public image, but more in 
establishing connections with the powerful officials. Some people were even willing to 
pay extra to ensure that such connections are made explicit. For instance, some PWG 
members were said to spend USD30,000 to build a primary school, and about 
USD5,000 more just to get the school named after a certain powerful individual7 8. 
6.3. Three illustrative cases 
In the following, three case districts are presented, not to provide a systematic 
evaluation of the PWGs, but to recount how they are actually arranged and operates on 
the ground. 
6.3.1. Case 1: A PWG headed by a businessman 
The first illustrative case is from a fairly populated district located in the north-west of 
the country. It is a well-off district quite close to the provincial centre, and has been 
experiencing rapid economic growth and urbanization in the last few years. People 
there rely mainly on rice farming and trading. The CPP dominated the district in 2008 
election, taking about 60% of the votes cast. The PWG head is a high ranking central 
official who is also a businessman and has been running successful land speculation 
business both in Phnom Penh and various provinces. 
He, according to the district governor, is not a long-term veteran of the party, or of 
official government bureaucracy. Instead, he has been known as an opportunistic 
entrepreneur, who saw the importance of having a position in the government to help 
his business. He is one of the new blood and has claimed a high position in the 
government and party through his 'advisor' position, which was provided to him 
personally in exchange for his constant contributions to the party. As part of his party 
obligations, he is assigned to take care of the district which is also his hometown. 
Under him are some other high ranking officials from Phnom Penh including a close 
relative of a deputy prime minister. 
The district party official has kept very good records of the contributions from the 
PWG since 2003. The records were bound into a booklet entitled 'A List of the CPP's 
achievements for 2003-2007'. Among all the districts visited, this is the district whose 
data in the field was complete enough to allow a fairly reliable estimation of the PWG's 
support. Based on the records and an interview with district governor, it was learnt that 
from 2003 to 2007, the district working group contributed about $1,050,000, about 43% 
7 8 Interview with a central CPP official, June 06, 2008 
of which was spent on schools, 25% on irrigation, 16% on pagodas, 3% on roads, and 
the rest on other support such as on housing and wells. 
The record of the district was quite aggregated, requiring that I go to the commune 
level to learn more. I went to see a commune chief with whom I had had previous 
contact. According to the commune chiefs estimate, the total support of PWG was 
around USD 160,000 for the period from 2003 to 2007 for his commune. Most of this 
was spent on common infrastructure projects, namely, schools, roads, and one irrigation 
project. What is interesting about this commune is that a lot of PWG support was given 
to pagodas. The commune chief estimated that around $200,000 was given to the six 
pagodas in that commune . 
The district visited has ten communes. For the purpose of estimation, it was assumed 
that each of the ten communes in the districts received more or less the same amount of 
support. With this assumption, pagoda support district-wide would add up to about 
USD2 million dollars for the period from 2003-2007. Although appear to be too high, 
when considering that there are about 40 pagodas in the district, and how luxurious 
some of them are, the $2,000,000 figure might not be too surprising. Most of the 
support to the pagodas was spent on construction, decoration, and big Buddha statues. 
The support given to pagodas is included in the calculation of PWG support because for 
most cases, pagoda support is given in the name of the head or key members of the 
PWG. Usually, many people in the PWG will pool their contribution under the name of 
the PWG heads or members. That contribution is then given to the pagoda, usually 
during a religious period, called 'kathen\ 
Support to pagodas is also included as 
part of the party financing mainly 
because, as I observe, it is very common 
for people to associate a pagoda with a 
political party. For instance, it was said 
that in the commune, out of the six 
pagodas, three used to be CPP, three 
Funcinpec (i.e. the Royalists), but in 2008, five had turned CPP, leaving only one still 
79 The commune chiefs estimate of the value of support to the pagoda was cross-checked with an 
estimation provided by a long-serving pagoda committee member. 
Table 5: PWG support from 2003-
2007/2008 
Types of supports USD 
Suport on infrastructure 1,050,000 
Support for pagoda 2,000,000 
Hand-outs 450,000 
Total 3,500,000 
Source: District records obtained during 
the fieldwork 
deciding which way it would swing. This also reflects the politicization of the so-called 
'Pagoda-Support Committee,' most of whose members act not only as older, respected 
people (acha), but also as key party activists. 
Besides support for infrastructures, the PWG spent a lot on handouts especially during 
election campaign. In the case study district, for the 2008 election campaign, it was 
estimated that about $150,000 was spent on handouts. For the period from 2003 to 
2008, three elections took place: the 2003 national election, the 2007 commune 
election, and the 2008 national election. Assuming that the amount of handouts was 
similar for each of the three elections, the estimated total value of the handouts from 
2003 to 2008 would be around $450,000. In total, as Table 5 shows, the PWG support 
over a period of four to five years is estimated to be USD3.5 million. 
What should this USD3.5 million be compared with? The ideal point of comparison 
would be the total state and donor budget disbursed to the district. However, such data 
is virtually impossible to obtain. First, given the current overly-centralized nature of the 
state budget, and the fact that district had ceased to be a budget level since 1994, there 
is no single, integrated budget data for districts. One remotely possible way to obtain 
data on how much state money has been disbursed to a district is to do the following: 
go to provincial departments of education, then health, agriculture, rural development, 
irrigation, and then religion to ask how much 'recurrent' expenditure has been 
transferred down. My experience of tracking expenditure in education sector in 2005, 
however, taught me that such tracking would not be possible because only aggregate 
(i.e. by province, not by district) spending data is kept at provincial departments (World 
Bank 2005). 
Even if such data were possible to obtain, it would have covered only the 'recurrent' 
side of it, namely, salary, operations and maintenance, and travel per diems. In the 
current budgeting system, the investment side of the budget is not allocated down to 
provincial level, meaning one cannot obtain any information about the investment 
budget by visiting provincial departments. Moreover, such budget information is not 
even available at line ministerial level. To obtain it, one needs to go to the Department 
of Investment and Cooperation (DIC) of the Ministry of Finance. But even if the DIC 
were willing to share that information, it would still be worthless for the purpose of this 
study because the information available there is nationally aggregated, showing 
disbursement by projects, without detailing the location of spending (Pak 2009a). 
An alternative point of comparison, which would be both more feasible and justifiable, 
is the Commune Sangkat Fund (CSF). CSF is an unconditional grant for the elected 
commune councils. The CSF has an administrative component and an development 
component. The CSF is financed partly by the national budget and partly by donor 
contribution. The national budget contribution amounted to 2% of national recurrent 
revenue in 2002, and increased to 2.7% in 2008. The World Bank's contribution 
accounted for the biggest part of the donor supports. The annual CSF for each 
commune was estimated to be about USD8,680 on average from 2002 to 2006 (STF 
2008)80. 
Besides the fact that its data is readily available at local level, what makes CSF amount 
a good point of comparison is its being the only development budget that has been 
transferred and managed at local level. Other development budget, as just discussed, is 
managed by the higher level through many standalone projects, with the local level 
having very little say and knowledge. In other words, the CSF is what makes the local-
level people feel they are entitled to something from the state. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to compare the PWG support with CSF development component money. 
In the case study district, the total CSF development budget allocated to all the 
communes was around USD 0.5 million for the period 2003 to 2007. Comparatively 
then, the PWG support for infrastructure in the district is about two times higher than 
the CSF. The proportion jumps to about 3.5 times if the pagoda support and handouts 
are also factored in. 
As appears to be the case elsewhere, the head of the PWG plays a very important role 
in mobilizing resources. He is also personally close to the district governor. He even 
provides a personal contribution (a kind of 'personal' salary) of about $40 per month to 
five CPP activists: three at the district level (including the district governor), and three 
in the case commune (including the commune chief). The commune and district people 
describe him as generous and accessible; he makes frequent visits to the district, 
especially during election campaign time. Every time he comes to visit, he brings gifts 
80 From 2011 onward, the CSF was increased to about US$21,000 per commune (RGC 2010c) 
and hand-outs. District and commune people consider him as resourceful not only 
because he is a rich businessman himself, but also because he has good connections to 
the top, along with extensive networks (ksae bandanh) with other businessmen and 
government people. 
The relationship between the PWG head and the local officials is direct and close. The 
commune chief said 7 discuss matters with him on the phone and when he agrees, he 
asks me to go to Phnom Penh, meet him at his home or office. He would give me 
$US5,000 at a time for me to arrange for the contractor to build or repair roads'*1. 
However, after a while, the PWG head became close friends with a contractor in the 
provincial center. From then on, most of the contracted works were implemented by 
this new contractor. 
This, as we will see in other cases, is a part of a wider pattern in which central officials 
have close relationships with local party officials, but do not necessarily entrust the 
latter with project implementation, especially in terms of PWG budget management. 
Yet, the commune chief did not feel that trust was taken away from him. Rather, he did 
not want to be involved in the PWG money management either, saying that any small 
scandals associated with that money could cause him a lot of troubles in the party. Plus, 
he added, he is still the one who receives the cash for campaign spending. For that 
money, he said, he is given a great deal of trust and responsibility in management and 
distribution. 
The good records kept in this first case district allowed me to reasonably estimate the 
relative size of PWG support. The quality of the records in the second case does not 
permit such reliable estimation. However, the dollars and cents of is not the most 
interesting thing about PWG. Instead, it is its operation and the political implications 
attached to it that deserve more attention, and this is what we will learn more from the 
second and third case district. 
6.3.2. Case 2: A PWG and the state budgets 
He is instead an influential, old party veteran who can manage to obtain resources not 
only from the PWG members and his informal network, but also uses his influence to 
have state budget allocated to his constituencies. 
81 Fieldwork interview with commune chief, June 03,2008 
The second case district is located in a relatively poor area, with about 60,000 voters 
registered for the 2008 election. Ninety percent of the people there depend principally 
on rice-farming. Their main livelihood challenge has been drought and lack of 
irrigation water. The opposition has been weak in the district, relying on an electoral 
promise that appeals almost exclusively to the landless, that it will give back land to the 
people if it wins. The CPP, however, as in other provinces, relies on its ability to build 
things and on dividing and co-opting the opposition. 
The PWG arrangement in this case is similar to that in the first case. The PWG head in 
this case, however, is not known for his wealth. Yet, he is known as one of the most 
powerful individuals in the Central Committee of the CPP. A veteran himself, he is 
known to be a person of principle. He is reputed among those I spoke to for believing in 
party solidarity and the obligation to serve the people, rather than being driven by 
personal financial incentives. 
The PWG also has some key members some of whom are from the central and some 
from the provincial level. For those from the central level, most of them (four out of 
seven) are assigned to the district because it is their srok com neut (place of family 
origin). Those from the province are assigned to the district because they are seen as 
having 'potential' to help. As their positions (a deputy governor and four directors of 
line departments including Agriculture, Irrigation, Land, and Labour) indicate, these 
people can use their formal influence to meet the most pressing needs of the district: 
agricultural support and water. 
On the size of PWG support, the records they 
kept show the number of projects, but not 
their values. Yet, based on various reports 
and interviews with the party officials at the 
district, some indicative findings were made 
about the size, sources and, more 
importantly, the ways in which the PWG has 
used to help the district. As shown in Table 
6, the PWG support focuses on two things: 
schools and irrigation-related activities. As with the schools, the support was largely 
provided by or in the name of the Prime Minister (around 50 out of the 75 classrooms). 
Table 6: PWG support to the district 
Type of spending Units 
Schools 75 classrooms 
Roads 14 lines 
Bridge 6 bridges 




Rice 155 tons 
Source: District records obtained 
during the fieldwork 
As in the previous case, after visiting the district level, I went on to meet people in a 
commune in order to learn more about the PWG operation. In the commune, I looked at 
a roughly prepared list of PWG projects. The list showed that the biggest support from 
the PWG was the building of 15 classrooms, costing around $US75,000, all of which 
were presented as direct gifts from the Prime Minister. The PWG also built a total of 9 
kilometers of earth roads, costing around USD70,000. The PWG, with joint financing 
from the Red Cross of the Prime Minister's wife, has also helped dig 45 wells, each of 
which cost around $200. Summing up, the supports from the CPP (which is partly Red 
Cross money) is estimated to be around USD 150,000 for the period from 2003-2008, or 
three times that of the CSF disbursed to the commune for the same period82. 
Support to pagodas was noticeably high, just as in the first case. Among the five 
pagodas in the commune, four are financed by CPP elites in the PWG, and the other by 
a Royalist family. Three out of the four CPP-financed pagodas have been very well 
resourced. Since 2003, on the estimation of the commune chief and members of the 
pagoda support committee, these three pagodas received at least $US400,000. The 
support was used to construct two luxurious pagoda building and their luxurious fences 
(for some pagoda pictures, please see Chapter 7). 
Supporting the pagodas also involves an interesting story. One businessman who owns 
various types of businesses in the provincial town, including a garment factory, a clean 
water distribution system, and a construction company, is a member of the district 
PWG. That businessman is the key financier of one of the three well-financed pagodas. 
In the interview, he said the main reason he made so much contribution (about $50,000 
just for construction, plus other types of in-kind and cash contributions) was because he 
wanted the pagoda to be remembered in his and his family's name. Since the French 
period, he said, no one had ever fully finished the construction of that pagoda. When 
the war came (in the 1970s), everything was destroyed. Now, he made his name for 
being the first to ever 'fully' finish the construction. The businessman, it was also 
learnt, is a very influential person and well connected with the provincial Governor. 
Irrigation has been receiving little financial support from the PWC, despite the 
overwhelming need for farming water. As the commune chief related, there have been 
requests for PWG help for the rehabilitation of some canals, but the capital requirement 
82 The CSF figure is based on Seila Task Force database 
was too high for the PWG to mobilize among their members and networks. But this is 
the interesting point about this PWG: because it cannot mobilize sufficient resources 
from within the PWG, the head has used his influence to have a part of the national 
capital investment budget allocated for the irrigation development in the district. The 
following is how this occurred. 
In the current budgeting system, all capital investment projects need to be approved by 
the central level. The head of the PWG, through his influence in the party, made direct 
contact with the minister to send technical people to conduct a feasibility study of the 
projects. The technical study judged the projects feasible, and it was agreed that they 
would be financed with state money. Up to this point, all the key decisions were made 
off the record. After the green light was given through this informal channel, the 
ministry asked its provincial line department to make a formal request for the funds. 
Unsurprisingly, the projects were approved and quickly implemented. 
Without the influence of the head of the PWG, the project requests were much less 
likely to succeed because they would have to go through the much more tiring approval 
process of the formal budgeting system. In other words, they might have just ended up 
as just wish (or waiting) lists and it might take a year before it is known whether they 
are approved or rejected. Even approved, it might take many months before they could 
be implemented, and when implemented, they would go through many sign-offs (up to 
10-15 signatures). To get through this sign-off, many informal fee payments are 
expected, adding up to about 20% to 40% of total project value (Pak and Craig 2008). 
With the intervention of an influential person like the PWG head in this case study, 
however, all these headaches were substantially minimized. 
Another interesting finding in this district involves the relationship between the party 
system and the formal decentralization funding modality. In the district, there have 
been a number of instances where the PWG, rather than supporting a completely 
separate project, consulted the commune councils and decided to co-finance with the 
CSF, so that bigger and more desirable projects could be implemented. 
One example is a canal rehabilitation project. The transferred CSF was enough to 
finance only part of the rehabilitation. To deal with the problem, the commune chief 
made a request to the PWG, and received about $US3,000 from it to make the canal 
project possible. In the absence of additional party funding, he related, a lower priority 
project such as building a road might have been picked up. This co-financing 
arrangement is just one of the many examples indicating that the PWG have not 
competed but complemented with other financing arrangements (e.g. NGOs, state 
budget and CSF). 
6.3.3. Case 3: A PWG with good relationship with donors and NGOs 
The third case is a district located along the Mekong. With about 52,000 voters, the 
case district is located in a fairly prosperous province. People there rely on a 
combination of rice farming, cash-crop, and fishing. The challenges for the poor living 
in the district are the floods which destroy crops every year and the poor roads by 
which they travel to bring their produce to the nearby market. In terms of politics, this 
is a district where the CPP was strongly challenged by the Royalist Party in both 1993 
and 1998 elections. Even now, the opposition party has been doing quite well in the 
area, despite the growing domination of the CPP since 2003. 
The head of the PWG assigned to the district holds a ministerial position in the 
government which gives him access to alternative sources of financing, including 
international donors and NGOs. He was born in the district and has powerful and 
spiritual memories about the place. Local people related a story of how spirits from one 
of the pagodas in the area saved his life during war time. His father is buried in the 
pagoda, and he regularly visits and prays at that place. 
There are also some other big names in this district PWG: a senator, a high-ranking 
official from the health ministry, a deputy chief of a national port, and an under-
secretary in the Ministry of Rural Development. 
I asked the district party officials to provide an estimate on the monetary value of the 
PWG support. With incomplete record, the officials were not able to provide systematic 
estimation of the support value. However, the list presented below provides some ideas 
of its size. 
Table 7: PWG and other supports to the district 
Projects/ Head of Gifts from CPP Other members From 
supports PWG leadership of PWG NGOs* 
Schools 
98-03 few 101 rooms Cash contributions 46 rooms 
03-08 25 rooms 40 rooms Cash contributions 49 rooms 
Roads 
98-03 3.1km 25km Cash contributions 24.4km 
03-08 32.0 km none 2.8km few 
Pagoda 
98-03 No record none 
03-08 31 projects 8 big projects Cash contributions none 
Wells 
98-03 30 wells 2 wells Cash contributions No record 
03-08 37 wells none Cash contributions 30 wells 
Canals 
03-08 4km 2.7km Cash contributions 20.4km 
Source: District records obtained during fieldwork and key informant interviews. 
* Interestingly, the PWG records also include these NGO-provided supports, arguing that it was because the 
head of the PWG had contacted and brought them to help the district. 
Key informant interviews indicate that there are many people in the PWG who have 
made contributions to the district. However, their names were rarely, if at all, listed in 
any public documents. This is because those contributors do not want their names to be 
known publicly; what they wanted was to be seen as serving or 'giving face' to the 
head of the PWG or the higher people in the CPP leadership (such as Prime Minister 
Hun Sen and Chea Sim), and not being seen as competing with them. 
Interestingly, the district records show that all the support from donors and NGOs has 
come to the district through the PWG. One big donor support was given when a Korean 
delegation came to the area with the PWG head and agreed to donate a big dam with a 
value of about one million dollars. Discussions with local sources indicate further that, 
very often, local people do not really know which projects are given by donors, and 
which by government. But for sure, most people know the PWG head and that he has 
done a lot to bring support to their areas. 
Four communes in the district are flooded every year. The governor informed me that 
those communes seem to have received much less support from the PWG. To get a 
better picture, I visited one of them. Interviews with the commune chief confirmed 
what the district governor had said. The commune received virtually no support from 
the period from 1993 to 2003, except for one secondary school built by Prime Minister 
Hun Sen in 1997, and two occasions of food relief, also given by him. It was only in 
2007 that a project to repair a 3.2 km flooded commune road was promised, provided 
the CPP won in the 2008 election. 
Two reasons explain why such little support had been given. The first is a political one. 
Since 1993, the commune had strongly favored the Royalist party. The commune is 
also the hometown to a former high ranking Royalist party official who has provided 
support to the pagodas there. In other words, since 1993, the commune has been 
marked as a Royalist-supporting commune in a district progressively turning into the 
CPP hand. Since the Royalist party has been in disarray, its elite have not been able to 
provide much support. Plus, there is no CPP elite originally from this commune, 
therefore, there is no one who is particularly interested in helping. 
The second reason relates to the geographical characteristic of the commune. It is 
flooded almost annually from the Mekong, which significantly destroyed especially 
roads and some irrigation systems. As such, it is said, the PWG found the place not 
very good to 'invest.' 'The PWG might have thought that people would not remember 
their help very long. Any roads built today will be washed away next year, and they 
would have to build them again. It is too expensive,' the commune chief said . 
In the last local and national elections (2007 and 2008), the CPP managed to win, but 
only with a very small margin. 
Coming back to the district PWG, another interesting observation was that the district 
and commune officials, along with pagoda committees, despite their active roles in 
proposing projects to be financed, have had very limited roles when it comes to project 
implementation. The PWG's head has a nephew who owns a construction company in 
the provincial towns. Virtually all of the projects were contracted to his nephew, while 
the local authorities and pagodas just 'wait to get whatever was built.' 
Interesting too, the PWG in this case has supported not only infrastructure, but also 
help create a 'health funds', into which the PWG makes regular contributions. The fund 
however is managed by a close friend of the PWG head, who is also a rich businessman 
in the area. 
83 Fieldwork interview with a commune chief, June 28, 2008 
To sum up, the three cases above were chosen to illustrate different aspects of the PWG 
arrangements and functioning. The first finding from the cases is that, in terms of fund 
raising practice, the PWG is like a big octopus reaching to various sources including the 
business world, the state budget, and even the NGOs and international donors. Second, 
the role of the PWG head is very prominent in the operation of the PWG, suggesting 
that the PWG is in itself a rather personalized entity. 
Third, the PWG's support can be of help to local development, and it does not 
undermine, but complements with other financing sources, such as CSF, NGOs, etc. 
Fourth, there seem to be a close relationship between people from the centre and those 
at the district and commune. However, the central people, who are the fund-raisers, 
tend to show reluctance to allow the lower level people to manage the PWG projects 
and funds. When it comes to money, they still prefer to entrust it to those who are much 
closer to them personally, whether their close friends or relatives. 
From the presentation of the cases, trying to make accurate estimation of the value of 
the PWG support is not easy. This is not because the party officials are unwilling to 
share, or they feel ashamed, or cautious about the political sensitivity associated with 
the PWG itself. On the contrary, they see the PWG support as achievements of the 
party, as something they should be proud of. The difficulty in estimating, however, 
comes from the uneven quality of the records kept at district and commune level. 
Despite such difficulty, however, this study has made an attempt to collect more 
empirical data about the PWG, based on the cases visited during the fieldwork. All 
these are presented in the next chapter. 
Chapter 7: The CPP's off-budget support: Perspective 
on the ground 
This chapter continues from the last. Chapter 6 presented the overall arrangement of the 
PWG, and introduced three cases to show how the PWG actually operates on the 
ground. This chapter provides a more systematic presentation based on the findings 
from 11 districts (equivalent to 15 communes) focusing on the types and size of 
supports provided by the PWG, as well as regional variation. To complement this 
supply-side description (i.e. a description from the perspective of the PWG people), the 
chapter will also analyze the perceptions of the local people about the Party support. 
Finally, the chapter assesses the PWG's contribution to local development. 
7.1. Types and size of PWG support 
From the data drawn from 11 districts and 15 communes, the study finds that the PWG 
tends to support, in order of frequency, schools (primary schools in particular), rural 
roads, irrigation schemes, and pagodas. This finding is consistent with my observations 
about the kinds of projects often shown being inaugurated on TV by party officials. 
These types of projects are also the ones local people tend to remember being provided 
by the Party (this will be expanded in section 7.4 later) 8 4. The PWG support, it was also 
found, tend to focus only on capital investment and rarely on regular operations and 
maintenance (O&M). In interviews with commune chiefs, all but two of them 
responded that the PWG had never provided money for O&M, leaving this burden to be 
borne by local contributions and in some cases by commune councils which had used 
part of the commune's own CSF . 
Due to the incompleteness of the records kept at district and commune levels, 
estimating the value of the support provided by the PWG is particularly challenging. 
However, the study attempts to provide a range of estimates, using the following 
methods. 
First, the research uses the estimated values provided by the chiefs in six selected 
communes who kept records of the support they have received from the PWG. As 
8 4 Interestingly, the types of projects commonly financed by the PWG are consistent with those usually 
favored by the Prime Minister since 1995 (Cabinet of Prime Minister 2008) 
8 5 As with the two exceptional communes, the PWG set up a fund to finance regular repairs and 
maintenance. Such an arrangement, however, was very rare and occurred in the two communes mainly 
because of the exceptional resourcefulness of the head of the PWG. 
shown in Table 8 below, the values of the support from 2003 until 2008 is estimated to 
be from 1.3 time to 6.5 times as compared to the development component of the CSF86 
for the same period. 
While schools and roads received more attention, irrigation, although very important to 
agriculture, has received little support. According to anecdotal evidence, the reasons for 
such low support are. first, irrigation schemes usually requires big capital investment 
which, in most cases, is beyond the capacity of the PWG; and second, irrigation 
schemes require higher recurrent costs (pumping machines, gas, etc), a commitment 
that most PWGs do not want to get involved in. 
Table 8: Levels of support in selected communes (from 2003-08) 
Support (units and $)/ 
Communes 
| 9 t 2nd 
3 r d 4 t h 5 t h 6 , h 
Schools (Classrooms) 30 18 10 20 15 6 
($) 150,000 120,000 50,000 100,000 75,000 13,000 
Roads 2 big 
bridges 








($) 180,000 - 45,000 50,000 70,000 30,000 





($) - - 62,000 12,000 - | B | 
Others Wells.. Wells Rices/wells Generators 45wells None 
($) 2,000 1,400 3,500 8,000 9,000 -
Total 3 3 2 , 0 0 0 1 2 1 , 4 0 0 1 6 0 , 5 0 0 1 7 0 , 0 0 0 1 5 4 , 0 0 0 4 3 , 0 0 0 
CSF (Development 
component*) ($) 5 4 , 7 6 0 4 5 , 0 0 0 3 8 , 5 0 0 3 6 , 3 5 0 4 7 , 7 0 0 3 2 , 9 4 0 
Party support as 
compared to CSF 
6 . 5 2 . 7 4 . 1 7 4 . 7 3 . 2 1 . 3 
Source: Information about the party support is based on fieldwork. The data on the CSF is based on data provided 
by an official of Seila Task Force. 
The second method relies on the commune chiefs personal experience to provide an 
estimation. Because they were familiar with both the CSF money and the PWG's 
support, commune chiefs were asked to compare the two. Based on the response from 
the ten commune chiefs, the answer was that, excluding support to pagodas, the PWG 
support is estimated to be two to four times that of the CSF. It is recognized that this 
estimation may be subjective, but it can at least serve to cross-check the record-based 
estimation above. 
86 CSF has two components: administrative and development. Here, the PWG support is compared only 
to the development part of it. 
The last estimation was done at the district level, which was relatively more difficult. 
According to the three case districts where information was complete enough to make 
estimation, the party support was found to be around two to three times that of the CSF 
development component. Table 9 sums up the estimations derived from the different 
three methods: 
Table 9: Different estimations of PWG support compared to that of CSF87 
1st method - based on party records from six communes 1.3 - 6.5 times 
2nd method - based on estimation by ten commune chiefs 2 - 4 times 
3rd method - based on estimation by three district records 2 — 3 times 
This study, using case-based approaches, does not claim that this estimation is 
nationally representative. It is instead the best this study can come up with. However, 
despite that, the estimation of this study is seen as a contribution to existing knowledge 
about CPP's financing of infrastructure projects, simply because there has never been 
such an attempt before. 
The PWG support is not given equally throughout the year and across years. Instead, 
because part of the PWG support is intended to gain votes, based on my TV 
observations and field interviews, the amount and intensity tend to go up during the six-
month period leading up to elections. As observed, and also pointed out by one PWG 
head, in gearing up for the last election in 2008, PWG officials were most active going 
out to the rural areas, which also implied more projects were being given out. 'Before 
only me who went out to campaign,' a PWG head said in a district party meeting, 'now, 
even my wife has to go out to help.' My TV observation confirms this claim. 
PWG support for pagodas was also found to be significant. In the communes visited, 
there were usually from four to six pagodas89, and most of them have people in the CPP 
PWG as their patrons. Traditionally, pagodas depended on contributions from local 
people during several annual ceremonies to support monks and the various ritual 
activities. However, currently, more and more pagodas in Cambodia have been 
receiving support from wealthy individuals, who in a way become their patrons. 
87 Throughout the country, based on the Seila Task Force database, from 2003 to 2008, the CSF 
development fiind is averaged to be about USD 12 million annually (STF 2008). 
88 Personal participation in CPP PWG at district level, June 18, 2008 
89 As of now, there are 4,400 pagodas in Cambodia (CPP 2008c) 
Usually argued as acts of merit making, support for pagodas is also increasingly 
attached to politics as more of the individuals who provide such support, in one way or 
another, are attached to a political party. 
Estimating party support to pagodas is particularly difficult for two reasons. First, the 
contribution from the PWG is often put together with the local contribution. Second, 
sometimes, the heads and members of the PWG claim that such support is their 
personal contributions, without explicit mention of the party. Despite such difficulty, 
the study learnt that a large part (more than 80% by the commune chiefs' estimation) of 
the supports given to the pagoda come from donors from outside the communes, and 
whether explicitly or implicitly indicated, those individuals tend to be associated with 
the CPP. 
Overall, support to pagodas has been huge. This claim is based on three sources of data. 
The first is from my own field observations. Going around the country, I often saw very 
luxurious and imposing pagodas, erected amidst rice fields and in poor communities. 
The second piece of evidence comes from the three illustrative case communes 
presented in chapter 6. From those cases, PWG support to pagoda is even higher than 
that given to secular projects such as roads, schools, and irrigation canals. 
The third source of data is the rough estimation provided by the commune chiefs and 
pagoda committee members. Their responses were that, compared to CSF development 
components, the party support given to pagodas are around three to seven times that of 
the CSF. These three methods, again, are subjective, but at least they can provide an 
insight into the perception of local authorities about party support. 
Support for pagodas is also interesting in the way its request is put forth. In some cases, 
it goes through a channel that is quite independent of the commune chief, i.e. through 
the pagoda committee. Being the 'executive branch' of a pagoda and traditionally 
influential, the committee in some cases is said to get in touch directly with PWG 
heads; sometimes, they even compete with the commune chiefs in seeking PWG 
supports. And when they compete, they rarely fail because both the PWG and the local 
people tend to be more welcoming, or at least find it hard to say 'no' to requests from 
pagodas. For PWG head and many Cambodian Buddhists, saying 'no' to requests from 
pagodas means saying 'no' to merit-making itself. 
Figure 15: PWG support in pictures 90 
—^frwiOiliiiH^^ffhiMn^iiiwiiiniMi^Bfiiiiiiiliil 
This is a CPP poster showing pictures of various 
types of infrastructure projects under the CPP 
logo and leadership. The letters read 'vote for 
the CPP, we get roads, bridge, irrigation, and 
thousands of schools, hospitals and pagodas 
everywhere.' 
This dirt road was road recently built by the A CPP road damage by rain because there 
CPP's PWG. is no support for maintenance. 
A luxurious pagoda built by a businessman who 
is assigned to be head of a PWG. 
This is a school in a commune that has a 
less resourceful PWG. The CPP still 
managed to win more votes in 2008. 
This big secondary school was funded by a 
resourceful PWG from the Ministry of 
Finance. 
90 These pictures were taken by the author during fieldwork in 2008. 
Helping pagoda, however, has recently gone beyond just merit making; it has become 
part of the quest for personal image on the part of the contributor, and a race to show 
off on the part of some pagoda head monks. For some time now, there has been talk 
about pagodas of the rich and those of the poor. In the former, pagodas are built to 
show just how rich it is (or its supporters are). Even the Prime Minister himself has 
noticed this trend. 'Pagodas now,' he joked, 'do not want to just build residences (kots) 
for the monks, but villa residences (villa kots).,,9] 
Some local authorities have also made a similar observation. From the interviews, 7 out 
of 11 commune chiefs and 4 out of 7 district governors said they appreciated the 
support given to pagodas, but added that at least some parts of that should be shifted to 
secular development projects, especially irrigation. Similar concerns were also 
expressed by some local people, as will be shown in section 7.4. 
7.2. Regional variation 
Although the PWG has funded infrastructure projects throughout the country (as Table 
8 shows), the sizes of its support varies a lot from place to place - at least, in term of its 
comparison to the size of the CSF. This section examines this variation. Once again, the 
challenge of data incompleteness requires that this section relies partly on qualitative 
data which includes some of my own field observations. Also, the findings of this 
section should be taken as indicative rather than conclusive. 
The argument here is that, while several factors might serve to explain the variation, 
three are of significance, namely, (i) the resourcefulness of the head and members of 
the PWG, (ii) the level of personal attachment that PWG heads and key members have 
with the district/commune they are assigned to (e.g. it is their or their spouse's 
homeland), and (iii) competition for votes. This section discusses the first two, leaving 
the third to be further detailed in the next section. 
The methodology chapter (chapter 3) already discussed how the resourcefulness of 
PWG's heads and key members is determined. Applying that method, this study found 
that such resourcefulness, although not decisive, is the primary factor determining the 
level of supports to a constituency. The study bases its argument on two sources of 
91 Personal observation of the author 
data. The first came from my own observations and key informant interviews in four 
different case districts. 
In district 1 and 292, the head is from the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, respectively. Using the resourcefulness ranking as discussed in 
chapter 3, the heads of these two district PWGs are more resourceful than the head of 
district PWG in district 3 who is from the Senate, and of the PWG in district 4 who is 
from the Ministry of Information. 
According to the list of the projects, together with qualitative information obtained on 
these four districts, the study came to a ranking that the supports given to the first two 
districts was larger than that provided to the third and fourth districts. While it was 
difficult to come up with exact dollar values of the projects given, the study based its 
ranking of the support given also on field observations and interviews with local and 
party officials. 
The second source of data comes from the survey of the better-informed and active 
local people (See chapter 3 on the methodology associated with the survey). As 
indicated in Table 10 below, when asked what makes them think some communes 
received more or less support than other communes (either nearby or that they know 
of), those who think they know the answers said that it is because the heads of the PWG 
are richer or poorer. 
Table 10: Reasons for higher or lower support according to the survey with better 
informed local people 
What do you think that makes the PWG support to a commune 
high or lower? (Number of respondent: 35) 
% 
Resourcefulness of the head and key members of the PWG 65 
Homeland to the head or key members of PWG 35 
Source: Survey conducted by the study (See chapter 3 for more information) 
Another key factor which determines the levels of PWG supports is whether the head of 
the PWG (or their spouse) is originally from that area, i.e. their homeland. The effect of 
this factor is especially pronounced at commune level, for it is this level that people 
tend to consider as their homeland. Field observations strongly suggest that CPP elites 
tend to provide more help - much more, to theirs or their spouse's homeland, i.e. their 
92 xhe districts are referred to as 1,2, 3 and 4 in order to keep confidentiality of the places visited. 
places of birth. This sentiment is very strong, as an old Khmer saying puts 'wherever 
people go, they will always go back to their homeland when they are old and die.' 
A few real cases can be offered here. In the case study district where the PWG head is 
an official from the Ministry of Information, for example, although district wide, the 
support given seems to be relatively low, the support that he gave to his homeland 
commune was very considerable. His homeland commune during the period from 1998 
to 2008 received many projects, including a 4 km paved road, a big steel bridge, lit by 
solar-powered lamp and a 10-classroom school building constructed at a height above 
flood level. A rough estimate of the total support poured into this commune, as 
provided by the commune chief, was no less than $750,000. 
The support, of course, did not come from him alone, but some other prominent figures 
and businessmen from whom he solicited contributions. But regardless of the source, 
the amount of support poured into his homeland commune is in stark contrast to that 
given to a nearby commune which is not his homeland. In this other commune, since 
1998, the supports from the PWG included only one primary school and a 2.3 km dirt 
road, which was washed away within a year by floods and has not received anything 
else since then. 
This PWG head has given and mobilized a lot of support for his homeland commune 
because it is his place of origin, a strongly felt notion among Cambodian elites. His 
whole family, it was learned, was from that place and his grandfather and father were 
well respected people there. A memorial-like stupa was built for his ancestors in the 
compound of a pagoda. Annually, in a Buddhist ceremony called ka-then which takes 
place right after the festival of the dead (around September), the head regularly brings a 
lot of support and contributions to that pagoda. His visits to the commune are also 
noticed to be unusually frequent: in a normal year (meaning, not an election year), he 
usually visits about six times; the number of visits increases during an election year, 
especially in the six months prior to the voting day. 
Local chiefs also informed me that the head has been superstitious about that commune 
since the war time, where he, while escaping from the Khmer Rouge, took an oath that 
he would come back to make offerings to the 'supernatural power' there, should his life 
be spared in the killing field. 
The support driven by homeland sentiment is even more impressive in the district 2 
where the PWG head is from the Ministry of Finance. In that case, although throughout 
the district, the support is high, as evidenced by the many tangible projects, the support 
that the PWG head gave to his homeland commune is probably the most impressive of 
all. It includes a massive 50 or more classrooms of secondary schools with attractive 
artistic designs, palace-like pagodas, and a 10 km dam protecting a major part of the 
rice field there from the Mekong flood. 
There are two explanations for the 'homeland effect'. First, most of the current CPP 
elites have their origins in the rural areas, where their families (and parents) were 
peasants. War time turned the country upside down, allowing the people of more 
humble origins a chance to make their marks. These elites, although now living 
luxurious lives, still have a strong affection for their place of origin, which is a driving 
force for them to go back and help their homelands. Other motives include the desire to 
build their images and a legacy for themselves and their family (or family line) in their 
hometown. 
The other reason is that, within the affairs of the party, it would be a cause for shame 
among their peers and a disappointment to their superior (whoever that might be) for a 
key CPP elite to lose votes in his homelands. ' Weeks after the election result comes 
out,' one key informant described, ' those whose homeland did not win would not even 
want to meet their peers face to face, lest they ask how come they did not win.' It is 
something to be ashamed of, he added 9 3. 
So, it is the resourcefulness of the heads of the PWGs and the personal connection to 
their homeland that mainly determine the level of support. Interestingly, the CPP 
Central Committee grasps this fact so well and applies it in the way it dispatches people 
to various PWGs to ensure more regional equality in the levels of support. 
The result was an arrangement, where some resourceful people are assigned to be heads 
of a PWG for provinces and districts which are not their homelands. For instance, some 
key MOI officials, although most of them are from Prey Veng province, are instead 
assigned to Battambang province. The point is that if the party just all the party officials 
9 3 Oddly, however, the Prime Minister himself used to lose big in his homeland (Kampong Cham 
province) to the Royalists in 1993. 
choose, they would only choose to go back to their homelands, and that would result in 
some provinces receiving so much higher supports than others. 
The profiles of the members assigned from Phnom Penh to selected district PWGs, as 
illustrated in Table 11 below, shows that in each PWG, there are always people whose 
places of origin are not the district or province they are dispatched to. The number, of 
course, varies, with PWG number 4 having six out of seven key members originally not 
from the district, and PWG number 1 having only one out of the five key members who 
is not from the district94. 
Well-informed local people also express a similar perception of how and why the elites 
come to help their communes. About 35% of them said they (the elites) were here 
because the party assigned them, 28% said it was because the commune or district was 
his (the elite's) homeland, and, lastly, they come to help because the people here voted 
for the ruling party. 




Number of key members sent 
from Phnom Penh whose 
homeland is in the district/ 
province compared to total 
number of key members 
1 4 out o f5 
2 5 out of 10 
3 3 out of 4 
4 1 out of 7 
5 7 out of 11 
Source: Survey conducted by the study 
Table 12: Reasons for PWG member 
assignment, according to the survey 
with the well-informed local people 
Why do you think the 
elites come to help your 
commune? 
% 
Party assignment 35 
Hometown 28 
Vote for his party 22 
Don't know 15 
Total 100 
Source: Survey conducted by the 
study 
The Party has tried to create a mix in PWG membership of those that are resourceful 
and those who have origins in a particular place. Yet, despite such attempt, key 
informant interviews indicate that, areas which are the homelands of high-ranking 
officials tend to receive much higher support than those that are not. In addition to the 
cases qualitatively presented earlier, the most obvious evidence to support this claim is 
the amount of support (especially number of schools) the Prime Minister himself has 
94 By 'key' members, this study refers to those people who are reported as the ones most active and 
responsible for raising funds for the respective constituencies. 
given to various provinces in the country. Originally from Kampong Cham (the most 
populated province in the country), the Prime Minister has been shifted to be the head 
of the PWG in another similarly populated province: Kandal province. 
According to his recent cabinet report, in the last 13 years, the Prime Minister, either by 
or in his name, has built 3,030 schools, equivalent to 15,267 classrooms. Table 13 
shows that out of this number, his PWG province and his hometown province (among 
the 24 provinces countrywide) have received the largest number of those classrooms: 
17% in Kandal and 18% in Kompong Cham. Of course, the number of children that 
need to go to schools in these two provinces might be higher than in other provinces 
(see Table 13), but this is not a convincing explanation for the pattern of the 
distribution. The key explanation, this study strongly argues, is because they are his 
PWG province and his homeland province. It is not just schools but irrigation projects 
too that have been distributed more to these two provinces by the Prime Minister: out of 
the 43 main pumping stations he has provided, 15 are in Kandal and 5 in Kompong 
Cham. 
Table 13: Prime Minister's schools built by him or in his name 
Provinces 
No of classrooms provided by 
or in the name of the PM 
(National percentage) 
# of enrolled students 
in 2008 (National 
percentage) 
Kandal (his PWG province) 2,570(17%) 295,182 (8.97%) 
Kampong Cham (his homeland) 2,733 (18%) 408,367 (12.42%) 
The province with the 5 t h most 
classrooms given from PM 
835 (5.5%) 155,419(4.73%) 
The province with the least 
number of classrooms given 
from the PM 
37 (0.2%) 42,574(1.29%) 
Note: The total number of classrooms of built by or in the name of the Prime Minister 
from 1998 to 2008 is 15, 267 (Source: Cabinet of Prime Minister (2008)) 
7.3. Levels of party support and number of votes 
Is there any correlation between the number of votes gained and the level of support 
given by the PWG? This study does not have sufficient data to robustly test this 
correlation. However, it can give at least an indicative answer to the question. What this 
study has done was to compare the level of support (grouped into high, medium and 
low) with electoral results for the CPP in selected provinces. The comparison suggests 
that although the indicative amounts of support might have been the impetus for the 
increased number of votes, the correlation between the two is not decisive. The 
correlation is even less clear when a comparison among selected communes is made. 
At the level of province, it is clear that provinces which have had prominent and 
resourceful PWGs heads and key members have seen an impressive increase in number 
of votes for the CPP. Resourceful PWG in turn means high supports given to those 
areas. As suggested in Figure 16 below, the first three provinces (Takeo, Kandal, and 
Kampong Cham) have the Prime Minister and powerful deputy prime ministers as the 
heads of their PWG. It is clear that from 1998, the number of votes for the CPP in these 
provinces has increased dramatically. 
This pattern makes sense when viewing the cases of Prey Veng and Kampong Chhnang 
provinces where the party support is ranked as low because the PWGs in the two 
provinces are not headedly by resourceful groups of people. The pattern, however, no 
longer holds when Posat province is considered. In Posat, although with a less 
resourceful PWG head, the CPP has experienced a very impressive increase in votes, 
from 1998 to 2008 9 an even greater increase than in Kompong Cham, Kandal and 
Takeo. The correlation between the level of support and the votes, even more 
interestingly, was almost non-existent when considering the last two provinces, 
Rattankiri and Koh Kong. 








ftjsat Rattanakiry Koh 
Kong 
Indicative levels of CPP financing 
Source: Data from the electoral analysis book of the CPP (CPP 2008a) 
The inconclusiveness of these correlations is further confirmed when the focus is 
zoomed in to the commune level. Twelve communes that were visited during the 
fieldwork are used here. To ensure confidentiality, the communes are referred here only 
by numbers. Each commune, depending on the level of resourcefulness of its PWG 
head (again, see chapter 3 on the resourcefulness issue), is classified as low, medium, 
or high in terms of PWG support received. Figure 17 illustrates this. 
While the communes that have received high levels of supports from the CPP have seen 
high shares of the votes for the party (communes 2, 3, 4, and 7), the communes that 
receive low support have also given the party high votes (communes 6, 10, and 11). 
The percentage of SRP votes does not seem to be in parallel with the indicative level of 
CPP financing either: in the 2008 election, the SRP managed to gain more than 30% in 
commune 2 where CPP financing is high, but only less than 10% in commune 11, 
where the CPP financing is low. In between, as Figure 17 also shows, the correlations 
seem to be mixed. 
Figure 17: Percentage of CPP and SRP votes in 2008 election 
deflni 
This study suggests that party financing is definitely a contributing factor to number of 
votes gained by the CPP, a finding which is generally consistent with that of the IRI 
(2008). However, the study also suggests that there are more factors than just the 
amount of the PWG support that determine the number of votes. Those other variables, 
according to results from the key interviews and observations, might include the party's 
administrative capacity in mobilizing voters, the popularity of local chiefs, the levels of 
competition from the opposition and the living standards of the people within each area. 
To confirm the significance of these other factors, a more rigorous quantitative data 
analysis is required. 
7.4. People's perceptions 
Sections 7.1 to 7.3 above based more on the interviews with party officials, who can be 
considered as the 'supply' side of the equation. To obtain a more rounded picture, it is 
also important to understand the perceptions of local people about the party's support. 
That is, it is also important to present the 'demand' side to complement the 'supply' 
side. Such perceptions, first of all, need to be understood, keeping in mind the common 
characteristics of Cambodians as voters and their general perceptions about the state 
and those in authority. While chapter 5 has already discussed all these, some key points 
are re-emphasized here. 
First, it is noted that, despite some economic progress being made, rural people in 
Cambodia are still in vast needs of better infrastructure. Second, from the historical 
perspective, expectations of the people of the state have been very modest, even 
compared to those in other developing countries. As briefly mentioned in chapter 5, 
many people who are now in their 40 or 50 have lived through four or five regimes, all 
of which have left varying degree of horrifying memories. These historical memories 
significantly shape their perceptions and expectations of the state. Third, their 
perceptions have also been shaped by other factors, including the influence of the so-
called 'heads of the winds' in their localities, the media, and the limitations of their 
knowledge about public affairs. These contextual factors need to be considered when 
more specific perceptions from the people are interpreted. 
7.4.1. Findings from the 'Ordinary people' survey 
This section will present some of those specific perceptions, using the results from the 
surveys (see more on the survey methodology in chapter 3). For the 'ordinary people,' 
although some of their responses are very insightful, in general, it was found that this 
group is generally poorly informed about matters beyond what they can see with their 
own eyes, and what their village authorities selectively tell them. Also, it was clear that 
people were in desperate need of any kind of support that was given to them: 83% of 
them feel grateful for whatever projects that were given to their community by the CPP 
and anyone else. 
Table 14 below presents more specific findings. An interesting point is that the ordinary 
people, while not very knowledgeable about many things, think that most of the 
infrastructure projects in their community have been built by the CPP, and particularly 
by Prime Minister Hun Sen (altogether, accounting for 18% and 38%, respectively). 
Table 14: Ordinary people's perceptions about local development and the CPP's 
support 
Description 
Those who can identify three or four development projects given to their 
communities since 1998 
70 
Those whose first response was that the Prime Minister Hun Sen was the 
one who supported the project that first comes to their mind 
38 
Those whose first response was that other elites of CPP's PWG supported 
the project that first comes to their mind 
18 
Those whose first response was that they were told by village authority 
(chiefs or deputy chiefs) about who supported the projects 
55 
Those whose first response was that they knew by themselves (e.g. sitting 
in an inauguration ceremony) about who supported the projects 
38 








Source: Survey conducted by the study 
Another interesting point from the survey is the role of village authority in 
disseminating information to the people. Village authorities (chiefs and their deputies) 
are appointed officials, getting salary from the Ministry of Interior. They are in many 
ways observed to be key operational forces forming the basis of the state and the ruling 
party. Village authorities, in the state line, are in charge of disseminating information 
from commune to people, mobilizing people to attend meetings, and raising local 
contributions. In the party line, they work with their 'group heads' to campaign and 
persuade people to join the party, observe tactical attacks from the opposition, mobilize 
people to attend party-sponsored ceremonies, and distribute party handouts. The survey 
findings show that village authority has been the key actor forcing national politics 
agenda and political messages onto local people. 
7.4.2. Findings from the 'Better-informed local people' survey 
The survey of the better-informed local people provides deeper and more specific 
insights about local perceptions. Out of the 195 respondents, 27% of whom were 
village chiefs, 16% were pagoda committee members, 16% are teachers and school 
w P l e a s e n o t e that the percentage figures in this column are not supposed to add up to 100%. The table is 
a summary of responses given to different questions in the survey. 
directors, and the rest are farmers who are known to be active in community affairs. 
Table 15 summarizes the key findings from the survey of the 'better-informed local 
people.' 
The survey results show that, unlike the 'ordinary people,' this group tends to have 
closer interactions with commune authorities: 40% of them responded that they know 
of party supported projects from the commune chiefs. But similar to ordinary people, 
schools seem to be the kind of project that comes first to their mind (76%) when asked 
about party support, followed by roads and irrigation. 
While appreciative of the PWG support, this group of respondents think that the 
targeting of support should be adjusted to some extent: 32% of them said the support 
given to their communes should be given to different projects. This opinion is 
especially noted in areas where irrigation has been the biggest need. This is consistent 
with the expression from the commune chiefs as well. In those areas, commune chiefs 
have been complaining about insufficient irrigation water, the result of which has been 
people's farming being too vulnerable to drought. 
Respondents from this group also see that the CPP elites have been the key supporter of 
the pagodas in their communities, and about 55% of them observe that there has been a 
close relationship between the PWG heads and head monks in those pagodas. However, 
they do not think that this is wrong in any sense. 
Table 15: Key findings from the 'better-informed' local people survey 
Description %96 
Those who get information about party support from the commune chiefs 40 
Those who think of schools as the first type of projects of the party 76 
Those who think the party should change the targets of their support to 
irrigation projects 
32 
Those who think the support to pagodas should be shifted to irrigation 31 
Those who think that it is a good idea to seek support from the ruling 
party 
77 
Those who strongly express that people should be grateful for the support 82 
Source: Data from the survey conducted by the study 
At the same time, however, about 30% of them think that support to pagodas - while 
helpful in promoting Buddhist practices in the community, and more directly, relieving 
the burden of local contributions, have become too large and unnecessary. Irrigation, 
96 Please note that the percentage figures in this column are not supposed to add up to 100%. The table is 
a summary of responses given to different questions in the survey. 
they emphasize, is where more support should be given. Such opinion about pagoda is 
also comparable to that of commune and district authorities, as presented earlier 
(Section 7.1). 
Interestingly, during the survey, I rarely heard people question the legality of the 
sources of money that the PWG has used to provide support. This is interesting 
because, at the national level, the opposition parties often criticize the CPP for using 
corrupt money to build schools, roads, and pagodas. They also urge that people 
question where the money is from 9 7 . However, the survey shows that even among those 
considered to be better informed local people, the questioning on the source of money 
has rarely been raised. 
This does not mean that the party is clean of corruption charges. Instead, what the 
survey findings show is that for many local people, the needs are so overwhelming that 
gratitude is the first sentiment that comes to their minds when any projects are given to 
them and their localities (more than 80% of them think this way). In addition, when 
asked whether they think it is a good idea for commune chiefs, being elected by the 
people and representing people of all political preferences, to seek support from the 
ruling party, more than 75% said 'yes,' 3% said 'no,' the rest had no idea. For those 
who said 'yes,' the reason given is that the needs of the people should be urgently 
addressed, and that political issues should only come next. 
However, the fact that people rarely ask where the money comes from might also have 
cultural dimensions to it. First of all, local people see the party support as an act of 
generosity on the part of the PWG elites. And generosity, when seen as merit making, 
should not be questioned, for to do so is rude and ungrateful. Putting even more weight 
on this point, Cambodian tradition, reflected through folk tales, has a nasty name for the 
ungrateful: the crocodile. This notion is strongly felt not only among local people, but 
also local authorities. To return the act of generosity of the Party,' the commune chiefs 
and district governors are commonly heard saying during the interviews, 1 our jobs are 
to work hard to maintain the projects given and encourage the people to vote for the 
party.' 
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When asked if the support from the PWGs should somehow be integrated and reflected 
in the CSF, all the chiefs and governors responded 'no,' arguing that this support is 'a 
gift' and shows the generosity and benevolence of the elites and CPP leadership. 
Therefore, their benefits and credits should be distinguished from that of the state. 
Interestingly, 'gifts,' 'generosity,' and 'benevolence' are also the images that the party 
wants the local people to perceive: the title of the report issued by the Prime Minister 
Cabinet in 2008 reads ' The Gifs of Samdech Prime Minister and His Wife to the People 
Countrywide.' 
7.5. Contribution of PWG support to rural development 
Based on the cases visited and existing studies, this section briefly discusses the 
contributions of PWG support to rural development. My first tentative argument on this 
issue is that, because the need for rural infrastructure is still vast, the support from the 
PWG, to a different extent, must have had positive impacts on rural livelihoods. But 
such support has its pros and cons, as follows. 
Starting with the pros, it is argued here that the support given by the PWG has been 
particularly pro-poor given its targeting and the way in which each project is selected. 
Actually, most projects financed by the PWG tend to be those most needed by the 
people, because most of them are usually the ones included in the so-called Commune 
Investment Plan (CIP) 9 8. 
Another positive aspect of the PWG support is that it has complemented, not competed 
with, other sources of funding. A commune, in a nutshell, can receive funding from the 
CSF (which is about US$8,680 per year for the period from 2002 to 2006 and increase 
to about US$21,000 in 2011 (STF 2008; RGC 2010c)), together with various projects 
from NGOs, donors and government. Commune authorities usually have a rough idea 
of which commune projects these other donors might support, and with this knowledge, 
they try to propose to the PWG that it should fund activities that are left unfunded. 
A big chunk of PWG support has gone to rural roads and because the PWG road 
projects are so similar to those funded by CSF, assessment of the latter can also be used 
to infer about the former. Tracey-White and Petts argue that most roads (dirt and 
laterite) have been pro-poor, saving people time in traveling (Tracey-White and Petts 
9 8 CIP is a list of investment projects which is drawn from participatory meetings with local people. 
2001). Abrams (2004) later on provides a more in-depth economic analysis of this 
funding, showing that about 90% of the benefits derived from rural roads is captured by 
the residents of rural communities. A more recent study by CDRI also indicates that 
roads have been the key factor determining whether a community is likely to stay in or 
move out of poverty (Fitzgerald and So 2007). 
The biggest investment by the party and its elites has been on schools. The party 
achievement report indicates that the Prime Minister has helped build about 15,267 
classrooms, or about 30% of total classrooms countrywide. Many other party elites 
have also built many schools (CPP 2008c:283-90). Political and other personal interests 
aside, it is obvious that these elites have contributed a lot to the improvement of 
education in the last decade, a situation which has been occurring in parallel with the 
increasing commitment of the state and donors to this sector. Partly because of the CPP 
financing of school buildings, it is now reported that the lack of classrooms is less of a 
challenge than it used to be. However, education quality is still a big concern (MOEYS 
2005; NGO Education Partnership 2007; Pak 2009a) 
Support to pagodas, besides having religious significance and relevance, has also 
helped rural people economically, although its extent cannot be calculated in this study. 
Prominently Buddhist, rural people in Cambodia see pagodas as not just a place for 
them to seek spiritual well-being, but also as an institution that they are obliged to 
support. Every year, a pagoda holds various ceremonies and occasions to which local 
people voluntarily make contributions. One of the intentions of the contributions is to 
construct pagodas and upgrade their compounds. People rarely say 'no' to such fund 
raising, although it does take away some food from their family budget. So, this study 
argues that the party's and elite's support to pagodas indirectly helps the local people, 
by relieving them of some of their obligations to contribute directly to the pagodas. 
Another positive aspect of the PWG support is that, although its main objective is to 
help win electoral support, it has rarely been used to discriminate against voters who 
are known to support the opposition. Children from families voting for the oppositions 
have rarely been denied entry to schools built by the Prime Minister or other CPP elites; 
and rarely have farmers who are known not voting for the CPP been denied from 
traveling on CPP roads, from taking water from CPP-built irrigation and pumping 
stations, or from going to pray in pagodas built by the CPP's people. However, as 
indicated in case 3 in section 6.3.3, it is possible that the CPP paid less attention and 
provided much less support to an area (possibly, a village, a commune, or even a 
district) in which most people voted for the Royalist or opposition party. 
Of course, the party has done this to co-opt more people and to ensure that its good 
image is retained. Even so, the fact that it has not used its support as a punitive tool 
towards non-supporters places the CPP in contrast to some other ruling parties, such as 
the People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore in the 1980s and 1990s where 
government support was used as a threat to people living in districts known to be anti-
the government (Crouch and Morley 1999:313-55). 
Besides all the practical and poverty-alleviation orientation of the funding, a number of 
inherent limitations of the PWG's support are identified. As far as rural development is 
concerned, three limitations are identified: sustainability, adequacy, and regional 
equality. 
Timing is the first challenge to sustainability. It was observed that although the support 
from the PWG support arrives continuously from year to year, most of it tends to come 
about three to six months prior to and after elections: the pre-election is when promises 
are made, and the post-election is when the promises are delivered. It is also noted that 
national elections, not so much in the case of local elections, draw more support. 
Therefore, in the five years between elections, people might see a lot of fluctuation in 
party support across time, and this is not sustainable. 
Another sustainability issue is the scant attention given to regular operations and 
maintenance of the projects by the PWG. The elites who provide the supports want 
tangible results to show the people and they want to add to the scores of tangible 
projects built. They do not pay much attention to whether the existing projects are 
running well, leaving the day-to-day operations and maintenance responsibility to the 
local authority and community. 
Inevitably, insufficient attention paid to maintenance undermines the pro-poor impacts 
of the projects and, more importantly, their sustainability. Abrams, in his economic 
analysis, shows that at a discount rate of 12% for rural roads, the Economic Internal 
Rate of Return (EIRR) was estimated at 25% with maintenance and 6% without 
maintenance. For wells, the EIRR was at 10% with maintenance and -3% without 
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maintenance (Abrams 2004). Regular maintenance is even more challenging for 
irrigation schemes (Aruna Technology 2006)". 
The adequacy issue, on the other hand, comes from the small volume of financing that 
can be afforded at a particular point in time by the PWG: this makes the PWG 
arrangement unfit to meet some of the most urgent local needs, especially, irrigation. 
Although so central to Cambodian farmers, irrigation has not been sufficiently 
supported by the Party or the state in general. The reason for this is not a lack of 
understanding, but the lack of sufficient capital to invest: people ask for irrigation 
support, and the government and the PWG hear it, but they do not have sufficient 
capital to respond. Plus, irrigation requires on-going operations and maintenance, a type 
of recurrent spending which the PWG tends to avoid. 
Finally, as argued earlier (in section 7.2), although the party has attempted to take into 
account the potential regional inequality in the PWG support, the situation in which 
some regions have received much higher levels of supports than some others have still 
persists, regardless of their poverty levels. 
7.6. Conclusion 
This chapter and the previous chapter together answer the following questions: 
• How has the off-budget party support been arranged and given by the CPP? 
• What more can we learn from such off-budget party support about the CPP, 
especially in terms of its relations with the state and elite/patronage? and 
• What have people perceived about the off-budget support and what does it mean 
for the CPP's legitimization effort? 
From the discussion in both chapters, several conclusions are offered. First of all, it is 
clear that the PWG support does assist and contribute to rural development especially in 
the most needed area of infrastructure. Its amount, however, using estimates made in 
this study, is not very large, especially compared with the state national budget, and 
donor support annually. It is however a large amount of money compared to that of the 
CSF, which so far has been the only funding that gets transferred as a part of the 
decentralized arrangements. 
9 9 All these studies were done on CSF funded roads, wells and irrigation projects. However, their finding 
can also be used here given the similarity between PWG and CSF projects. 
Another important finding is in relation to the resourcefulness of the PWG. First, a 
PWG's resourcefulness relates positively and directly to the status and the lucrativeness 
of state positions held by its heads or key members. Second, the study found that 
resourcefulness of a PWG also depends on its head's and key members' networks 
which extend beyond the state, to include also business and even the NGO sector. 
While the dollars and cents of the PWG support are interesting facts to know, its 
political attachment and implications are even more fascinating. The significance of 
PWGs in the CPP's political strategies indicates the Party's efforts to build its 
legitimacy, here being developmental legitimacy. Its strategic effort is in turn an 
indication of the CPP's adaptive strategy and learning. Its 1993 defeat taught the party 
that it could not win an election by using its administrative control and surveillance 
alone. That is why, since 1993, the CPP and Prime Minister Hun Sen in particularly 
have provided support to rural development projects. 
The survey with the local people indicate that the CPP and Prime Minister Hun Sen 
have been quite successful in building their desired image: about 56% of the local 
people think that most of the infrastructure projects in their community were built by 
the CPP, and particularly by Prime Minister Hun Sen. Whether people's perceptions are 
correct or not is irrelevant here, for it is the perception itself that matters. The CPP has 
been trying to send this message to the people: 'CPP and development are one. 
Samdech Prime Minister Hun Sen and development are one,' and it seems that the 
message has got through to a large extent. 
However, the perception needs to be understood in its own context. Cambodian voters 
in the last four elections have formed their perceptions about the state and authority, 
and by extension the CPP, based on their life experiences. Still poor, most voters form 
their own perceptions and make their decisions in a context within which they still 
struggle on a daily basis with their basic needs. Their perceptions have also been 
shaped by the fact that they have limited access to the outside world, except through the 
CPP-controlled media. Added to this, from 1998 onward, with the Royalists fast falling, 
rural Cambodians have been given fewer choices besides the CPp. All these contextual 
factors are among the key factors shaping people's voting decisions. 
Given all these constraints, however, it does not mean that the Cambodian people have 
stayed completely passive. Instead, like the Party that has sought to win their supports, 
people have also learned and adapted. Within their frame of thinking, as just discussed, 
people start to link their voting rights with their everyday lives. With that, people start 
to judge a political party by what it can deliver to meet their needs. Such a judgment 
has, however, been limited to only tangible things and the immediate material support 
that a political party can provide. In other words, the people have learned and adapted, 
but only within the narrow circle of their poverty and choice. 
The PWG has been the mechanism to raise the funds to meet the people's needs and to 
prove to them that the Party 'dares to promise, dares to deliver'100. But what the CPP 
has done through the PWG is not just to show a long list of delivered projects. As 
shown in chapter 6, the PWG activities can be best seen as 'a play' put on by the CPP 
for the people, and through this play, the CPP seeks to build its legitimacy not only 
through its ability to deliver, but also on religious and cultural grounds. 
For instance, by heavily supporting pagodas and having monks present at inauguration 
ceremonies of its projects, the CPP has been quietly but successfully associating itself 
with Buddhism, a solid and moral base which its leadership sometime uses to not only 
boost their image but also attack the opposition's image. One explicit example was 
when Prime Minister Hun Sen jokingly said the opposition would go to 100* hell for 
criticizing his building of infrastructure projects. Besides Buddhism, the CPP and its 
leadership also attempts to identify their activities to certain Khmer traditional values 
such as those expressed through gift-giving practices at the wedding. 
Through its examining of the PWG, this study has learnt more not just about the CPP's 
relationship with the masses, but also about some of its internal dynamics and affairs. 
In the PWG, for instance, one can clearly see the importance of leadership, especially 
that of Prime Minister Hun Sen. Existing studies and party documents support this 
claim. Prime Minister Cabinet claims that the PWG has been initiated and led by Hun 
Sen, and that the PWG's focus on rural infrastructure has its root in his rural 
development policy issued since 1987. Hun Sen's biographers argue more or less to the 
100 T h i s s i o g a n i s 0 f t e n u s e d by the CPP. It was heard often during my participation in the CPP ' s PWG 
district meeting, June 18 ,2008 
same effect. While these claims might exaggerate his roles, they are not completely 
contrary to the findings of this study. 
Through the PWG, this study also identifies a kind of incentive structure that the CPP 
has used to encourage and pressure its members to contribute. There are both soft and 
hard elements in that incentive system. On the soft side, some of the most forceful 
motives including homeland-sentiment and merit-making aspirations have been 
integrated by the CPP into the functioning of the PWG. By so doing, this study argues, 
the leadership of the Party has encouraged their members to contribute to PWG not 
only because they are party members, but also because their contributions will build 
their images as individuals. 
On the hard side, the CPP has linked its members' contributions within this shadowy 
mechanism to their performance as party officials in general. Their party performance, 
in turn, reflects on their performance as the officials of the state. It is like a 
performance-based appraisal system, but in the CPP's way. What this shows is a thick 
overlap between party member performance and the performance of State employees, 
another indication which confirms how deeply the Party has come to be identified with 
the state. 
To link to the next chapter, it should be noted that, as a dominant party, the CPP does 
not use one, but a combination of strategies to pursue its interests, especially when it 
comes to enhancing its legitimacy and control. Among those various strategies, 
decentralization is identified as one by this study. The next chapter will discuss this 
argument. 
Chapter 8: The CPP decentralizing to enhance its 
legitimacy and control 
The key to the success of a dominant party like the CPP lies subtly in its ability to 
adapt. The PWG as described and analyzed in Chapters 6 and 7 is an example of how 
the CPP has adapted itself by using vast patronage networks as a way to mobilize the 
resources needed to serve its electoral and image building purposes. This chapter will 
discuss another example of CPP adaptation, which took the form of the party's 
introducing decentralization into the state and its own administrative structures. In 
doing so, the chapter addresses the following questions, as derived in Chapter 3: 
• What have been the CPP strategies toward decentralization? and 
• And how have local legitimization and central control been mixed in those 
political strategies? 
This chapter uses empirical data from various sources to support its argument. Those 
include existing research findings and survey results, primary field data collected by 
this study, my personal experiences working on decentralization issues from 2003 to 
2007, and my direct involvement in the formulation of the National Program for Sub-
National Democratic Development (NP-SNDD) during late 2008 and early 2009. This 
chapter does not, however, just piece those data sets together. Instead, it attempts to 
combine them in ways that help understand the dominant party politics in Cambodia. 
The argument of the chapter is this: decentralization in Cambodia tells a story in which 
the CPP maneuvered under the name of institutional reform to establish its local 
legitimacy, while at the same time, in very subtle and strategic ways, still ensuring the 
central control over the rural base. The way in which the party approaches the reform 
also reflects the 'learning by doing' attitudes of its key politicians and policy-makers. 
These people learn from history, from the experiences of donor pilot projects and from 
their trial and error approach. This is why, to really understand the politics of the 
reform, it is important to understand its context, as well as the angle from which the 
dominant party sees it. The chapter starts off with a brief background of Cambodia's 
decentralization and sub-national administration. 
8.1. Cambodia's sub-national administration - A background 
Currently, Cambodian state administration is divided into central, provincial, district 
and commune levels. This administrative set-up had its origin in the French 
colonization period. Before the French arrived, the village was the basis of Cambodia 
peasant society and traditionally, family and kinship were the building blocks of the 
village. The colonial period's sub-national administration was carried on after the 
country gained its independence in 1953. During Sihanouk's regime, it seemed that the 
district was playing the most active role compared to provinces and communes. The 
districts were serving as the liaison between the national and local levels, supervising 
central ministries' staff in the district, and police staff (Ebihara 1968). Despite the 
linkages in this administrative set up, however, the outreach of the state was still 
limited during the Sihanouk period (Marston 1997:80). 
The Khmer Rouge from 1975-79 completely demolished the previous administration 
structure and divided the country into various regions (Chandler 2008). At the local 
level, structures called 'agricultural cooperatives' whose three members were holding 
real power were put in place. In those cooperatives, outsiders were often brought in to 
rule, especially to break down the previous local bonds of loyalty and patronage 
(Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002:119). 
Under the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (i.e. the former name of the CPP 
from 1979 to 1989), the sub-national administration went through another round of 
radical change. Following the Communist tradition, the CPP at the time established so-
called People's Revolutionary Committees at provincial, district and commune level 
(Slocomb 2004). The Committees were given five-year terms, with the possibility of 
being dissolved by the Councils of Ministers, the executive arm of the national 
government. The provincial level, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, could 
also dissolve a commune's Party Revolutionary Committees (Slocomb 2004). 
Compared to the previous regime, the PRK state exercised strict controls and reached 
the local level to a much greater extent than more than any other governments before it, 
with the exception of the Khmer Rouge (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002:117). Partly 
because of the loosely-defined and loosely enforced formal apparatus, and partly to 
allow flexibility to deal with the many urgent matters including food shortages and 
wars with the Khmer Rouge, the sub-national administration at the time was given lot 
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of discretion by the central level. For the same reason, police, local militia and military 
dominated at the local level during the PRK period (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 
2002:126-35). 
Another phase of change began in 1994. Starting in that year, the Royalist-CPP 
coalition government was abruptly re-centralizing back its power from the provinces, 
districts and communes. The intention was to reverse the decentralized and chaotic sub-
national administration left over from the previous regime. While still responsible for 
security matters, in the new set-up, the provinces and districts were relieved of a lot of 
discretion and resources. Line ministries were pulling back their powers, and exercising 
budgetary power and control through their de-concentrated arms. Most of the state 
revenue was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. In 1998, some 
budgetary powers were given back, allowing the provincial level mostly recurrent 
budgets, and a very small provincial development budget (RGC 1998). Under these 
new arrangements, provincial and district governors were reduced to only delegated 
officials of the Ministry of Interior (Mol 1994). 
Cambodia's sub-national administration stayed virtually unchanged from 1994 until 
February 2002. The provincial level, having been stripped of its power and provided 
with only limited resource, was acting mainly as staff of the central level. The district 
level, even worse, was almost omitted from the administrative map. Administratively, 
provinces and districts together constitute the middle level between the central and the 
commune. However, with such a weak middle link, state service delivery had seriously 
suffered, especially in the priority areas such as education, health and agriculture 
(World Bank and Asian Development Bank 2003). 
In February 2002, however, a new change happened at the local level, when the first 
local election was held to elect 1,621 commune/sangkat101 councils countrywide. A 
majority of communes in Cambodia at the time had an average population of around 
4,000 to 8,000 people. Each commune was to elect a council of seven to eleven 
members, depending on its population. About 950 women and 10,300 men were elected 
into these councils. The CPP, while won only a little more than 60% of the votes, 
claimed about 98.6% of the commune chief positions. The Royalists were obviously in 
101 Sangkat refers communes in urban areas. To make it simple, commune is used in this thesis to refer to 
both rural and urban commune. 
decline, claiming only 0.5% of the total chief positions. The new opposition, the SRP, 
did quite well, replacing the Royalists as the counter-force to the CPP. But the SRP 
then was still new and weak (Romeo and Spyckerelle 2003). 
The commune elections occurred at a time when foreign aid was increasingly flowing 
into rural development projects throughout the country. Amongst those, a project called 
Seila (a Khmer term for 'foundation stone') stood out. Seila was initiated in 1993, with 
the aim of helping returning refugees in provinces along the Thai border. It was first 
geared at quick infrastructure and settlement schemes rather than sustainable 
development. However, lessons from that early emergency stage were documented and 
used to establish a platform for more sustainable and participatory local development 
practices at the sub-national level. In 1996, a new phase was designed. This time, while 
still focusing on rehabilitation, the program was expanded to also serve as a pilot for 
decentralized approaches to planning, financing and implementation of rural 
development projects (STF 2008). 
With increasing donor support, Seila's coverage expanded rapidly to include 500 out of 
1,621 communes by 2001. The program also initiated the election of Village 
Development Committees across Cambodia and the formation of Commune 
Development Committees consisting of elected village representatives and chaired by 
the then government-appointed commune chiefs. In collaboration with provincial 
authorities, the program designed and adopted a system for participatory commune 
planning and prioritization of development projects as well as financial systems and 
implementation procedures (STF 2008). What was piloted and expanded then was 
essentially the establishment of a de facto local governance system, which again was 
successful in securing the buy-in from the government. With its historical significance, 
it is fair to say that the Seila program was an essential part of Cambodia's 
decentralization reform and the establishment of the commune councils themselves. 
But the establishment of the commune councils did not bring any sudden changes to 
broader Cambodian politics. Once in existence, the councils were given a very 
confined zone of authorities. The Commune Law (2001) and subsequent sub-decrees 
were not sufficiently specific about the roles of the communes, except for the delegated 
task of civil registration. Lack of functions transferred also meant a lack of financial 
resources and authority given to the communes. Since 2002, the only source of finance 
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for a commune has been the CSF, an unconditional grant composed of national budget 
and donor contribution. The implemented CSF in 2006 was about USD 13.2 million, 
43% coming from the government, 42% from the World Bank, and the rest from UNDP 
(STF 2008). 
In 2007, the second commune elections were held. Expectedly, the CPP won with a 
large majority, followed by the SRP, and almost nothing for the Royalists. By that time, 
when the commune level had been through many stages of reforms, especially in terms 
of rural development practices, administration at the district and provincial level was 
still left virtually unchanged from the system introduced in 1994. The district still did 
not have their own budget, acting essentially as another level of de-concentrated offices 
of the provinces. The limited supporting capacity of the provinces and districts were 
further undermined by the over-centralization of budget allocation and management. As 
indicated in Chapter 5, less than 20% of total national budget was allocated to the sub-
national level. 
The government was well aware of how detrimental the disempowerment of districts 
and provinces had been in supporting and building trustworthy and responsive 
communes. As a response, in a policy statement issued in 2005, the government laid out 
a vision of a unified administration that needed to be put in place at the two levels, with 
the intention of promoting the so-called democratic development and better support to 
the communes (RGC 2005b). In 2008, after intensive discussions, the Law on 
Administration of Province and District was adopted (RGC 2008d). 























means 'accountable to' 
1 • Means 'coordination' 
The new Law calls for a provincial and district council to be indirectly elected by the 
current commune councilors. Up against a tight timeline (i.e. less than one year after 
the Organic Law was passed), on May 17, 2009, councils for all 24 provinces and 180 
districts were elected. Not surprisingly, the CPP, which had the most commune 
councilors (in this case, they were the electorates) won in all the councils. A council, 
according to the Organic Law, was supposed to serve as the legislative body for its 
locality. As with the executive branch, however, the Law calls for the appointment (not 
election) of the Board of Governors (BOG) headed by the Governor, whose job is to 
implement the decisions, including budgets, approved by the councils. Although 
appointed, the BoG is supposed to be accountable to the Council. Once in place, the 
councils will gradually be transferred more functions, resources, and authority. That 
transfer will be a long and complicated process which is yet to unfold. 
8.2. Decentralization as a legitimization strategy - lessons from 
the commune reforms 
When the CPP-controlled government announced in 2001 that it would hold a 
commune election in early 2002, some political observers in Cambodia doubted its 
seriousness and possibility. The reason, these people argued, was that since 1979, the 
commune had been too important a level of control for the CPP, and as such, it was not 
in the party's interest to decentralize (noted in Slocomb 2004). Some other observers 
questioned not only the possibility that the CPP would allow the reform, but also the 
appropriateness of the whole notion of decentralization within the top-down and 
hierarchical administration and culture of Cambodia (Turner 2002). Despite these 
doubts, the reform did take place in February 2002. So why did the CPP become 
engaged in commune reform? The answer is that, in decentralization, the CPP saw a 
political strategy to further legitimize and tighten its control. This section focuses on 
the legitimization part of this reform. 
First of all, it is noted that the decision to decentralize dated back to 1994, a year after 
the 1993 coalition was formed between the CPP and the Royalists. Both parties then 
saw controlling the state apparatus as the key to consolidating their power. At the 
national level, they were sharing ministerial posts. The Royalists, being the winners of 
the election, were taking the Ministry of Finance, which, after the re-centralization of 
budgetary power from the provincial level, had become influential in the areas of public 
financial management. In the provinces, they were sharing governor and deputy 
governor posts. At the district level, however, the power sharing seemed to proceed 
more slowly, with the Royalists meeting more resistance from the CPP (Doyle 1998). 
At the commune level, however, the two were discussing and seemed to have agreed on 
a national election. 
As shown in the review of the literature in chapter 2, decentralization can be attractive 
both to those parties who just come to power and to those that have long been in power. 
For the new-comers, decentralization is good because it can help wipe out the power 
base of the previous regime; for the long-time rulers, the reform could help further 
consolidate their control. The same motive, it seemed, applied to the Royalists (the 
new-comers), and the CPP (the longer-term ruler) in Cambodia. 
Historical facts supported this claim. Since 1993, decentralization has been a policy 
matter under the umbrella of the Ministry of Interior (Mol). At the time, as a power 
sharing arrangements between the Royalists and the CPP, the MOI was under two co-
ministers, one from the CPP, and the other from the Royalists. By August 1994, the 
CPP minister had already talked about commune elections, and instructed his staff to 
draft a commune election law. The Royalist minister also supported the plan (Peou 
2000:291). 
For the Royalists, this study argues, the commune election presented a real political 
opportunity at the time. Having just won the national elections in 1993, the Royalists 
were reasonable enough to believe that it would win the commune elections, which 
would allow itself to penetrate local administration of the state. Even if it did not win, it 
could still manage to control a larger part of the rural base, which was then under the 
complete control of the CPP. For the CPP, the incentive behind its agreeing to push 
forward the local election came from a combination of factors. First, as the loser in the 
1993 election, the CPP could not resist every proposal put forward by the Royalists. 
Second, it was probable that the election was also in line with its own political interest, 
for during that time, there were some constitutional legitimacy as well as urgency to be 
addressed. The following Mol instruction illustrates this point: 
Since the Cambodian government was formulated [Sept 1993], it has generally 
been observed that the commune authorities within some provinces seem to be 
reluctant to perform their duties and tasks, and that their commitment towards 
the responsibilities of managing the administration and public security in local 
areas has [loosened]. The main reason for those [problems] is that they are 
waiting to see the outcome of the election of commune [authorities] as 
prescribed in the National Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia. (MOI, 
Instruction no. 324, May 10, 1994, unofficial translation, quoted in Ojendal and 
Kim 2008b:72). 
The CPP had however been strongly resisting power sharing at district level as well as 
key bureaucratic positions at ministerial level (Doyle 1998). As early as 1997, it was 
clear that the Royalists had not won much of the control over the state apparatus. 
Political competition therefore intensified, overshadowing the more micro-reform such 
as local elections. The tensions eventually led to the internal fighting on July 5-6, which 
ousted the Prince and drove him out of the country. The CPP managed to keep some 
international legitimacy by conducting the national election in 1998 which it won 
(Sullivan 2005). At that time, some were expecting Cambodia to become a one party 
state, where the CPP would exercise 'hard politics' (a term used in Ojendal and Kim 
2008b) in its domination and allow little space for change. 
However, after winning the 1998 election, the CPP put decentralization back on the 
agenda. There were three important motives for this. First, similar to arguments made 
by Ojendal and Kim (2008b) and Sullivan (2005), decentralization, when implemented 
within the stable political climate controlled by the CPP, could be a very beneficial 
legitimizing act, for both international and domestic audiences. Since 1998, the 
international community, including the EU and the UN, had pushed the government to 
'pursue a policy of decentralization and de-concentration, seen as the most effective 
means to extend democracy and improve delivery of public services and infrastructure 
development in Cambodia. ' 1 0 2 The expectation among donors was that the CPP was 
useful in ensuring political stability, leaving local-level space for bottom-up political 
changes, and that is why they (donors) supported decentralization. The CPP saw this as 
an opportunity to align itself with donor ideologies and expectation. 
Staying in harmony with donors also has significant fiscal implication. Since 1993, 
Cambodia has been receiving increased foreign aid (averaging about USD500 million 
per year) which was significant for the country's development. In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, it was noticed that more of those funds had been flowing to support rural 
development projects throughout the country. As previous chapters indicated, rural 
development was important for the Party in building its development-friendly image 
and by committing to decentralization, the CPP was expecting that even larger donor 
support would be made possible to advance this image building objective. 
Empirical evidence suggested that this strategy did work. Seila, a development program 
behind Cambodia's decentralization, for instance, was used as a mechanism for 
mobilizing foreign aid into Cambodia's rural development. Over the six years of the 
Seila program's second phase (1996-2001) a total of USD215 million was mobilized, a 
large share of which came from donor agencies. Increasing donor funding had also 
been attracted to support decentralization since the 2002 commune elections (STF 
2008). 
102 unDP. Report on the elections of the commune councils. Cambodia, March 2002, p.10, quoted in 
Sullivan (2005). 
Second, local elections were a strategy to clean up the unpopular elements among the 
current commune chiefs which had been appointed by the CPP since before 1993. 
Some of the appointed commune chiefs in power thus far were involved to different 
extents in acts of violence, intimidation and abuse. This was the legacy of the wars and 
power struggles following the 1993 election. While violence and intimidation carried 
out by those chiefs were instrumental in winning votes, they were also the main reason 
why people did not support the CPP. Those local officials were the ones who had 
enforced conscription, put up illegal checkpoints, and over-exploited common 
resources 1 0 . The party recognized that it could not keep on relying upon violence and 
intimidation to sustain its legitimacy. It also recognized that if it could get good people 
to be party candidates it would have more success in the upcoming elections. 
Third, after winning the 1998 election, the CPP wanted the country to have stability to 
help facilitate its control. One way to do that was to reduce the possibility of armed 
confrontations among former enemies at the lower level. The commune electoral 
system reflects such post-conflict solutions. Despite its growing domination, the CPP 
agreed to have other parties to be present within the councils no matter how few votes 
they received compared to those of the winning party. Thus, within a commune council, 
while the chief position was given to the party that claimed the most votes, the first and 
second deputies must come from the second and third winning parties (RGC 2001). The 
intention was to promote cooperation and sharing of responsibilities among different 
parties (Romeo and Spyckerelle 2003). 
1 0 3 Personal experiences living and discussing with people in rural Cambodia 
A typical commune council building. At the local level, the CPP and the state are 
very close. It is not uncommon to see that a 
commune building located close to that of the 
party, as in the commune shown in the picture. 
Figu re 19: Commune councils and the party at the local level 
he Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
making a speech about 
reform. To his left, is the 
of the National Committee for Sub-
Democratic Development (NCDD) 1 0 4 
An accountability box established for a A house with CPP logo. This means that the 
commune. People rarely used it for filing family is not only members but also activists 
their complaints, however. of the party. 
So, given all the political calculation and intention expected by the CPP, what has 
happened with the communes? Has the CPP been able to establish its own legitimacy at 
the local level as it had predicted? The answer is largely yes. The commune councils 
1 0 4 Source: http://www.ncdd.gov.kh/ 
since 2002, according to different surveys, have made a good impression on local 
people. Unlike the more violent and intimidating commune authorities that people used 
to experience prior to the 2002, the councils as institutions and commune chiefs as 
individuals and representatives of the CPP have acquired gentler, more people-friendly 
images (Meerkerk et al. 2008). 
Better understanding between communes and local people has also been noticed. For 
instance, in a survey, 68% of councilors thought their people needed more roads and 
other typical rural infrastructure including small scale irrigation and wells, a response 
which closely resembled the response from the people on the same issues (78% of 
surveyed people thought the same) (Meerkerk et al. 2008). 
The survey by Meerkerk et al also shows that people did see gaps in the councils' 
capacity to meet local needs, especially in the areas of clean water and irrigation. 
However, people seem to understand that such gaps exist because the communes have 
been given limited resources and power. The people surveyed also showed more trust 
in the commune: most people (about 90%) felt that the communes would perform better 
if they were given more power and resources 1 0 5 (Meerkerk et al. 2008). Moreover, 
although people's participation in commune decision-making process is still limited, 
most (about 80%) feel they can access and request information and relevant assistance 
from the commune chiefs and councilors if they approach them (Meerkerk et al. 2008). 
Elite capture has not been a key concern since the commune elections. A majority of 
people (89%) seem to trust the transparency with which commune councils make 
decisions and even encouraged that the councils be given more authority in such 
decision-making process. Yet, it has been recognized that the practices of informal fee 
payments have been common at the commune level although there have not been any 
serious complaints from the people (EIC 2006). The informal fee have been quite 
small: the estimated total informal fee paid to communes is about $5-6 million, 
equivalent to 10% of total annual amount of unofficial fees paid by households to all 
public services at all levels in 2005 (EIC 2006). 
ins T h i s f m d i n g is also consistent with a management evaluation study which found that the results of 
commune performance so far were generally very positive, with over 80% of projects having been 
delivered (Biddulph 2006 :21). The report also shows insignificant amount of corruption in the use of 
CSF by the communes (from 1-3%) (p.29). 
All in all, local elections have brought a new, more likeable face to the communes. 
Observations from the eleven communes selected for this study further suggest that, if 
people like a CPP commune chief, they too would tend to feel positive about the party, 
the Prime Minister, and by extension, the PWG members assigned to take care of the 
community. That is why it is not surprising to see that the Party has taken seriously the 
popularity of its commune chiefs. Such seriousness was strongly confirmed when the 
party decided to introduce the democratic nomination of their commune chiefs into its 
internal procedures. 
During the first local election in 2002, district governors who are the appointed officials 
and district party chiefs played key roles in the nomination process. In the second 
election in 2007, however, the nominees needed to win support from the majority of 
party activists within the commune106. The result of this change was quite noticeable: in 
one province, more than 30% of the commune chiefs left from the first term were voted 
off the nominee list. And among the eleven communes visited, three had a different 
nominee for the second term107. 
8.3. Decentralization as a new way of control 
The CPP has gained from decentralization and because of that, it was willing to 
introduce some democratic procedures into the Party, one example of which is the 
nomination process of local candidates. Despite that, though, it does not mean the Party 
was fully in favor of promoting local democracy and making the commune councils 
accountable to the local people who elected them. The same goes for the district and 
provincial reforms: although it allowed the election of the councils, it does not mean the 
CPP is in full support of an autonomous provincial and district administration. In other 
words, the party still seeks to keep sub-national administrations under its control. 
8.3.1. The CPP and the commune level 
Starting with the communes, it is argued here that, while decentralizing, the CPP has 
tried to ensure that, although elected by the people, commune councilors were still 
ultimately accountable to the Party. Various mechanisms have been put in place to 
achieve this objective. First, within the party hierarchy, the commune chiefs are still 
considered subordinates to the districts, and this is confirmed by this fieldwork and 
106 Interviews with a provincial CPP chief, June 07,2008 
107 Fieldwork key informant interviews in the 15 communes 
other studies (see for instance Ojendal and Kim 2008a). The district, administratively, 
is also the immediate boss of the commune within the hierarchy of the Ministry of 
Interior. This is not to mention the fact that the district has more authority in the field of 
police and military (Ojendal and Kim 2008a). 
Another channel of control is also in place, i.e. that of the PWG. A commune in this 
structure is a like a foot soldier whose role is restricted to mainly suggesting and 
implementing any decisions made by the head of the PWG. Moreover, from the 
fieldwork, all the commune chiefs interviewed for this study believed that the PWG is 
influential in their nomination for the next term, and nine of them perceived that a good 
relationship with the PWG and the support given by the PWG have been helpful in 
making them more popular among their local people, i.e. make them look more 
responsive, resourceful and credible. 
However, on this point of what makes a commune chief popular, people surveys reveals 
different perceptions. To the people surveyed, a chief is popular not mainly because of 
his connection to the big guy at the central but of because of his characters, including 
his leadership, honesty, gentleness, perceived fairness in dealing with conflicts and 
whether he has been involved in exploiting common pooled resource such as forest, 
fishery and lands. In other words, a respected commune chief is still one that most 
resembles a typical, respected local leader in the traditional senses. 
From this particular finding, it can be argued that, through local elections and selecting 
popular local chiefs to stand for office, the party has managed to co-opt and make most 
use of the popularity of local leaders for its own political benefits and legitimacy 
enhancement. In other words, these well respected commune chiefs and councils have 
been made the legitimate faces of the party, and therefore, a good strategy to win 
political supports1 . 
This is not to suggest, however, that all the commune chiefs from the CPP are all 
virtuous. Among the eleven communes visited, two commune chiefs were particularly 
unpopular (according to the survey with the local people), and in one commune, the 
CPP had just lost the election because its candidate involved in illegal logging 
108 Actually, it will be shown in chapter 5, the party has also been exploiting other types of local/ 
traditional institutions for their political purposes, the most noticeable of which is the pagodas. 
corruption109. The first two communes, the chiefs were reported to have been involved 
in problematic community land sales110. However, the scandals did not significantly 
affect the CPP votes because they did not affect the interests of many people's 
everyday lives. 
8.3.2. The CPP and the district and provincial levels 
Since the re-centralization in 1994, the CPP was making effort to ensure its control over 
the district and provincial levels. While the party was in more agreement with the 
Royalist party in 1994 on how to reform the commune, it was much less compromising 
about the power sharing at the district and provincial levels (Doyle 1998). That was 
because controlling district and provincial levels, unlike the case of the commune level, 
had different implications for the CPP control over the state. First, districts and 
especially provinces, are bigger in scale and cover large area of land and resources: 
Cambodia has up to more than 1,600 communes, but only 180 districts and 24 
provinces and municipalities. Second, while district and provincial governors after 
1994 were not given much administrative and financial power, they still had some roles 
in the security matters, although those roles were not as powerful as the period prior to 
the 1993 election (Ojendal and Kim 2008a). 
During the 1990s when the CPP still saw the Royalist party as a political threat, it was 
important that the party held on its control over these two levels. However, this thesis 
argues that the CPP did have plan for decentralization reform for these two levels. For 
instance, the talks about reform at these middle levels were discussed in as early as 
2005, only within three years after the commune election (RGC 2005b). However, what 
seemed to concern the CPP most about reforms were the question of timing and the 
speed that they should move forward. The best timing for the CPP, this thesis argues, is 
when it was sure that the reforms would not lead to any destabilization and weakening 
of its control. That was possibly an explanation why the CPP was really pushing for the 
district and provincial laws and election after it won big the local election in 2007 and 
national election in 2008. 
109 Various cases reported in newspapers indicate that sometimes CPP's local officials are involved in 
scams relating to illegal acts affecting fishery and lake conservation (See Phnom Penh Post, August 12, 
2010). 
110 Key informant interviews, July 12 and October 06,2008 
Provided that the district and provincial reforms do not threaten the CPP's power base, 
this thesis argues, it is in the interest of the party to push them forward. First, there has 
been more recognition that the current system is too centralized, the consequence of 
which was limited support for education and health services111. The study observes that 
to some extent there has been genuine interest among the CPP leadership to see 
improvements in these social services, partly because they are not immediately 
threatening and because they can enhance the developmental image of the party. 
Second, weak middle levels mean little support to the commune level, which in turn 
might lead to deterioration of the councils' credibility among local people. The 
commune councils now are like the 'children' of the CPP on the ground. The party 
therefore must have some incentives to take care and provide more support to them 
through the middle levels. 
However, it is observed from the fieldwork that political incentive to strengthen local 
governance become much weaker in the areas where there are conflicts over natural 
resources between vested interest from outside and local communities. These outside 
interests in most cases are well connected to higher level officials and to the Party, and 
most of the times these powerful people managed to win over the voices and protests of 
the affected poor villagers (OHCHR 2007). 
The observation about the natural resource conflicts suggest (and as later section will 
show), the CPP is still much less pro-poor and much less pro-decentralization when 
there are rent-seeking opportunities (such as natural resource exploitation) involved. 
This is mainly because with more opportunities to seek rents, more resistance to reform 
from many vested interests at the central level will also emerge. The resistance will be 
no doubt a key factor slowing down district and provincial reforms. However, as the 
reforms just only started, it is hard to know how they will unfold and what the Party 
will manage them. For the time being, what this thesis can do is analyze how the Party 
has done with regards to the design and the early implementation of the reform itself. 
The reform at the district and provincial level, which started with adoption of the 
Strategic Framework on D&D in 2005, fundamental and challenging as it is, were 
designed to favor the CPP's political interests. First of all, the elections of both councils 
in p r i m e Minister Hun Sen's speech, January 28,2009; Meeting with officials of Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, June 8,2009. 
were set up in ways and at the time that would guarantee CPP domination in those 
councils. The Organic Law states that the provincial and district councils are elected by 
the current commune councilors, a majority (70%) of whom are CPP's. So it would not 
be surprising to see the CPP win the election. 
Still, the result of the 2009 election was somewhat surprising, not because the CPP won 
fewer, but because it won more votes than from its own commune councilors. 
According to the election results, the CPP won about 80% of the provincial council 
seats (equivalent to 302 seats), and about 78.6% of district council seats (equivalent to 
2,249 seats). The data from the National Election Committee shows that the party won 
at least 600 votes from non-CPP commune councilors, about 350 of which are from the 
SRP. After the results came out, the SRP made many complaints about the CPP using 
112 
money to buy off its councilors. The complaints did not bring about any changes . It 
was hard to confirm whether the allegations by the opposition were true, but there were 
concerns that the National Election Committee itself, being a part of the Ministry of 
Interior, was not fully independent from the CPP (Blue et al 2008). 
Winning provincial and district council elections was of least concern for the CPP 
given its political strength at the time. The bigger question is the power relation 
between the centre and the provinces and districts as entailed by the reform, i.e. 
whether the last two would be kept in control when it increasingly gains authority. To 
address this concern, the CPP-led government designed the decentralization reforms in 
the following way. First, the province in the new setup is given limited power 
especially in its relationship with the lower tiers of administration, including the district 
which is now supposed to be accountable to the communes (RGC 2008d). 
In addition, in the new set-ups, the provincial, district and commune levels are expected 
to play different but complementing roles. A province will undertake more of planning 
and coordinating roles and stay closer to the national level in ensuring the proper 
implementation of national policy and standards; districts will primarily perform tasks 
to respond to the commune needs. The key control however is this: each level will have 
separate budget, all of which are decided upon at the national level through the 
adoption of the national level budget (RGC 2008d). 
112 Neak Khloimmeurl Bulletin, No. 38, Year 11, June 30,2009 
The central government (and therefore the ruling party) also seeks to ensure that it still 
has control over the operation of each level of sub-national administration. ^Vhile the 
councils are indirectly elected, the BoG, which is like the executive branch and headed 
by a governor, is appointed by the central government. Although the BoG is supposed 
to be accountable to the councils, and the councils can propose to have a governor 
removed, the decision on such dismissal or punishment lies totally with the central 
government S t h e Prime Minister, to be specific. The arrangement, as the Prime 
Minister put it, is uniquely Cambodian and was put in place to ensure 'a balance of 
,113 power 
There seems to be different political treatment given to the district versus the province, 
especially in term of the amount of control from the centre and the Party. The 
provincial level set-up is intended to reflect more of the central government/ party's 
preference, whereas at the districts, more voices from the communes are allowed. 
According to my key informant interviews, the central government and the Permanent 
Committee of the party play more roles in deciding on the nomination of the chiefs of 
councils and the appointment of the governors of the 24 provinces11 . 
The nomination of a district council chief, however, reflects the preferences and voices 
of the communes. According to a local newspaper, and later confirmed by interviews 
with some people at the MOI, the ruling party has been very careful in nominating 
people to be at the top of party list for the district council elections. What it did was to 
conduct a poll among the current CPP commune councilors to ensure that whoever got 
nominated for the head of the (district) council would get the most votes from the party 
members (i.e. the CPP councilors)11 . 
That the provincial and district indirect elections would further strengthen the CPP was 
not hard to see given the indirect election arrangement. The arrangement came under a 
lot of criticism immediately after it was made known to the opposition party, the donor 
community and the CSOs. But at about the same time it became clear that the indirect 
113 Prime Minister Hun Sen's speech, January 28,2009 
114 Also a powerful governor is a key asset for a central politician - no wonder the Pnme Minister Hun 
Sen has,' since before 1993, been active in building his personal networks with these individual governors 
(Gottesman 2003). 115 Koh Santepheap newspaper, January 29,2009 
elections were going forward anyway, the criticisms turned soft and then became 
supportive . 
Having no real bargaining power, those critics came to see indirect elections as at least 
their second best solution. For the opposition, the indirect election was its first 
opportunity to have their people at districts and provinces: as a result of the elections, 
the SRP now had somewhere between 15 and 20% of the council seats at these 
levels117. Of course, it is less likely that the SRP would manage to have any of its 
people on the executive, i.e. the BoG. 
The CSOs saw some other opportunities in the indirect elections. Thus far, many CSOs 
involved in service delivery or advocacy had had one of two choices: to work with the 
central level which was quite antagonistic towards the CSOs as a group, or to work 
with the commune or community level, which is far too small to make any impact 
beyond a community border. Now, with the existence of the district and provincial 
councils, a new space for interaction was opened up where the CSO can work directly 
and on relatively bigger scale. 
Reforming the districts and provinces, in addition to consolidating and legitimizing the 
CPP power at these two levels, also allowed the party to appease its long time serving 
party officials at both levels by sending them to retirement with a smile on their faces. 
As shown in chapter 5, many people at provincial and lower levels have not been well 
rewarded financially. Now, many of these people are approaching retirement ages. The 
party, this study argues, sees the newly established councils and the sub-national 
administrations, at least in their first term, as a new space into which these retiring 
people would be 're-deployed' and in the process, make them feel they were being 
rewarded for their services for the party. 
The result of the council elections (from 24 provinces and 15 districts) confirms this 
argument. The result shows that 14 out of the 24 previous provincial governors were 
kept in the same posts after the election, while in other cases, deputy governors of 
resourceful provinces were promoted to be governors of the less resourceful provinces; 
14 of the 24 chiefs of provincial councils elected were deputy governors of that 
116 Neak Khloimmeurl Bulletin, No. 38, Year 11, June 30,2009 
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province prior to the election. Among the 24 chiefs of councils, two used to be the 
provincial governors themselves, and the other two were retired MOI officials 1 1 8 . 
The result of the provincial election was more like a reshuffle of the CPP staff. Yet, it 
was made to look like everyone had been given a promotion by the party. In addition, 
all the 375 newly elected provincial councilors are given 'His Excellency' titles. 'His 
Excellency' is a well respected social status in Cambodia, although its value has been 
inflated recently. However, it is a very attractive, even fulfilling, idea for almost all 
retiring party veterans to be granted this honorific prefix. It is, in other words, what 
makes those people go into retirement with smiling faces. 
8.4. Decentralization as a 'learning by doing' process for the 
CPP and its people 
Learning is central to a successful dominant party in adapting to its changing 
environment. For the CPP, decentralization provides the best case to demonstrate this 
point. Writing on the Seila program which was the foundation of the current 
decentralization, (Rudengren and Ojendal 2002) called the reform 'a learning by doing' 
process. In later studies (see for instance White 2006; Hughes 2007), such learning 
aspects were also emphasized. My recent fieldwork adds more empirical findings to 
this claim. 
Decentralization in Cambodia, with its root in the Seila program, involved many actors, 
and it seemed, almost everyone had experienced a learning curve. Starting with the 
Seila program itself, some scholars look at it from an aid-effectiveness perspective, 
therefore, implicitly, emphasizing the learning aspects of the donors and their ways of 
doing things. Hughes, writing for an edited volume on 'aid that works' (Hughes 2007), 
praised Seila as a success story in aid management. Key to such success, she argues, 
was the donors' learning about the importance of focusing on policy and institutional 
environment and of placing relationship and partnership with the government as its 
priority. 
The people implementing the reform have also been learning. Sub-national level 
people, including the communes, districts, and provinces, have been put through 
numerous capacity-building programs, and with that, gradually becoming familiar with 
1 1 8 Key informant interviews with Mol officials, June 8,2009 
decentralized governance. With the reform, a sense of a system has been growing at the 
local level, e.g. procedures for local need prioritization, project monitoring and 
financial management system (STF 2008). All these developments are significant for 
Cambodia's local administration where a bureaucratic system has rarely taken roots 
since the French colonization period 1 1 9. 
The CPP and its people have also been learning about decentralization. While donors 
were learning how to make decentralization work in the post-conflict Cambodia at the 
time, the CPP was learning about the effects that local elections might have on its 
power base. Seila program in this sense was an experiment by the government and the 
party. But the CPP learning about decentralization and local election occurred long 
before Seila. Since the 1980s, the Party was experiencing with the election of the so-
called People's Revolutionary Committee at the commune levels. An undated party 
document from that period declared the following: 
'In order to strengthen the great victory [7 January 1979] and in order to create 
prosperity in the building of the Kampuchea national... this year, our leaders 
must fulfill greats tasks. First they must hold an election to choose members of 
the People's Revolutionary Committee of the communes... The election was to 
make commune a helpful administrative level for the Solidarity Group (krom 
samaki) to deal with the agricultural and food crisis at the time. Various criteria 
were set to be the qualifications of candidates in the elections, all of which point 
to three important things: loyalty to the party, being liked by the people and 
competency and knowledge in the development in their local areas' (Quoted in 
Slocomb 2004). 
While still a communist party, the CPP was also learning how to manage the district 
and provincial levels in a decentralized manner. Because it was then a one-party state, it 
is often assumed that districts and provinces must be under tight control from the 
centre. On the contrary, the two levels at the time were given a lot of economic 
discretion (Vickery and Amer 1995). 
With that discretion, the provincial and district people were developing their own 
power base and use it for personal rent-seeking. Since 1983, the regional and local 
militia controlled the production and sales of timber and used their guns to protect 
illegal logging and trading of the commodity. Ministry of Agriculture for instance, 
complained about being unable to control these activities and the proceeds generated 
1 1 9 Meeting with Sak Setha, September 23, 2008 
from the timber trade (Gottesman 2003:223-37). It was partly because of that 
experience that the CPP in 1993 was pushing to have all the fiscal powers of the 
provinces and districts abruptly centralized (Mol 1994). 
Within the CPP, various groups of actors were learning from decentralization. The first 
group includes some key policy makers at the Mol who have been leading and 
managing the reform. These people have been learning through their direct involvement 
in the reform process, as well as their interaction with international consultants, and 
other forms of capacity-building such as training and fieldtrips to other countries, etc. 
These people have been working on sub-national administrative management since 
before 2002120 which means they have a good knowledge about the history about 
central-local relationships in this country. In addition, they have learnt not only about 
decentralization per se, but also how to play bureaucratic politics with other line 
ministries. For instance, from my observation,121 they learnt what agenda to push and 
when, which vested interests they should push or avoid, when and on what issues they 
need to refer to the top leaders for decision-making, etc. 
Another group consists of the people from the Ministry of Finance which is not 
particularly enthusiastic about decentralization. Although agree to create the CSF and 
allocate budget to the communes, this group is still criticizing decentralization, pointing 
out to various examples the reform has led to lower efficiency in the spending of state 
resources122. The group was also very skeptical about the district and province reforms. 
The skepticism was silenced, however, when the Organic Law was passed in 2008, 
Prime Minister made speech on January 28, 2008, and when the indirect elections were 
held in May 2009. 
This group, while not openly resisting decentralization, has used certain bureaucratic 
techniques to maintain their budgetary control. One director of provincial finance 
department told this story very well. Having been a Department of Finance since 1993, 
the director had observed that, the slow progress with decentralization was not so much 
120 In my understanding good examples of these individuals might include key individuals working at the 
National Committee for Democratic Development (NCDD) 
121 Most of the observations were done when I was work.ng in the formulation team of the Nat.onal 
Program for Sub-national Democratic Development and through my experiences working as a researcher 
on decentralization issues since 2003. 
122 Official meeting at the Ministry of Finance, December 11, 2008 
due to the low capacity at sub-national level, but the intention of the centre to centralize 
power. 'In the past, the leadership [meaning the Prime Minister] has pushed for 
decentralization on a number of occasions, but the Ministry of Finance was playing 
tricks to ensure that while 'it let go the head, it still held on to the tail," he 
complained123. He gave one good example of a bureaucratic trick: 
As with the public procurement, the changing law stated that any procurement 
of 200 million riels or less shall be done by the provincial department of 
finance. However, the instruction also stated that if different line departments 
need to purchase similar items, for example, repair and construction, they all 
have to be pooled. Most often then, the procurement [after being pooled] ends 
up with 250 million riels easily. Then the procurement would be given back to 
the Ministry. So, in a way, they give but they don't really give124 
The example shows how an agency has learnt to protect its own interests while not 
appearing as opposing the reform. This kind of game is called bureaucratic learning and 
bureaucratic politics. Bureaucratic politics, which entails 'learning to play a system,' is 
not unique to Cambodia. But the game as played out in Cambodia has been largely 
driven by patronage interests that penetrate the bureaucratic structure itself125. 
The patronage also increases the importance of personality in policy and bureaucratic 
decision making process. One concrete example occurs amidst a negotiation between 
the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance regarding local taxes. In an interview, a 
senior government official of the Ministry of Finance shared his experience that, when 
the two ministries were arguing about local taxes and how to sequence the own-source 
revenues reforms, there were heated disagreements in the formal workshops. 
After the formal discussion, the ministers of the two ministries assigned him, as a 
technical person, to meet one-on-one with another supposedly hands-on high ranking 
official from the Ministry of Interior. What he found was that the disagreement between 
the two ministries was not really serious126. The heated discussion, he noted, was the 
result of a personality clash, and not so much due to the subject matters. 
While there was no way of verifying the story, the story told was not completely at 
odds with my general observation, both during the National Program formulation 
123 Fieldwork interview, December 05, 2008 
124 •ujj 
125 This was mainly during my working in the formulation team of the NP-SNDD 
126 Fieldwork interviews, December 12, 2008 
process and with my long time researching governance issue in Cambodia. Personality, 
I have long observed, plays a key role in policy-making in Cambodia. This is not to say 
that in other countries, such personal relations are not important but what is intriguing 
about Cambodia is the extent to which success or failure of certain policies or agendas 
relies on personal and informal networks. 
In ministries that I had worked with and learned of, one issue that stands out is that real 
decision-making power in those organizations tends to be concentrated around a few 
people. When these people are absent - whether they are sick, on holidays, or in 
another meeting, things would have to stop moving. These few people, moreover, tend 
to be responsible for too many things. The implication of this for my 'learning' thesis is 
that not only has a small group of individuals come to dominate the policy arena, but 
the learning itself about such matters has also been limited to that small group. 
Such heavy dependency on personality in policy matters mirrors the limited 
information sharing and coordination with the bureaucracy. The first explanation of this 
has been the culture of not opening up the state bureaucracy to younger technical 
people. Hughes and Conway, in their unpublished paper on the policy process in 
Cambodia (Hughes and Conway 2004) showed that, given the significance of patronage 
among the bureaucrats, loyalty and ceremony have often been given more weight than 127 
technical capacity when discussing policy matters and when a 'boss' selects his staff . 
8.5. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to answer two broad questions about the politics of decentralization 
reforms in Cambodia and to relate them to the CPP's strategies for dominance: 
• What have been the CPP strategies toward decentralization? And 
• And how have local legitimization and central control been combined in those 
political strategies? 
The following is the concluding answers of this chapter. First, as with the motives for 
reform, there were many pushing factors, including international community pressure 
1 2 7 The result has been high barriers to technically capable people to get into the government. Anecdotal 
evidence strongly suggests that most students holding Master Degree in public administration and 
development have largely left outside the government working for the NGOs. This; is so because the 
salary within the government is too meager to make a living (about USD30 per month). Those who are 
w i S g to get into the Government are those said to have 'pipes,' meaning networks and patrons who are 
expected to share rents. 
and the positive demonstration effects of donor-funded Seila program. However, the 
key motive for the party to adopt decentralization was its learning to appreciate the 
reform's instrumentality in cleaning up its rural power base and building stronger local 
legitimacy for itself. 
This chapter provides evidence that decentralization has so far been helpful in building 
the CPP's legitimacy at the local level. Gentler and more developmental faces have 
come to replace the more violent and intimidating ones of the pre-election local 
authorities. Having likeable local party officials, it is concluded here, helps build not 
only local but also national legitimacy for the CPP and its leadership. The low level of 
elite capture is another positive change of the reform, something that had further 
accrued credits for the CPP. Having seen the benefits of decentralization, the CPP then 
made the step to introduce the more democratic measures into the process of 
nominating its commune and district council candidates. This indicates that 
decentralization has affected not only the state structure but also the intra-party politics. 
Despite the reform, however, the current system is still very centralized, firstly in terms 
of budgetary authority. The central level still holds on a large share of state budget, 
leaving those at the sub-national level very limited access to state resources. What the 
CPP has so far then is a strong rural administrative system, but one which has operated 
128 very much at the mercy of the central level's financing capacity . 
Despite decentralization, the central level and the party still exercises a lot of power 
keeping the sub-national and local level under their control: the central government and 
party still have the final say in party candidate nomination for sub-national elections; 
that PWG still exercises a lot of power over the communes and districts; and the central 
level is still the ultimate decision maker on the appointment and dismissal of the 
district and provincial members of BoG. 
The persistent centralization is partly the result of the party's intention to control. But it 
can also be explained by the power tension among key central ministries (e.g. beween 
the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance), a finding which confirms what 
was partly raised in chapter 5 about elite conflicts within the CPP. This chapter shows 
1 2 8 This is reflected in the arrangement and functioning of the PWG wherein the centre is responsible for 
financing, while commune and district people work more like foot soldiers. 
that central elites, while aware that they belong to the same party, fight in a more quiet 
way to expand and maintain their domains of power, while avoiding being seen as 
opposing the directive given from the above. 
Another related conclusion is about the learning capacity of the CPP and its people. 
Previous chapters had discussed different aspects of this topic, e.g. how the party in 
general terms learnt to adapt from a communist regime to free-market and democratic 
system (discussed in chapter 4), how it manages state budgets and elites and builds its 
rural administration (in chapter 5), how it has skillfully devised the PWG to establish its 
image and legitimacy (in chapter 6 & 7). This chapter zooms in further on this issue of 
learning, offering some specific concluding remarks. 
First, it is concluded here that one thing that CPP and its leadership has learnt is about 
dealing with different competing forces and, in so doing, finding the right balance 
between the need for its tight control and for enhancing legitimacy. In pushing 
decentralization, for instance, the party has to find a balance between demands from the 
international community on the one hand, and addressing the needs to clean up its own 
party, and building its own local legitimacy on the other. The reform also involves 
finding a balance between giving more power to the sub-national levels and keeping 
them under central control. 
Second, the CPP bases its learning on actual doing and a step-by-step process. As with 
the decentralization reform, it first starts small, learns of its demonstrating effects, and 
then considers scaling up. For instance, the whole decentralization push first started as a 
local development project (i.e. Seila) and was then scaled up to a national reform. 
Another example is how the CPP has gradually reformed its internal party procedures, 
introducing more democratic measures in the nomination process of commune and 
district councilor candidates. 
However, as the third point, the CPP's and its people's learning has been concentrated 
among a few key individuals, most of whom are senior, old guard officials. While 
seniority means more experience being brought into policy thinking, it also means less 
possibility for a new frame of thinking to emerge. If the CPP's enduring dominance 
depends on its ability to learn (and, by extension, to adapt), it seems that it will have to 
work to recruit and include new and younger minds in its own learning and adapting 
process. 
Similarly, the opposition also seems to be learning. While the Royalists were less 
successful in competing with the CPP, the SRP has been seen as adaptive enough to 
make use of the opportunities presented by local and sub-national elections as a way to 
establish its local presence and get closer to voters. However, as this chapter has shown, 
its lack of financial resources (which is mainly the result of its lack of access to the 
state) has made it very difficult to prevent its activists from defecting to (and/or being 
bought off by) the CPP. 
Chapter 9: Conclusions 
This thesis set out to better understand dominant party politics within a weak state. 
Growing academic interest in this political system has been the result of a long time 
observations that, despite regular democratic elections, some political parties in third 
world democracies still manage to stay in power, ruling over states that are seen as 
weak and unable to meet even their own people's basic needs. While many studies have 
attempted to address this puzzle in terms of those countries' progress toward 
democracy and good governance, what this study has done instead is to choose a case 
and empirically study it in order to better understand the underlying dynamics and 
mechanisms that lead to a party's enduring dominance. 
Analytically, the study proposes the 'Party's domination as a system' framework which 
argues that a party's dominance needs to be understood as a system in which the 
incumbent party relates to various actors, including the state, elites, opposition, voters, 
donors and civil society. Such a systemic perspective, the study argues, brings to light 
the incumbent's adaptive capacity as manifested through the ways in which it manages 
and makes use of the various relationships with these other actors. Methodologically, 
the study adopts a single-country case study approach, choosing the incumbent CPP in 
Cambodia as its case. 
Indeed, a party's dominance can be extended to cover various domains of power, 
including specific areas of state bureaucracy, the economic sectors, the military and the 
police. This study, driven by the observations it made before the fieldwork, chose to 
focus on four areas, including: the way the CPP manages state budget, strengthens its 
rural administration, initiates and funds off budget spending for rural infrastructure 
projects, and manages inter-governmental relations and decentralization reform. 
Extensive fieldwork was conducted in Cambodia to collect empirical data on these four 
areas which were then used to explain the CPP's system of domination. 
This concluding chapter has four main sections. The first consolidates the findings from 
the five preceding empirical chapters, reflecting them through the 'Party domination as 
a system' framework and coming up with systematic arguments as to why the CPP has 
managed to stay dominant. The second section discusses the usefulness and limitations 
of the 'party domination as a system' framework, together with a reflection on the 
research methods used. The third section takes on the task of presenting specific 
theoretical arguments underpinning certain aspects of a party's dominance in a weak 
state. The last section proposes some topics for future research. 
9.1. Explaining the CPP's dominance 
Based on the 'Party's domination as a system' framework and collected empirical 
findings, Figure 20 is proposed for the case of the CPP. The basic elements of the 
diagram reflect what were illustrated in Figure 3 (in chapter 2), namely, the context, the 
dominating forces, countervailing forces, and voters. What is new is the how the 
framework has been reflected and contextualized to reflect the case of the CPP in 
Cambodia. 
The diagram illustrating the CPP's dominance has three important aspects: the first is 
the dominating forces (on the left side), focusing on how the party has established its 
so-called 'foundational elements of control'; the second focuses on the countervailing 
forces and the voters (on the right side); and the third shows the dynamics of the 
system, focusing on the adaptive capacity of the CPP as found empirically. 
Figure 20: CPP's domination as a system 
Context: Post conflict, former 
communist, and aid-dependent 
9.1.1. Foundational elements of control of the CPP 
As reflected in the diagram, this study argues that the CPP is enduringly dominant 
primarily because of its strong foundational elements of control, here starting with its 
tight control over the state (relationship 1). First, the party has been in tight control of 
the state budget (as discussed in chapter 5), which has in turn allowed it to 
accommodate elite and patronage interests in exchange for their support. The same 
accommodation strategy, however, has also been the cause of widespread corruption, 
making Cambodia comparable to a neo-patrimonial state. 
On this particular point, the case of the CPP is similar to that of many other dominant 
parties whose hegemony comes primarily from their incumbency advantages, i.e. those 
resulting from their control over the state (Green 2009). It is noted that in the CPP case, 
historical events have led and shaped the ways it has come to gain and maintain such 
control. As discussed at length in chapter 4, the fact that the CPP came to power as a 
communist party made the party much closer to the state. As discussed in chapter 5, it 
seems that even up to the present, administratively, the party-state closeness still 
persists. In this aspect, the CPP bears- some resemblance to the former communist 
parties in Eastern European countries which managed to maintain their administrative 
penetration over the states' despite democratic elections (Grzymala-Busse 2008a). 
Unique to the CPP case, however, is the ruins of the state over which it came to rule 
right after the Pol Pot's regime fell. Chapter 4 indicates that the CPP in the early 1980s 
was essentially starting from scratch in building the state. This historical fact was one 
of the many explanations of why patronage practices were nourished and became 
become intertwined with the state, partly as a way to complement the weak state 
institutions at the time, and partly as a means for personal and group enrichment. 
Historically, then, in the case of the CPP, the party, state, and the patronage seemed to 
have been mixed together right from the beginning of its ruling. 
As discussed in chapter 5, there are specific, noticeable points about the CPP's 
strategies to control the state budget. Fist, it has centralized budget control which in 
turn has given central elites much more room for rent-seeking, compared to those at the 
sub-national level. Second, fragmentation in budgetary management is also found to be 
a key strategy used by the party to ensure that the rents sought are accumulated not in 
one but different domains of the elites and their patronage. Firstly, this is important for 
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reducing elite conflicts and maintaining coalitions among them. Secondly, the existence 
of many and competing domains of power work to prevent the current elites from 
becoming too powerful to challenge the current leadership. 
Although no studies have been identified using a dominant party perspective to 
understand budgetary management in a weak state, many studies have looked at this 
topic from public financial management and neo-patrimonial perspectives (Cammack et 
al. 2007; Schiavo-Campo 2007). These studies indicate that budgetary centralization 
and fragmentation and associated corruption is not uncommon in other weak states 
especially some in Africa. That said, however, it is still important that budget 
centralization and fragmentation in Cambodia be understood within the political and 
administrative changes ince 1979, particularly the power competition between the CPP 
and the Royalists (see chapter 4) and the changing back and forth between 
decentralization and centralization since 1980. 
Budget centralization has produced a sort of intra-party vertical fiscal imbalance 
(relationship 2), where a small number of central elites benefit a lot from their control 
over a large share of the state budget, while the numerous 'foot soldiers' at the sub-
national level have been given fewer of such opportunities. Even with such vertical 
fiscal imbalance, however, the CPP still manages to expand and improve the 
effectiveness of its rural administrative capacity. This implies when talking about rural 
politics, it is not just money, but also other factors that matter. These other factors 
include the parly's control over the administrative domains of power at the local levels 
(i.e. commune chiefs and village chiefs), its tightly controlled administrative units 
which reach down to sub-village (called 'group') level, and equally important, its co-
optation of key domains of influence in the rural areas, including the pagoda and its 
committees (see chapter 5). 
The CPP, having its origin as a communist party, has been serious about building its 
rural power base. Actually, it started to do this shortly after it came to power in 1979. 
That most of its senior people have their origins in peasantry society and that many of 
them still keep frequent contacts with their villages (through the PWG) has kept the 
CPP close and well-informed about rural politics and voters. In addition, the CPP has 
also used decentralization to further legitimize its rural legitimacy and clean up 
unpopular party members ( see chapter 8). The CPP's care in building its rural power 
base however is not uncommon. Other ruling parties such as that in Uganda in the 
1980s had done similarly, i.e. holding local elections to ensure its local legitimacy and 
purge unpopular party members (Manor 1999; Ndegwa and Levy 2003). 
Control over the state gives the CPP another political weapon which is inaccessible to 
the opposition: control over the media. As indicated in chapter 5, the CPP controls most 
of the radio and TV channels, especially the ones that reach rural people. Through these 
mouthpieces, it has been able to constantly pour out political messages about how good 
it has been and how bad its competitors have been. Emphasized in those messages is 
the CPP's contribution to rural infrastructure development which has largely been 
funded through the PWG. The PWG in this sense serves as another political weapon 
which was made possible because the CPP has been controlling the state and elite 
networks. More detailed conclusions about the PWG will be discussed later. 
9.1.2. Voters and countervailing forces 
Popular support and legitimacy are important for the dominant CPP (relationships 3 and 
4). That support, while shaped by the manipulative strategies of the incumbent, is also a 
function of the people's perceptions. In the case of Cambodia, firstly, a majority of 
voters with whom the CPP has dealt since 1993 are those who had experienced war and 
have been passive and less demanding of the government. This popular characteristic 
however is not uncommon in a post-conflict situation where people are not only less 
demanding but also unable to mobilize collective actions to make their voice heard by 
the state (Oosterom 2009). 
Given their low level of expectations, Cambodian voters seem to have been easily 
pleased, especially with tangible projects offered to them and their communities by the 
CPP and its elites. This means little pressure on the state (and by extension, the CPP) to 
adopt reforms needed to ensure better service delivery. Such low expectations have also 
allowed the CPP to use off-budget redistributive channels (such as the PWG) to deliver 
certain types of rural development in exchange for popular support (as discussed in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7). That people tend to give high value to tangible projects also 
reflects their limited knowledge and access to information about what they can expect 
of the state, which again is just another common feature found among peoples in post-
conflict countries (Oosterom 2009). 
The ways Cambodian people perceive and interact with the state also reflect prevailing 
cultural values which are also found in other Southeast Asian states. For instance, they 
tend to see their leaders in a more paternalistic perspective (i.e. as their patrons) rather 
than politicians or bureaucrats from whom they can demand accountability. Similarly, 
reflecting the prevailing Buddhist practices, people also see the benevolence and merit-
making acts of leaders as respectable acts (discussed in chapters 6 and 7), a finding 
which has been said of other Buddhist Southeast Asian countries (Pye 1985; Vatikiotis 
1998). The finding about the CPP's trying to present its PWG activities as a political 
play (chapter 6), moreover, holds some resemblance to what (Geertz 1980) describes as 
theatre states in Bali. 
This study finds that the CPP has been very successful in terms of gaining popular 
support. However, it is not yet conclusive as to how secure the CPP is on this matter. 
Although the party is arguably in control over virtually everything (i.e. the state, the 
elite, private business, rural administrative network), the number of votes (not of 
parliamentary seats) that it has won does not convey the same sense of overwhelming 
superiority. The CPP's own electoral record shows that it polled 58.11 % of the votes in 
the 2008 elections (CPP 2008a). 
The percentage is impressive for a party's performance at an election, especially when 
compared to the 1998 result when it won only 41.42 % (CPP 2008a). However, the 
figure also indicates that, although the CPP is so dominant, more than 40 % of the 
people did not vote for it when it was at its peak. It indicates also that the impressive 90 
out of 123 parliament seats that it controls do not entirely reflect its popularity, but are 
partly the result of an electoral system and seat allocation formula which favors the big 
party. In another word, the system allows the incumbent CPP to win more parliament 
seats than it did with the number of votes, and the oppositions to win fewer seats than it 
did with votes (Blue et al 2008). On this point, the CPP case is similar to other 
dominant parties which tend to manipulate electoral rules (including formulas for 
parliamentary seat allocations) to their advantages (Schedler 2002). 
Another caution for the CPP is the demographic change among voters in the coming 
elections. It is estimated that, by 2013 (the next election), about 50% of the electorate 
will have been born post the Khmer Rouge, and by the 2018 election, this proportion 
will increase to about 70%. Urbanization is also a factor, but more gradual: 17.6 % in 
1998 to 19.5 % in 2008 (Adler and Craig 2010). The questions remain as to whether 
these post-war and more urbanized people will articulate higher demands on the CPP-
government to perform and whether such demands will be strong enough for the ruling 
party to adapt in order to accommodate. 
The CPP's success also reflects its dealing with countervailing forces which include 
opposition parties, donors, and civil society (relationships 5 and 6). First, the parly's 
rise has been facilitated partly by weak and young opposition parties, starting with the 
Royalists and later on SRP. As in many other dominant party politics (Rakner and van 
de Walle 2009), these opposition parties are weak mainly because they do not have 
access to the state's resources. On top of this fiscal disadvantage, oppositions in 
Cambodia also show other signs of weaknesses, including their vulnerability to the 
CPP's divide and rule strategies, and their lack of familiarity with rural politics 
(discussed in chapter 4). 
The SRP, being the only credible opposition left standing and despite its improving 
electoral records since 1998, still has a lot to do. That includes building its 
administrative structure at all levels, preventing its membership from defecting to (or 
allegedly being bought off by) the CPP, protecting its leadership from constant lawsuits 
and threats by the incumbent. While fighting an uphill political contest at the central 
level, the SRP, with some success, has pushed its efforts to win more votes at local 
elections (see chapter 8). However, the SRP, without access to state resources, still 
finds it very hard to gain more votes from the people (relationship 7) who tend to 
appreciate politicians' ability to deliver infrastructure projects. As in many other 
dominant party politics (Schedler 2006), limited access to the media only adds to the 
opposition's electoral disadvantages. 
In Cambodia, (as in many other aid dependent countries (Brautigam 2000)), Western 
donors have been complaining about governance and corruption issues but their 
conditionality has often been weakly enforced. The common donor alignment and 
harmonization problems aside, donors in Cambodia have had to face the reality that for 
the moment, the CPP is not only dominant but also seems to be the only party that can 
keep post-conflict Cambodia from falling back into chaos and civil wars (Cock 2010). 
Concerns have also been raised lately about whether the Western donors' influence will 
increase along with their aid. The reason for this concern is the increasing aid from 
China to the CPP-government with no strings attached. 1 2 9 . That said, the CPP is still in 
need for the support from Western donors, partly to ensure its international legitimacy 
and the significant foreign aid (see Chapter 5 ) 1 3 0 . 
Experiencing difficulties in pushing for key reforms at the national level, donors have 
put more emphasis on their intervention at the local level. This in practice means more 
donor support being given to local governments, pushing for decentralization reforms, 
and providing assistance to NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) 1 . The 
NGOs and CBOs, non-state actors in Cambodia, are still young and their roles both as 
countervailing forces to the state (and the party) and as catalysts to promote popular 
capacity to demand more accountability from the state are still limited (see chapter 5). 
Similar challenges however have been found in other post-conflict countries (Oosterom 
2009; Scott 2009), 
9.1.3. Adaptive and learning capacity 
Discussed in the first sub-sections of this chapter was an analytical presentation of the 
current state of the CPP's dominance. What makes it evolve into such state, this study 
argues, is the dynamics of the domination system, at the centre of which is the CPP's 
adaptive and learning capacity. There are a number of points to be made about this. 
First, as discussed in Chapter 4, the CPP's adaptive capacity can be said to be the result 
of three decades of 'on the job' training and trial and error: it came to power in 1979, 
and practically learnt how to set up a state and party administration while fighting wars 
on the border; when Communism fell, the party (and some of its people) learnt not just 
about how to transit into a free market economy and how best to position themselves to 
exploit from such transition; in the first elections in 1993, it learnt to deal with electoral 
politics, by not only learning to lose (a term used by Friedman and Wong (2008)) but 
how to win again. 
Existing literature about the CPP suggests that the CPP's learning has not been 
confined to any specific ideology, but reflects a certain kind of pragmatism in the ways 
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1 3 1 An example of this supports is the project on Civil Society and Pro-Poor Markets Component 
(CSPPM) of the Natural-Resource Management and Livelihood Pogramme (NRMLP), or a recent EU 
program called Strengthening Performance, Accountability and Civic Engagement (SPACE) of 
Democratic Councils in Cambodia 
in which it adapts. While pragmatism is used to mean non-ideological, the literature 
leaves this particular notion pretty much to whatever interpretations readers incline to 
have. Based on its newly collected empirical data, this study takes this point a step 
further, arguing that the CPP has successfully adapted by seeking to manage the seven 
relationships proposed in the framework (Figure 20). 
Without running the risk of repeating what has already been discussed in section 9.1.1 
and 9.1.2, this section argues that central to the CPP's managing those seven 
relationships is its constant search for the right a balance between control on the one 
hand and legitimacy on the other. Such balancing act is found to be central regardless 
of what level being discussed. For instance, the CPP's dominance per se can be said to 
be the constant adjustment between the party's seeking to control the state and the elite 
(relationships 1 and 2) on the one hand, and dealing with the voters and countervailing 
forces on the other (relationships 3 to 7). 
A balancing act is also needed (and was indeed found) in the ways in which the CPP 
manages specific areas of its domination. For instance, in managing inter-governmental 
relations, the party needs to find a balance between appeasing the central elites and the 
numerous local party activists (and it seems that, fiscally, such a balance still needs to 
be found (see Chapter 5)). In running its rural administration, a balance is also involved 
between tight control and surveillance on the one hand (e.g. setting up 'group' units), 
and legitimacy on the other (e.g. a popularly elected commune authority). 
Talking about balancing act as an adaptive strategy, the most interesting empirical 
evidence about the CPP is its use of the PWG. This shadowy mechanism is a good 
example of how the CPP has innovatively used a middle way to mix together both its 
control and legitimizing strategies. While continuing to control the state and allowing 
patronage to flourish, the CPP has used this PWG as a way to tap into its people's 
accumulated wealth and use it to build its own image in the face of the people. 
Understanding about the PWG has allowed this study to understand some of the 
internal dynamics of the CPP, further substantiating the claim about adaptability. First, 
it has learnt that leadership (especially that of the Prime Minister Hun Sen) has been 
important for the party to take innovative measures especially at a national scale. On 
the one hand, this finding is not that different from what is also said of many other 
dominant parties (Friedman and Wong 2008a). On the other hand, however, Hun Sen's 
role should not be under-estimated, given that the very PWG mechanism itself was 
initiated by him and that since 1998, more than 3,000 schools (and hundreds of rural 
roads, and bridges) built by the PWGs bear his name (Cabinet of Prime Minister 2008). 
The second point is the incentive structure that the party has put in place to encourage 
and pressure its members to contribute. As soft incentives, the party has integrated 
some of the cultural and traditional values such as homeland-sentiment and merit-
making to encourage members' contributions to the benefit of the party and its 
leadership. On the hard side, the Party has linked its members' contributions within the 
PWG to their performance as party officials in general, which in turn reflects on their 
performance in the government agencies. It is like a performance-based approach in the 
CPP's ways. It also shows a very close overlap between party and state official 
performance, which is another indication of how deeply the CPP has come to be 
identified with the state. 
The incentive system in the PWG is an indication of a proven pragmatism favored by 
CPP leadership. Prime Minister Hun Sen and his men have learnt from their experience 
that a system will not work if there is no money or incentive in it. This was exactly 
what Prime Minister Hun Sen said in the late 1980s when his regime was considering 
economic liberation reform. Another interesting aspect of this pragmatism is that, when 
it comes to money, the party seems to care less about what such a system might look 
like, at least in a formal sense, as long as it delivers results. The Prime Minister Hun 
Sen's recent speech was indicative of this point. During a 2007 televised speech, Prime 
Minister Hun Sen told a revealing story. He was responding to criticisms of his 
government's tax and customs regimen. 
A Chinese lord, he related, faced a revenue crisis which meant he would not be able to 
pay his imperial tribute. A leading court mandarin advisor proposed raising taxes on the 
peasantry, and another advised sending subjects to mine the gold. Both were rejected as 
inefficient, unpopular and requiring unavailable time and manpower. But a third 
advisor asked for just twenty soldiers and a few days to solve the problem, and, in 
quick time, he duly returned with the gold. It had been procured by simply taking the 
soldiers and going from house to house around (other) high mandarins' residences 
(quoted in Craig and Pak 2009). This story sheds light on the functioning of the PWG. 
However, comparing the Chinese lord story to the PWG does not mean that the latter is 
not systematically set up. Instead, it has been highly systematic, and yet shadowy and 
its accountability structure is highly result-oriented. 
Despite its many interesting characteristics, the PWG however has some inherent 
limitations in term of its contributions to rural development. It has been helpful in 
financing small-scale one-off capital investments such as constructing schools, roads, 
pagodas and canals, but it has great difficulty meeting the recurrent spending needs 
such as repairs and maintenance, personnel and operational spending. It might not be 
able to meet one-off investments which require big capital such as that needed for 
irrigation schemes. It has also been poor in terms of sustainability and regional equality. 
All of these lead to an argument that the PWG-like funding support will not be able to 
replace the state-mechanism for public service provision. The question however is 
whether such limitations of the PWG will be transformed into incentives or pressure for 
the party to accelerate state reforms, namely, the budgetary and decentralization 
reforms to fill the gaps. 
The way the CPP approaches decentralization reform indicates another adaptive and 
learning capacity. In decentralization, the CPP has managed to use an institutional 
reform to achieve its local legitimacy without easing up on its central control - or, at 
least, not yet. In other words, through the reform, the party has attempted to manage 
relationship 2 and relationship 4. 
That decentralization has been managed in ways that benefit the CPP does not mean it 
also brings benefits to the local people and/or the sub-national levels. Actually, the 
current centralized fiscal relationship has prevented local authorities from being 
responsive to local needs which in turn can undermine their (people's) trust in the local 
authority and, by extension, the party. Identifying this potential concern, the CPP-led 
government has recently pushed to decentralize provincial and district level (see 
chapter 8). A lot remains to be seen, however, as to how and how far this new phase of 
reform will go. The progress of this next step will surely alter the nature of intra-party 
relations (relationship 2) and the perception and support that people will have on sub-
national levels and local authority (relationship 4). 
Third, the CPP's dominance will depend on its continued adaptation, some of which 
has already been noticed. On September 14, 2009, for instance, the CPP's central 
committee issued an order advising its branches throughout the country to classify all 
households within their locality into 'CPP families,' 'other party families,' and 
'activists of other parties.' These will be marked, respectively as 'white,' 'grey' and 
'black.' The document orders party members to 'do whatever they can' to change black 
to grey and grey to white. It orders the deputies and chiefs of commune councils to 
strengthen their teams and organize a clear plan to carry out the order 1 3 . In addition, on 
March 18, 2010, the CPP issued another order setting up the 'Quick Reaction Youth' 
group whose responsibility is to respond to 'political attacks from the opposition party' 
at the local level 1 3 3 . It remains to be seen how effective these mechanisms will be. 
The recent decentralization at district and provinces is another possible sign of the 
CPP's continuous adaptation. CPP, this study predicts, will need to face the challenges 
that come from a small group of central elites controlling a large share of resources, 
leaving very little to those at the sub-national level. The current vertical fiscal 
imbalance is too obvious to last. There have been increasing complaints from province, 
district and commune level about the current overly-centralized system especially in 
terms of budgetary authority. The sub-national level, which has been like the foot-
soldiers, felt they have been given too little, and not commensurate to the services they 
have provided for the party. If the demands from below get stronger, they might well 
create an intra-party incentive for the CPP to push ahead the reform at provincial and 
district levels. It is not sure yet, however, how this will turn out. 
Recent broader political development has given mixed signals as to the direction of the 
CPP's adaptation, especially in relation to pro-poor reforms. On the positive side, the 
CPP has been pushing for the adoption of the long-awaited anti-corruption law 1 3 4 . At 
the same time, however, reports have been replete with the problems with the current 
judicial system, saying that the flaws are too numerous and that the courts have been 
used as political tools by the ruling party 1 3 5 . With this, the government critics add 
further that the anti-corruption reforms lacks the teeth to root out the country's endemic 
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corruption 1 3 6. Prime Minister Hun Sen also said that his government will push for deep 
governance reform 1 1 . But will all these be just paying lip-service to secure increased 
foreign aid? 
Because the CPP's (and the state's) decision-making is still centralized within a small 
group of individuals at the top, this study argues that its adaptive and learning capacity 
as a political organization is in turn a function of the learning and will of that small 
group. And because that group is still dominated largely by the old guard, sooner or 
later, the Party will have to address the need for attracting new, young minds and 
prepare them for future leadership so as to avoid leadership transition problems. 
This question about leadership succession is a big concern for the CPP. As this study 
has shown, at times, it seems as if the story about CPP dominance is also the story of 
the personalization of power under the Prime Minister Hun Sen. But it is also hard to 
distinguish the person from the organization because both complement each other. 
Sometimes, rumors have been heard about factional problems within the CPP which 
indicate that the Prime Minister, while powerful, cannot always use his power as he 
wishes 1 3 8 . 
At some other times, however, it seems that the Prime Minister is so powerful that his 
power becomes a myth. Even he himself is seen to be trying to create such myth. 
Recently, for instance, the Prime Minister on several occasions was telling stories about 
a peasant king from the 15 t h century named Sdach Korn and seemed trying to portrait 
himself as an incarnation of that king 1 3 9 . The similarity between him and Sdech Korn, 
he said, was that both rose from humble origins to topple the then-king and stayed 
enduringly in power. Is this a form of re-invention of tradition to further legitimize and 
consolidate his power? Or is it just something to serve his own self-gratification? 
Whatever it might be, people are looking and asking hard questions as to what happens 
after Hun Sen is gone, the question that the CPP itself more than any others, need to 
find an answer. 
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9 . 2 . Reflection on the framework and method 
The proposed framework on 'Party's domination as a system' is considered here as a 
key contribution of the study to the broader literature. The study wishes to highlight its 
usefulness and limitations after having used it to explain the CPP case. 
As indicated in Chapter 2, various scholars have attempted to identify a number of 
factors that help explain why a political party manages to stay so dominant. These 
scholars, individually, however tend to focus on one or two of those factors; some focus 
on elite coalition, some on incumbency advantages. Such a narrow focus is 
undoubtedly useful in providing in-depth insights about specific areas of a party's 
dominating strategies. The same focus, however, fails to capture the bigger picture and 
the broader dynamics which has led to enduring dominance of the party. 
Realizing such a limitation, some scholars have already attempted to construct a more 
systematic and holistic picture of how a dominant party operates. Schedler, for instance, 
has worked on the 'menu of manipulation' (Schedler 2002), Friedman and Wong on the 
different factors that defines a party's adaptive capacity (Friedman and Wong 2008a), 
and just recently, Schedler has introduced a model of 'manipulation dilemma' 
(Schedler 2009). Insightful as they are, however, these studies tend to present their 
arguments in the form of a listing of what a dominant party usually chooses to do rather 
than systemic explanations as to why, and more importantly, how the party chooses to 
do things the way it does. 
This study, with its proposed framework, focuses on the dynamics that underlie 
relationships among key actors, namely, dominating forces, countervailing forces and 
voters. With its holistic perspective, the framework is argued to be useful for its 
simplicity and its ability to capture the bigger dynamics by showing how those 
relationships complement or create trade-offs among themselves. The key implication 
of this approach is that it tells us not only what aspects of a party's domination one 
should look into, but also how they might interact. 
Another implication is that it allows a study like this to come up with a different 
perspective on what it is that defines a party's adaptive capacity. Such capacity, the 
study argues, lies not only in its ability to manage specific relationships, but also the 
synergies and trade-offs among them, taking into account the changing surrounding 
contextual factors. As the previous section already mentioned in relation to the CPP, 
simultaneously managing those different relationships involves finding constantly-
changing balance points, an endeavor which requires huge amount of vigilance and 
constant learning. 
As a limitation, however, the framework can be useful only when it is properly 
contextualized. Different contexts imply different political and socio-economic factors 
that might affect the nature of the actors involved as well as the relationships among 
them. Taking Cambodia as an example, the country's historical events and certain 
cultural and traditional values (such as hierarchy, religion, post-conflict imperatives, 
etc) play very important roles that contribute to the CPP's rise, how it manages the elite 
at different levels, and more importantly, how it relates to the masses. Contextualization 
is also needed because domination reflects adaptability, which in turn reflects learning. 
And learning is a highly contextual phenomenon. 
To contextualize the framework, this study argues that a single-country comparative 
study approach is particularly helpful. Of course, an inherent limitation of such 
approach is its lack of generalizeability. However, a case study is still a good choice 
because it can better explain the relevant causal mechanisms • not so much about 
causal effects - that lead to a party's dominance. A case study, when well guided by an 
analytical framework, allows for in-depth questioning into certain causal relationships 
without losing sight of why such inquiries are relevant to the broader question of party 
dominance. 
For instance, with in-depth case inquiries, this study has been able to produce empirical 
findings about the unique mechanism, the PWG. Such findings, this study argues, 
would not have been possible with a multi-case comparison approach. This is mainly 
because the very existence and operation of the PWG are highly contextualized, 
incorporating not only the fiscal but also cultural elements such as the homeland 
sentiment of the elites, rural people's tendency to appreciate rural infrastructure, rural 
politics and domains of power and the notion of the PWG as a political play put out by 
the party, etc. These less obvious attributes of the PWG are crucial to the better 
understanding of the CPP and its people. 
The case study approach also allowed the study to come up with the findings about 
'resourcefulness' (of the PWG, and by extension, of the CPP) explaining how the 
incumbent has established its fiscal advantages based on its control over the state and 
elite coalition. The finding about fiscal interlinks among the state, the patronage, and 
party, is a contribution to the study of public financial management and related 
governance issues in dominant party politics in a weak state (more on this shortly). 
My argument for a case study approach, however, does not mean that many-case and 
few-case comparative approaches are not valuable. Actually, the guiding framework 
that this study adopts is derived mainly from few-case comparative studies. However, 
given the newness of the field, in-depth case studies are still needed mainly to establish 
new hypotheses and the basis for questioning existing assumptions. As Whitehead 
(2008) and Snyder (2006) argue, the current debate still needs more knowledge about 
the so-called extra-electoral elements to better understand non-democratic regimes and 
their evolution. An in-depth case study, with proper conceptual guides, can help unearth 
those extra-electoral elements. 
A case study is most productive, this study further suggests, if the researcher has long 
experience and knowledge about the case. This is because, to capture the dynamics of 
certain causal relations, it requires more than just collecting existing quantitative data, 
which is often lacking in developing countries. New pieces of empirical evidence tend 
to come from key informant interviews and observations, the skills which require that 
the research has well connected networks of key informants. Preferably, he or should 
also has good command of the local language and culture, and more importantly, a 
certain level of informed judgment. Another important fieldwork lesson is the 
importance of being iterative and allowing sufficient flexibility for changing research 
questions from what was originally planned. To some extent, the fieldwork itself should 
be designed to not only collect empirical evidence to answer the original research 
questions, but also to allow adjustment to the questions themselves. 
9.3. Specific theoretical contributions 
9.3.1. On patronage and neo-patrimonialism 
In addition to the proposed framework and empirical findings, the study also comes up 
with specific arguments about a dominant party within a weak state. The first argument 
relates to the questions of elites and patrimonialism . This study argues that, similar to 
the cases of developed democracies such as Japan and Singapore, elite and 
patrimonialism are central to the endurance of a dominant party in the context of a 
weak state. In this context, the party usually allows elites and their patrimonial 
networks to seek rents from the state, and using the state resources in clientelistic ways 
to gain votes. The difference, however, is the extent to which such networks penetrate 
and seek rent from an already weak state. 
Where formal state institutions are weak, the party relies so heavily on informal 
institutions and rent-seeking to ensure its control over the state. The reliance is so heavy 
that the situation becomes comparable to a neo-patrimonial state. In this context, then, 
the formal state institutions become significantly substituted by patrimonial interests 
and ways of doing things. In the process, the state gets fragmented into various domains 
controlled by various factions of elites. In this sense, the neo-patrimonialism literature 
is particularly helpful in explaining dominant party politics. 
As a contribution of this study, it argues however that the neo-patrimonialism concept 
has certain shortcomings. First, the concept seems to over-emphasize the self-
enrichment function of the patrimonial practices, and loses sight of the bigger picture 
wherein patrimonialism and elite networks are not just seeking rent but also serving as 
a power base of the ruling party. In other words, the concept obscures the systemic 
dimension of the party-state-patronage linkage. Second, neo-patromialism, with its 
emphasis on the predatory nature of patronage, tends to identify all informal, 
patrimonial institutions as nothing but corrupt and thus cannot lead to any good. This 
study argues with empirical evidence that sometimes, informal institution such as the 
PWG can actually do something pro-poor as well. 
With these shortcomings, the neo-patrimonial concept is less likely to capture the 
important aspect of elite coalition and management in dominant party politics. 
Allowing elites and their patrimonial networks to seek rent from the state is one thing, 
but making sure that their conflicts do not destabilize the party itself is another and 
even more challenging task for the party. This means that it is not just rent-seeking, but 
also rent-sharing that is involved. The CPP's management of the state budget and the 
questions about centralization and fragmentation are good examples of this rent-seeking 
and rent-sharing. 
By examining the PWG, this study agrees with van de Walle (2007) who argues that 
the electoral politics might make the elites and their patronage more responsive to the 
masses. The PWG itself is a good example of how patronage-based rent has been 
mobilized to support development projects so as to win support from the masses. In 
doing that, the patronage has to find ways to raise more resources to accommodate 
mass preferences. However, arguing that patronage becomes more mass-responsive 
only to gain votes from the people (as van de Walle (2007) does) is incomplete. The 
case of the PWG strongly suggests that there are many other non-monetary and non-
electoral factors at work as well. Certain cultural inclinations of both the elites and the 
masses such as the notion of benevolence, homeland sentiment and religions, are all 
key factors shaping the dynamics of the PWG. This reinforces my earlier point about 
the importance of context when trying to understand dominant party politics. 
9.3.2. On budgetary control and legitimacy 
Another contribution of the study is on the budgetary implications of dominant party 
politics. In a weak state, especially a post-conflict one, the budgetary system is weak, 
both on the revenue and spending side. Donors have made efforts to help reform the 
budgetary system, but the progress has been limited. On this point, this study partly 
agrees with the argument that such slow progress reflects the fact there are too many 
tasks to be done and thus require more time. 
However, in the case of Cambodia, the slowness also comes directly from the nature of 
state-party-patronage relations within the system. As argued earlier, elite coalitions and 
patronage play a key role in dominant party politics, and this role is even more 
significant in a weak state. Introducing reform means that such patronage interest will 
be affected and thus is seen as potentially threatening to the very foundation of the 
party's power base. 
A dominant party not only resists budget reforms but also tries to make sure that the 
opposition does not gain access to the budget and other types of state resources. This 
fiscal disadvantage is the key explanation for why oppositions tend to be weak. They 
are weak not only because they do not have the back-up of the state, but because, 
without state resources, they are less effective in forming a solid and reliable elite 
coalition. 
A weak state, a self-enriching elite and patronage, and the need to respond to the 
preference of the voters, altogether make off-budget transactions (the PWG is a good 
example) rather tempting for the party. Such off-budget spending constitutes a kind of 
re-distribution in a patronage-based, not state-based manner. But it is not just the fiscal 
re-distribution that is altered; the overall governance of the state itself is also affected. 
The fiscal pressure entailed by the evolution to mass-patronage has been translated into 
a proliferation of patronage-based rent-seeking from the state. As it is understood that 
at least part of the rents will be used to further the interests of the party, politicians in 
that case has a real incentive to allow rent seeking to expand. The result is the further 
deterioration of the state institution itself. Rule-based bureaucracy would have to be 
compromised, and politicization becomes an undeniable fact of life. At stake is the 
capacity of the state to meet fiscal demand to provide basic services to the people. 
The existing literature on budgetary management and reform tends to focus only on the 
formal budgetary stream of the state. Their usual finding is that a country's fiscal 
capacity is weak because of the weak formal budgetary institutions, lack of political 
incentives and prevalence of patronage. These claims are not wrong, but they seem to 
miss the bigger picture because they do not well capture the existence of other 
budgetary streams that happens informally, or off budget. 
This study argues that there are at least three budgetary streams: (i) a patronage-based 
fiscal stream aiming at accommodating mass preference (such as the PWG), (ii) an 
elite-based fiscal stream benefiting only a small group of elites (as often happens in 
neo-patrimonial contexts), and (iii) a state-based fiscal stream delivered through the 
formal state-bureaucracy. 
A dominant party is strong because it is able to control these different budgetary 
streams. Such ability in turn comes from its control over both the state and the 
elite/patronage. The three fiscal streams, moreover, do not exist in complete separation. 
On the contrary, they are connected, compromised and complementary. Inherently, the 
patronage and the formal budget streams are in conflict with one another. Patronage 
rent seeking will inevitably reduce the ability of the state to mobilize resources into the 
national budget. Similarly, while a state budget is intended to re-distribute benefits to 
the people, patronage has a tendency to benefit only a small group of individuals. 
In contrast, the patronage-based resource mobilization which aims at meeting the needs 
of the masses might complement the formal state fiscal stream on the expenditure side 
of it, as both intend to provide support to the people, and both might serve the interests 
of the dominant party in gaining support and building its developmental image. The 
difference between the two lies in the ways such spending is done: the state-based 
follows the due process of budgetary management, the patronage-based stream does 
not. 
The differences between state and patronage support link this discussion to the 
legitimacy question. The literature on state building emphasizes the importance of 
building state capacity in order to establish its legitimacy through the provision of basic 
public services to the people. But as the case of Cambodia suggests, the formal 
budgetary system, despite going through years of reform, is still weak even by a low 
income country's standard. However, the CPP has opted to use the off-budget streams 
(the PWG) to build rural infrastructure for the people. By its own estimation, the PWG 
support is much smaller compared to the national budget, and donor support. However, 
this off-budget support seems to have produced a rather impressive approval rate from 
the people. On this, the study would like to make two related points. 
First, popular legitimacy is a function of two things: the people's perceptions and the 
skillfulness with which the ruling party approaches to shape such perceptions in its 
favor. On the people's perceptions, the more demanding, active and well informed a 
population is, the higher the performance expected of the state (or the party that 
controls it). In another word, even in a weak state, demand from people can also be 
strong if the state has a strong society (Migdal 1988). The question is whether off-
budget re-distribution (as the PWG) will be proved sufficient to meet such demand. But 
the party is also expected to use different strategies to shape or contain such 
expectations. Once again, the skillfulness of the party's leadership will make a 
difference here. The realty of a weak state (which also refers to the case of Cambodia) 
is that people in such a context tend to be low-demanding and poorly informed, which 
means less pressure on the ruling party to deliver. 
Second, the literature often talks about state legitimacy. But, given (i) strong 
personalization of (public) power among the elite in developing countries, (ii) the 
common tendency among people to not distinguish between the state positions and the 
people holding it, and (iii) the close connection among state, elite, and the party in 
dominant party politics (all of these are evident in the case of Cambodia), this study 
argues that in such a context, it is hard to distinguish between state legitimacy, party 
legitimacy and elite legitimacy. Going back to the question of budgets, does it make a 
difference then whether infrastructure projects are built through on-budget or off-
budget sources? This study argues that it does not, at least as far as the legitimacy of the 
ruling party is concerned. The question is more about who will get the credit from the 
people when something get done. 
9.3.3. On politics of decentralization 
The literature on decentralization so far has focused on the technical, and not so much 
on political aspects of the reforms. Whenever politics is mentioned, it is often examined 
from the donors' perspective, i.e. decentralization as a reform with democratic motives. 
This study provides empirical evidence to caution such idealist expectations. It argues 
that, actually, decentralization, when well applied, can be well in line with the political 
interests of the dominant party. A skillful politician who can see the big picture and is 
familiar with sub-national and rural politics can devise decentralization (its design and 
sequencing) also to further legitimize its local ruling, while still ensuring its strict 
central control. The case of the CPP demonstrates this well. 
However, this finding does not rule out the positive impacts of the reform either. While 
benefiting the ruling party, decentralization has brought more stability to the local level, 
and in the process, built legitimacy for the state in the face of the people. Such 
legitimacy has been established on the ground that a new locally elected government is 
established, thus bringing the government closer to the people, and with that, some 
forms of participatory development have been initiated. Decentralization also opens a 
new space for donor and NGO funded projects to be implemented right at the 
grassroots level, and thus, giving a positive impression to the local people about the 
state of their local development. Even opposition parties see their own opportunities in 
decentralization. 
The existing literature on the politics of decentralization tends to overlook another 
important point about decentralization: its potential impact on intra-party politics of the 
ruling party. This study finds that decentralization can provide incentives for the party 
to introduce democratic procedures into its own internal decision-making process, 
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allowing more discretion to its own sub-national party officials. The ruling party is 
keen to learn and introduce such intra-party changes so long as it does not threaten but 
helps strengthen its own legitimacy and administrative control. Given its dominance, 
such intra-party democratic promises can also be interpreted as encouraging signs for 
the wider local democracy initiatives. 
9.4. Suggested topics for further research 
If a dominant party in a weak state is an elephant and this research is a blind man 
touching it, the finding (or the drawing) as presented so far is the result of his touching 
on four different parts of the 'animal,' namely: (i) how it manages the state budget and 
maintains elite coalition, (ii) how it builds up and strengthens its rural administration, 
(iii) how it initiates and funds off-budget spending, and (iv) how it manages 
decentralization. By touching on these four areas, this thesis has provided a systematic 
explanation about dominant party politics in a weak state. However, such a political 
system is complicated in nature and broad in scope, which means the more areas one 
can touch, the more accurate a picture of it one can draw. This means new areas should 
be further researched. There are a number of such areas which this study would 
propose. 
The first topic is how a ruling party has managed and adapted to economic 
development and transformation to ensure its dominance. Experiences from other 
countries such as Indonesia (especially during the Suharto's period) show that the 
ability of the incumbent to manage and stabilize the economy by ensuring its steady 
growth and controlling inequality is one of the key factors in staying in power (Case 
2002). This study has only briefly mentioned (in chapters 4 and 5) the economic 
performance under the CPP's rule. It has shown that under the CPP, economy has 
grown at an impressive rate, but it has not sufficiently looked into how the CPP and its 
elites manage to drive, participate in and exploit the growth. This limitation should be 
addressed in future research. 
For the case of Cambodia, recently, it has been noted that research on development and 
political changes has shifted its focus from the post-conflict re-construction, good 
governance and corruption, and international intervention to include more about the 
economic transformation and the roles of the state within the process. For instance, a 
recent edited volume on Cambodia's economic transformation (Hughes and Un 2011) 
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and the research agenda of a leading Cambodian research institute, Cambodia 
Development Resource Institute (CDRI), has started to use the concept of a 
developmental state to better understand the dynamics underlying Cambodia's 
governance and institutional reforms. So by looking at these economic transformation 
phenomena from a dominant party perspective, a research can provide a new and 
complementary perspective on the ongoing debate140. 
Another topic deals with the relationship between a dominant party and policy reforms. 
This study has looked at how the CPP has dealt with budgetary and decentralization 
reforms. While insightful, more knowledge is still needed in this area. For instance, 
research can look at how other reforms such as civil service reform, pay reform, aid 
coordination, and those aiming at promoting civic engagement and see how differently 
a dominant party perceives and approaches these different reforms and why. From such 
research, one can learn a lot about the politics of policy reforms and move beyond the 
common perception that an authoritarian regime in a developing country is nothing but 
anti pro-poor reforms. 
There is strong research interest and active debates on this particular issue. For 
instance, donor agencies such as the World Bank (2008) and academic institutions such 
as the Asian Research Centre of Murdoch University (Asia Research Centre 2010) have 
started to give more thought to the politics of policy reforms. From personal 
observations, similar concerns have also received more attention in the context of 
Cambodia where various reforms are going on and yet a lot still needs to be understood 
about why some reforms have been moving forward and others have not. 
Another related topic is the role of individual elites or groups of elites in pushing for 
change - whether it is a change which brings stronger party dominance or a change that 
brings more pro-poor outcomes to development. This study has shown that elites and 
their coalitions have been key actors for the CPP. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that 
these elites are also the ones that drive policy reforms (e.g. decentralization). The study 
however has not collected sufficient data to really capture the bigger story about the 
links between elites as agents of change and the broader political context within which 
they operate. One way to look at this issue is to see these elites as leaders whose 
influence, either formal or informal, can shape the broader political dynamics. 
iio p e r s o n a i discussion with the research team of the Governance Unit, CDRI, October 22,2009 
In Cambodia, the early seeds of research interest on this particular issue are being 
planted. For instance, one study was looking at local leadership and decentralization 
reforms (Thon et al. 2009). At the international level, donor organizations such as the 
World Bank and Australia's Oversea Aid Program (AusAid) have also paid more 
attention to the role of leadership in development. Conceptually, this means the need to 
'bring agencies' back in (Lefitwich 2009). 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Questions for semi-structured interview 
Annex 1.1. For commune councilors (who are CPP officials) 
1. Background information 
1.1. Name of the commune, district and provinces 
1.2. Date of the interview 
1.3. Age, occupation (beside being councilors), and education of the respondents 
2. External and PWG support for development projects in the commune 
2.1. When you were looking for external support, who do you seek support from 
(i.e. government, party, NGOs, etc)? 
2.2. How do you contact them? 
2.3. Has the district level been helpful in such effort to mobilize resource from 
outside? 
2.4. How many of the projects are from the CPP's PWG? 
2.5. Were those projects promised before election time? 
2.6. How were those projects given and implemented? Please describe. 
2.7. What is your estimation of the PWG's support as compared to the commune 
development funds and NGOs support? 
2.8. Have there been supports to ensure the projects' regular maintenance and 
repair? 
2.9. How do you think those projects have helped the people in your commune? 
2.10. Do you think that the PWG should have supported other projects instead? If 
so, what are those alternative projects? 
2.11. Have the PWG support been given equally to all the villages in your 
commune? 
3. Perception about PWG heads and members coming to help the commune 
3.1. Who are the key PWG members assigned to help your commune? 
3.2. Where are those people from? What are their formal positions or business 
activities? 
3.3. Do you know why they were assigned to your commune? 
3.4. What have those PWG been helping besides funding infrastructure projects? 
3.5. How do you think the PWG supports have helped your re-election at the 
commune elections? 
3.6. What do you think you should do in return? 
3.7. If the CPP loses the election, do you think that the PWG will continue to 
support your commune? Why and why not? 
3.8. Compared to nearby communes (or any other communes that you are 
aware), do you think the PWG support to your commune is more or less? 
Why? 
3.9. Do you think it is a recommended idea to have the PWG support channeled 
through the commune fund? 
3.10. Does PWG money arrive faster than the commune fund? 
3 11. To you, are PWG projects easier to implement than the commune-funded 
projects? 
3.12. How do you think distinguish between your roles as a party official and state 
officials in your daily activities? 
4. PWG support to pagoda? 
4.1. How many pagodas are there in your commune? 
4.2. Who have been the key patrons/financiers of each of those pagodas? 
4.3. Do you know why the PWG members give support to pagodas? 
4.4. Have those PWG members ever held public meeting in pagodas 
compounds? 
4.5. What do you think of the relationship between the PWG heads or key 
members from the central with the head monk and pagoda committees of 
each pagodas? 
4.6. How have supports to pagodas been helping you and other people in your 
commune? 
4.7. Do you think the supports to the pagoda projects should have been spent on 
other projects instead? If so, what are those alternative projects? 
5. Additional points to be observed (and asked when situations allow): 
5.1. What are the key incentives for these commune councilors to serve the 
party? 
5.2. What are the relationship between the councilors and PWG people? And 
district? And village authorities? 
5.3. What are the key factors that make a commune chief influential? 
5.4. What are the key actors that help prevent internal factors of the party? 
5.5. How strong is the sense of ownership and of being elected representatives 
among the councilors? 
5.6. Others? 
Annex 1.2. With district party officials 
1. Background information 
1.1. Name of the district and provinces 
1.2. Date of interview 
1.3. Age, occupation (beside being councilors), and education of the respondents 
2. External and PWG support for development projects in the commune 
2.1. What is your role in relations to the commune? 
2.2. What is your role in the PWG of the party? 
2.3. Do you think keep a record of PWG support? If so, can you share a copy of 
it? 
2.4. Can you describe the process by which such support has been given and 
implemented? 
2.5. What is your estimation of the PWG's support as compared to the commune 
development funds (throughout the district) and NGOs support? 
2.6. Have there been supports to ensure the projects' regular maintenance and 
repair? 
2.7. How do you think those projects have helped the people in your district? 
2.8. Do you think that the PWG should have supported other projects instead? If 
so, what are those alternative projects? 
2.9. Have the PWG supports been given equally among the communes in your 
district? 
3. Perception about PWG heads and members coming to help the commune 
3.1. Who are the key PWG members assigned to help your districts? 
3.2. Where are those people from? What are their formal positions or business 
activities? 
3.3. Do you know why they were assigned to your districts? 
3.4. What have those PWG been helping besides funding infrastructure projects? 
3.5. How do you think the PWG supports have helped the party win at the 
commune elections in your district? 
3.6. What do you think you should do in return? 
3.7. If the CPP loses the election, do you think that the PWG will continue to 
support your district? Why and why not? 
3.8. Compared to nearby districts (or any other districts that you are aware), do 
you think the PWG support to your district is more or less? Why? 
3.9. Do you think it is a recommended idea to have the PWG support channeled 
through the commune fund? 
3.10. Does PWG money arrive faster than the commune fund? 
3.11. To you, are PWG projects easier to implement than the commune-funded 
projects? 
3.12. How do you think distinguish between your roles as a party official and state 
officials in your daily activities? 
4. PWG support to pagoda? 
4.1. How many pagodas are there in your district? 
4.2. Who have been the key patrons/financiers of at least five of those pagodas? 
4.3. Do you know why the PWG members give support to pagodas? 
4.4. Have those PWG members ever held public meeting in pagodas 
compounds? 
4.5. What do you think of the relationship between the PWG heads or key 
members from the central with the head monk and pagoda committees of 
each pagoda? 
4.6. How have supports to pagodas been helping you and other people in your 
district? 
4.7. Do you think the supports to the pagoda projects should have been spent on 
other projects instead? If so, what are those alternative projects? 
5. Additional points to be observed (and asked when situations allow): 
• What are the key incentives for these district party officials to serve the party? 
• What are the relationship between the districts and PWG people? And 
provinces? And communes? 
• What are the key factors that make a district governor influential? 
• What are the key actors that help prevent internal factors of the party? 
• Others? 
Annex 2. Questions for the survey with local people 
Annex 2.1. With 'Better informed local people' 
1. Background information 
1.1. Name of the district and provinces 
1.2. Date of interview 
1.3. Age, occupation (beside being councilors), and education of the respondents 
2. More background information of the respondents (Can choose more than, if 
needed) 
2.1. S/he identified as 'Better Informed Local People' because s/he is: 
• Close to the local authority 
• Wealthy 
• Educated 
• Close to the pagodas 
• Long time resident of the commune 
• Others. Please specify 
2.2. The kinds of works they have do in/for the community: 
• Official works (such as those carried out by village chiefs, etc) 
• Facilitation works (Please specify ) 
• Local resource mobilization 
• Gift distribution 
• Money lending 
• Teaching 
• Religious activities 
• Others. Please specify 
2.3. Reasons why s/he has kept doing those community works: 
• Merit-making 
• Financial benefits 
• Image building among their peers 
• Expected to be helped in return 
• Others. Please specify 
2.4. Reasons that make him or her influential among his/her peers: 
• Personal characters and outspokenness 
• Skillful at mobilizing resources from outside the commune 
• Close relations with powerful people at the higher level 
• Understanding of other people needs 
• Good past personal achievements and contribution to the community 
2.5. His or her relationship with the commune authority: Close/ Not close (why?) 
2.6. His or her relationship with the pagoda: Close/ not close (why?) 
3. Knowledge about PWG its development supports 
3.1. How many projects do you know that have been implemented in your 
commune? 
a. Please list them 
3.2. Who are the key PWG people do you know that help fund those projects? 
a. Yes/No 
b. Please list them 
3.3. How do you know of such information? 
a. Please describe 
3.4. Are you aware of the process of by which such support is given? 
a. Yes/No 
b. (If Yes) Please describe 
3.5. Have there been projects that were promised, but not delivered? 
a. Yes/No/don't know 
3.6. In your perception, can you say how big is the PWG support compare to the 
commune fund? 
a. Smaller/similar/bigger/don't know 
b. More specific (if possible) 
3.7. How do you think the projects help the people in the commune? 
a. Please describe 
3.8. Do you those supports should be given to other projects instead? 
a. Yes/No 
b. (If yes) Please indicate alternative projects 
4. Perception about commune and other local authorities 
4.1. Among all the members of the councils, who do you know as the most 
active in mobilizing resource from outside? 
a. Names 
b. How do you know? 
4.2. Do you know how s/he (they) do it? 
4.3. How is her/his relationship with the PWG and higher CPP people? 
4.4. Do you think it is a good idea that he asks for support from PWG? 
4.5. Are you aware of the process by which the PWG support is managed? And 
how do you know? 
5. Perception about the PWG people 
5.1. Who are the key PWG members assigned to help your districts? 
5.2. Where are those people from? What are their formal positions or business 
activities? 
5.3. Do you know why they were assigned to your districts? 
5.4. What have those PWG been helping besides funding infrastructure projects? 
5.5. If the CPP loses the election, do you think that the PWG will continue to 
support your commune? Why and why not? 
6. PWG support to pagoda? 
6.1. How many pagodas are there in your district? 
6.2. Who have been the key patrons/financiers of those pagodas? 
6.3. Do you know why the PWG members give support to pagodas? 
6.4. Have those PWG members ever held public meeting in pagodas 
compounds? 
6.5. What do you think of the relationship between the PWG heads or key 
members from the central with the head monk and pagoda committees of 
each pagoda? 
6.6. How have supports to pagodas been helping you and other people in your 
commune? 
6.7. Do you think the supports to the pagoda projects should have been spent on 
other projects instead? If so, what are those alternative projects? 
Annex 2.3. With 'Ordinary local people' 
1. Background information 
1.1. Name of the district and provinces 
1.2. Date of interview 
1.3. Age, occupation (beside being councilors), and education of the respondents 
2. Knowledge about the PWG support 
2.1. What are the projects do you know that have been implemented in your 
commune and the sources of such supports? 
a. Project 1: 
b. Project 2: 
c. Project 3: 
d. Project 4: 
2.2. How do you know of such information? 
a. How 1: 
b. How 2: 
c. How 3: 
3. What benefits do you think you will get the projects? 
a. Benefit 1 
b. Benefit 2 
c. Benefit 3 
know who are in the commune councils? 
a. Name 1 
b. Name 2 
c. Name 3 
d. Name 4 
know what the councils have been doing? 
a. Activities 1 
b. Activities 2 
c. Activities 3 
d. Activities 4 
know of the budget of the communes? 
a. Yes/No 
b. What do you know 
7. What do you remember about the party's (or PWG's) support/projects? 
a. Project 1 
b. Project 2 
c. Project 3 
d. Project 4 
8. Who are in the PWG that you remember? 
a. Name 1 
b. Name 2 
c. Name 3 
4. Do you 
5. Do you 
6. Do you 
d. Name 4 
9. Do you know why they help your commune? 
a. Reason 1 
b. Reason 2 
c. Reason 3 
10. Do you know why they have pagoda? 
a. Reason 1 
b. Reason 2 
c. Reason 3 
11. Do you know if the PWG support to your commune is more or less compared 
to the commune nearby? 
a. Yes/No 
b. How different 
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